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Abstract	  
 
The real-world sensorimotor paradigm is based on the premise that sufficient ecological complexity 
is a prerequisite for inducing naturally relevant sensorimotor relations in the experimental context. The aim 
of this thesis is to embed visual attention research within the real-world sensorimotor paradigm using an 
innovative mobile gaze-tracking system (EyeSeeCam, Schneider et al., 2009).  
Common laboratory set-ups in the field of attention research fail to create natural two-way 
interaction between observer and situation because they deliver pre-selected stimuli and human observer is 
essentially neutral or passive. EyeSeeCam, by contrast, permits an experimental design whereby the 
observer freely and spontaneously engages in real-world situations. By aligning a video camera in real time 
to the movements of the eyes, the system directly measures the observer’s perspective in a video recording 
and thus allows us to study vision in the context of authentic human behaviour, namely as resulting from 
past actions and as originating future actions.  
 
The results of this thesis demonstrate that 
(1) humans, when freely exploring natural environments, prefer directing their attention to local 
structural features of the world,  
(2) eyes, head and body perform distinct functions throughout this process, and  
(3) coordinated eye and head movements do not fully stabilize but rather continuously adjust the 
retinal image also during periods of quasi-stable “fixation”.  
These findings validate and extend the common laboratory concept of feature salience within 
whole-body sensorimotor actions outside the laboratory. Head and body movements roughly orient gaze, 
potentially driven by early stages of processing. The eyes then fine-tune the direction of gaze, potentially 
during higher-level stages of visual-spatial behaviour (Studies 1 and 2).  
Additional head-centred recordings reveal distinctive spatial biases both in the visual stimulation 
and the spatial allocation of gaze generated in a particular real-world situation. These spatial structures may 
result both from the environment and form the idiosyncrasies of the natural behaviour afforded by the 
situation. By contrast, when the head-centred videos are re-played as stimuli in the laboratory, gaze 
directions reveal a bias towards the centre of the screen. This “central bias” is likely a consequence of the 
laboratory set-up with its limitation to eye-in-head movements and its restricted screen (Study 3).  
Temporal analysis of natural visual behaviour reveals frequent synergistic interactions of eye and 
head that direct rather than stabilize gaze in the quasi-stable eye movement periods following saccades, 
leading to rich temporal dynamics of real-world retinal input (Study 4) typically not addressed in laboratory 
studies. Direct comparison to earlier data with respect to the visual system of cats (CatCam), frequently 
taken as proxy for human vision, shows that stabilizing eye movements play an even less dominant role in 
the natural behaviour of cats. This highlights the importance of realistic temporal dynamics of vision for 
models and experiments (Study 5). 
 
The approach and findings presented in this thesis demonstrate the need for and feasibility of real-
world research on visual attention. Real-world paradigms permit the identification of relevant features 
triggered in the natural interplay between internal-physiological and external-situational sensorimotor 
factors. Realistic spatial and temporal characteristics of eye, head and body interactions are essential 
qualitative properties of reliable sensorimotor models of attention but difficult to obtain under laboratory 
conditions. Taken together, the data and theory presented in this thesis suggest that visual attention does not 
represent a pre-processing stage of object recognition but rather is an integral component of embodied action 
in the real world. 
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Figure 1-1: Contribution to the feelSpace project.
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2 Introduction 
 
“To make discoveries, researchers need to look beyond the facts.” 
(Shermer, 2012) 
  
2.1 Motivation 
Six decades ago, the computational approach of cognitive science instigated a revolution 
in the studies of the mind. The prolific formative idea had been derived from logic and artificial 
intelligence and describes cognition in a computational way that can be implemented on 
computational machines. The so-called computational mind derives and manipulates symbolic 
representations of the environment, making inferences that aim to preserve logical truth statements 
about such representations to compute the best response of the organism to the current state of the 
world. As a major supposition, the mental realizes intelligent and meaningful behaviour through 
its independence from sensory and motor phenomena. The key to the mind is a universal 
computational machine that sits in between and gives meaning to sensation and action (Hurley, 
1998). However, naturalizing the mind is a “hard problem” (e.g. Chalmers, 1995, 1996; Metzinger, 
2000; Shear, 1999). It poses explanatory gaps between the mental and the physical that for 
conceptual reasons may resist explanation either in physical or in computational terms (Levine, 
1983). For instance, the symbol-grounding problem, how abstract symbols can acquire their 
meaning, has been a major source of critique to the cognitivist program. Cognitive science has 
taken a positive attitude towards such foundational problems, and in response largely been driven 
by conceptual analysis and theory which then instigated novel empirical findings.  
A prominent current theme is the theoretical re-evaluation of the role of sensorimotor 
processes for cognition, and the development of novel experimental paradigms for their 
investigation. Sensorimotor theories take inspiration from pragmatic philosophy, signal processing 
principles and neuronal plasticity to address problematic conceptual issues in logic and artificial 
intelligence. The pragmatic supposition is that cognition is not independent from but rather 
constituted in sensorimotor phenomena. Direct manipulation of sensorimotor processes situates the 
mental naturally in the world. Couplings between motor output and sensor input provide concrete, 
manifold and distinctively domain dependent relations of the organism to its environment. 
Sensorimotor contingencies are not defined in relation to logical truths about abstract symbols but 
in relation to the effects the organism’s actions have on its own perceptions while a situation 
unfolds. Physiological signal processing analysis highlights that the architecture of the brain 
adapts to such contingencies with remarkable plasticity at different time scales. Hence a 
sensorimotor view suggests that computations in the brain organize rather than interpret the 
couplings between system and world in an attempt to establish, maintain and enact couplings that 
are useful and adaptive in generating, preserving and achieving the goals of the organism within its 
world. 
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2.2 Overview of The Present Thesis 
A promising phenomenon to study a sensorimotor nature of cognition is the way in which 
we couple our attention to the world through movements of our eyes and gaze. For a long time, 
eye-movements have been seen as an experimental link from behaviour to cognition and a 
“window to the mind”. Eye-movements relate cognition to behaviour by directing perception to 
selected aspect of a situation both in space and time. Yet surprisingly, despite the 20th anniversary 
of the “embodied turn”, sensorimotor approaches to visual attention are only in their beginnings. 
This thesis present a sensorimotor account of visual attention and eye movement control that 
conceptualizes visual attention not as a pre-selective low-level processing stage of object 
recognition, but as a global systems-level component within whole-body orientation that directs 
sensory and motor processes in the service of sensory and behavioural goals.  
Pragmatic approaches highlight a need for novel experimental strategies that can 
investigate natural behaviour directly. When it occurs in the real world, natural behaviour 
instantiates interactions between physiological, embodied, situative and goal-directed aspects of 
sensorimotor processes. If a process such as attention is central to the organisation of these multi-
layered interactions, then an exhaustive investigation requires sufficient ecological complexity in 
order to trigger naturally relevant interactions at the systems level in the experimental context. The 
main part of this thesis presents a novel pragmatic eye-tracking paradigm to study gaze and visual 
attention within the complexities of spontaneous natural behaviour. This novel paradigm yields 
video recordings of the visual perspective of human observers taken in real-world scenarios 
outside the laboratory. They closely approximate the retinal visual input of humans when eyes, 
head and body can freely interact in their natural ways with how a situation unfolds. Recordings 
thus capture the realistic human visual stimulation in its double role as a consequence of past and 
as an origin of future behaviour. These unique recordings of gaze allow to analyse spatial and 
temporal sensorimotor aspects of visual attention and gaze control under natural conditions.  
 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 4 summarizes the empirical research that forms 
the main part of this thesis. Chapter 5 presents the respective studies in detail. Prior to that, chapter 
3 sketches a selective history of perception and cognition in cognitive science and 
neurophysiology that motivates the shift towards sensorimotor accounts of perception and 
attention. Chapter 3 is written to situate the empirical work of chapter 4 and 5 in a larger cognitive 
science context in accordance with the requirements of the PhD study regulations in Cognitive 
Science at the University of Osnabrück10.  
Section 3.1 sets the general theoretical background. It starts with an introduction to the 
early cognitivist insight of internalist computational and representational mental processing. It then 
lays out the path of two general strands of pragmatic/embodied theoretical responses: (1) 
embodied cognitive science and computational neuroscience, both preserving the cognitivist core 
of computational analysis; and (2) enactivism, refuting the representational/computational analysis 
in favour of constructivist principles.  
                                                      
10 Promotionsordnung des Fachbereichs Humanwissenschaften für die Verleihung des Grade „Ph.D. 
in Cognitive Science“ vom 29.9.2011. 
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Section 3.2 outlines the cognitivist eventually lead to models of perception that focus on 
constraints in computer vision at a cost of constraints from natural behaviour. This section argues 
that the seminal work of Hubel & Wiesel may be seen as a foundational bridge between 
physiological and computational aspects of vision. It started a transgression of visual physiology 
from early roots in signal processing and holistic constructivism to the immensely influential 
representational cognitivist scheme. In particular, the dominant salience model of visual attention 
has been inspired by computer vision approaches as a lower level pre-stage for object recognition.  
Section 3.3 explicates how pragmatic philosophy and models of neuronal plasticity based 
in signal processing theory form an alternative computational neuroscience of perception and 
action. Contingencies provided by the statistical structure in the world and in the organism’s 
behaviour shape physiological signals. Processes of activity-dependent plasticity in turn form 
neuronal representations contingent upon the particular sensorimotor behaviour. Experiments on 
the role of top-down processing in perception, on sensory adaptation, on sensory substitution and 
sensory enhancement illustrate the role of behaviour at the perceptual level. While sensorimotor 
signal processing does adhere to the computational core of cognitive science, it understands 
representations as sensorimotor representations that discriminate aspects of the world subjectively 
in relation to behaviour rather than in relation to objective truth. This section argues that as a 
profound implication, visual attention and salient processes should be modelled as whole-body 
sensorimotor rather than purely sensory phenomena. Experimental implications that accompany 
this theory form the main motivation for the real-world approach to visual attention presented in 
the experimental part of the thesis (chapters 4 and 5).  
Section 3.4 briefly explicates why the enactive approach to perception and cognition aims 
to pose a second strand of embodied and pragmatic theories that radically opposes computational 
analysis. Enactivism in part may be seen as a continuation of a second set of roots of sensory 
physiology in holistic-constructivism. The theoretical arguments of enactivism challenge the 
conceptual core of cognitivism that links neuronal activity to representations and to the processing 
of information. As an alternative, enactivism introduces novel non-representational constructivist 
principles such as autopoiesis, autonomy and sense-making that are taken to “co-construct” rather 
than to “re-present” an organisms world. Current work in enactivism is beginning to expand these 
concepts for empirical research, and the end of this section briefly sketches a novel enactive 
conceptualization of attention and salience as aspects of sensorimotor sense-making rather than 
sensorimotor computation. 
Section 4 summarizes and discusses the empirical publications. The reader only interested 
in the empirical work may directly begin with this summary on its own. Chapter 5 represents the 
publications in their original text.  
Chapter 6 describes preliminary results of further projects, in particular of my work as 
project leader of feelSpace. Sensorimotor accounts of perception imply that perceptual modalities 
may not result from modality-specific cortical processing modules, but from plastic, modality-
specific modes of sensorimotor organization using the discriminations provided by a sense organ. 
Sensory enhancement, as straightforward generalization, yields a stringent examination of this 
thesis. If true, introducing novel sensorimotor relations via an artificial sense organ should 
establish a novel perceptual modality. feelSpace supplies long-term directional information as 
vibro-tactile stimulation around the waist and investigates the resulting physiological and 
qualitative changes in perception in a set of behavioural, psychophysical, physiological as well as 
subjective measures. Since the main experiments are on going, they are presented as an appendix. 
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3 Background 
 This chapter situates the real-world eye-tracking experiment presented in chapter 4 and 5 
in a larger cognitive science context to fulfil the PhD study regulations in Cognitive Science11. 
Accordingly, it does not intend an in-depth historical review of cognitive science, which has been 
delivered elsewhere many times (e.g. Bechtel, 1988; Dupuy, 2009; Gardner, 1985; Stillings et al., 
1995). Rather, this chapter provides a selective review, introducing cognitivism based on its 
analytical philosophical foundation and highlighting its historic empowerment by the 
mechanization of logic in the computational revolution and the failure of first-order cybernetics. It 
then motivates the more recent shift towards sensorimotor accounts via aspects of the mental that 
are emphasized in pragmatic philosophical approaches. It concludes with an argument for 
computational sensorimotor approaches that are accompanied by experimental strategies for real-
world settings and an outlook to enactive approaches to cognition.  
 
3.1 Cognitivism and Artificial Intelligence12 
The cognitivist approach to the mind is founded in a long history of what philosophers of 
science call the analytical tradition of scientific inquiry (Hunt, 1999). The following aims to select 
a few relevant aspects of the analytic tradition that shaped the cognitivist understanding of 
cognition and perception which are in part both followed and questioned in recent theories of 
embodiment. 
3.1.1 The Core of the Cognitivist Research Program  
Analytic analysis is the epistemological attempt to understand a given domain of inquiry 
in atomic and context-free scientific theories. Analytic inquiry is a foundational explanatory 
program and seeks to describe a set of identifiable, well-defined basic properties and a set of 
general rules for their combination, such that a situation can be explained by the application of the 
rules on their constitutive parts. Part of the essence is that to fully explain a given domain, the 
explanation should not depend, neither as background nor constitutively, on any context outside of 
what is formulated in the theory (Morley & Hunt, 2000; Winograd & Flores, 1986). The analytic 
program had an upshot with the so-called computational revolution that also gave birth to the 
cognitive revolution in the study of the mind. With the Church-Turing thesis about a universal 
computational machine that can solve all computable problems13 (Turing, 1938) and von 
Neumann’s implementation thereof, any computable function could in principle be mechanized14, 
                                                      
11 Promotionsordnung des Fachbereichs Humanwissenschaften für die Verleihung des Grade „Ph.D. 
in Cognitive Science“ vom 29.9.2011. 
 
12 In this section I extend arguments presented in earlier work (Schumann, 2004).  
13 While a precise treatment of computable problems is beyond this thesis, in a nutshell, the 
expression refers to all functions that are lambda-definable or Turing-equivalent. 
14 However, this does not imply, that there may not be mechanical processes that are not Turing 
equivalent and thus necessitate a different approach to cognition. A contemporary debate for instance 
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giving causal power to logical form (Morley & Hunt, 2000). After a number of previous attempts 
in the philosophical history, when combining logic with computational machines, a genuine 
mechanization of mind for the first time seemed a real practical possibility and promising 
naturalistic contrast to Cartesian Dualism (Boden, 2006).  
Perhaps the hardest challenge for an analytic naturalization of the mental is an account of 
intentionality (Brentano, 1874). Following philosophy of mind, what is distinctive of the mental 
over the physical is that mental states are inherently intentional. Mental states, unlike physical 
states, are about something and have genuinely meaningful content. Philosophers argue that seeing 
a car or feeling a pain is about the car or the pain in a way in which the involved physical 
processes are not, and this intentional aspect is an essential property of the mental that has proved 
difficult to naturalize. The cognitivist attempt walked down a particular route that can historically 
be seen as a response to the crisis of its predecessor, the program of first-order cybernetics (Boden, 
2006; Froese, 2010, 2011). Ashby had shown that when the Wiener’s cybernetic setting of 
mechanization via feedback loops and nonlinear dynamical systems is taken to its extreme, 
seemingly intelligent behaviour can be observed on the basis of random processes in the absence 
of the applicability of any reasonable agency concept or representation of meaningful internal 
states at all. Ashby’s homeostat lead the field into a crisis, the response to which co-founded 
cognitivism as a computational variant of the philosophical program of representationalism that 
equates meaningful mental processes with internal states, described in formal logic (Froese, 2010). 
That is to ay, cognitivist research program subscribe to the general representational argument that 
agents do not perceive the world directly but experience an inner representation thereof. The 
explanatory power of the cognitivist representationalist strategy as well as a main source of 
critique (section 3.1.5 and 3.4) is in the entailed abstraction from meaning via representations. The 
crucial representational step is that mental states are intentional, about things in the world, by 
virtue of representing objectively meaningful events in the world. The crucial computational step 
is that representations in turn can be described and mechanized by logical-symbolic description 
that operate on a set of “context-free elements and some abstract relations among them” (Dreyfus 
& Dreyfus, 1988; cited in Hunt, 1999, p. 4). By combining representationalism and context-free 
analytic descriptions, taking care of syntax, which could now be done on machines, would also 
take care of semantics and intentionality (Morley & Hunt, 2000, Chapter 15, p.12). It lead to the 
early conviction know as ‘strong artificial intelligence’ that “[within] a generation the problem of 
creating ‘artificial intelligence’ will be substantially solved” (Minsky, 1967).  
3.1.2 Guiding Metaphors of Cognitivist Research 
As Morley & Hunt (2000) argue, based on Imre Lakatos’ work (Lakatos, 1976), core ideas 
of a research program, such as representationalism and computationalism above, are of 
metaphysical nature and not open for direct empirical testing, and hence the way in which they are 
further specified is a large part of what constitutes the nature and progress of a research program. 
From descriptive analysis, program typically follow a set of further metaphors that guide they the 
program progresses in response to experimental failure or theoretical developments.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
suggests that Liquid State Machines (Maass, Natschläger, & Markram, 2002) may transcend Turing 
computation.  
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The metaphor most prominent in practical cognitivist research is that of the mind as a 
representational information processing system that “receives, stores, retrieves, transforms and 
transmits information” (Stillings et al., 1995, p. 1). A core debate that instigated enormous 
progress in cognitive science has been what counts as information and what a processing thereof. 
What is meant by information processing has been spelled out in a variety of ways, of which a few 
seem most influential.  
The most disputable part common to these approaches is that they are variants of 
representationalism through the way they spell out intentionality by abstraction of meaning, to 
the extent that internal representational analysis has been considered the only game in town at the 
cost of neuronal and situational forces (Gardner, 1985). A less disputable part common to 
information processing systems is the use of internal structure, in some form or another, as 
“stands-in” for properties of the outside world (Bechtel, 1988), allowing the system a choice 
among a variety of alternatives by not cognizing and acting in the world directly (Winograd & 
Flores, 1986, p.97) as well as the use of environmental features when they are “not reliably present 
to the system” (Clark, 1997; Haugeland, 1991). 
Newell and Simon’s physical symbol hypothesis emphasizes the computational value of 
a symbolic format of in the “specific architectural assertion” that “[syntactic] symbols lie at the 
root of intelligent action”. And that as a result, symbolic representational analysis is both 
necessary and sufficient for human-like intelligence as seen in problem solving (Newell & Simon, 
1976, p.114). As a corollary, the concrete properties of the body are primarily a constraining factor 
on a system’s general symbolic computational abilities, and not an empowering source. The basis 
of the intuition is that processes within the concrete physical body are only an implementation of 
the causality-bearing level of computational processing that is required for action to be intelligent 
at the human level. In consequence, Newell and Simon also see neuroscientific research on the 
brain informative only in so far as it seeks to investigate the implementation of general symbolic 
computation in the brain, but explicitly not on its own rights, suggesting a high-level and top-down 
research strategy.  
The division between the physiological and the computational has been directly explicated 
in neuroscience in Marr’s tri-level hypothesis, which takes up the point that the concrete 
functioning of the physical sensory hardware is relevant to a science of cognition in how it realises 
the algorithmic principles that implement the computations that the nervous system is envisioned 
to perform (Marr, 1976). A specific variant of this general computational approach to neuroscience 
had been proposed much earlier in McCulloch and Pitts’ seminal work in theoretical neuroscience 
described the function of neurons as logical calculators and the function of neuronal activity in a 
form of propositional logic calculations (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943). Already McCulloch and Pitts 
attempted to add a computational level to their physiological roots in signal processing (section 
also 3.2.1). Today, computational analysis is a target of much critique from embodied approaches 
to cognitive science, however, as the remainder will show, the contrast between physiological and 
computational analysis, however, is not as substantial as it is often described in the embodiment 
literature. What is problematic is not computational analysis per se, but its explicit linkage to 
general symbolic computational architectures. Computational analysis of embodied physiological 
processes, for instance in information theory, neuronal networks or probabilistic and Bayesian 
approaches (Knill & Pouget, 2004) shares the information processing core of the cognitivist 
program but provide alternatives to the symbolic-syntactic implementations. In fact, computational 
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neuroscience may be able to deliver contextual notions of symbols emerging from physiological 
signal processing signals, connecting both levels of analysis just as McCulloch & Pitts envisioned 
(König & Krüger, 2006). 
Nevertheless, on the psychological side, symbolic analysis has been a major focus of 
cognitivism. Fodor’s computational theory of mind assumes that thought must have a syntactic 
grammar to allow systematicity and productivity. Both properties, taken from formal language 
systems, were at the time considered fundamental to intelligent thinking in general (Fodor, 1975, 
2000; Putnam, 1961). This goes well with Chomsky’s universal grammar, a set of innate 
syntactic rules that the brain provides and which all languages share (Chomsky, 1965). In the 
notion of general problem solving, Newell and Simon further specify cognition as a type of 
rational thinking achieved by a set of general, domain-independent strategies that can be applied to 
any kind of domain. The main tools of cognitivist research hence are those of artificial intelligence 
and computational linguistics; algorithms for search, inference, problem solving or constraint 
satisfaction with accompanying logical formalisms for knowledge representation (Newell & 
Simon, 1961, 1972; S. Russel & Norvig, 2002). In particular problem-solving for a long time, was 
“generally taken for granted in artificial intelligence research” (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p.20ff).  
3.1.3 Practical Cognitivist Research 
In practical cognitivist research,  
• general symbolic computation resulted in the practical search for an architecture of 
context-invariant modules, rather than an attempt to exploit concrete context-
dependencies.  
• cognition is approached as an amodal process operating on symbolic representations 
that are independent from the modal or cross-modal processes of perception and 
sensorimotor interaction. 
• cognition engaged in explicit computation, since actions had to be instructed 
explicitly because behaviour was a result of cognizing exclusively on abstract internal 
maps and ontologies of the world.  
• representations have to cover as many possibly relevant features of the world as 
possible, and most practical research problems chosen were instances of offline-
reasoning, where it is possible to pre-plan the full action-sequence before action 
starts with the available technological resources.  
• the early cognitivist program seemed more suitable for static problems such as chess 
or expert systems that avoid timely delicate interaction with the environment.  
• studies of perception (in the orthodox literature not considered cognitive per se) and 
attention within cognitive psychology and neuroscience singled out selection 
mechanisms to overcome informational bottlenecks in deriving a representation of 
the world from the continuous overflow of information offered by afferent signals 
(see also section 3.2.2).  
Overall, the resulting cognitivist picture of mind is that of a sequence of amodal symbolic 
mental states of a rather static, pre-planned nature that avoids time-critical interaction with the 
world. One the one hand, this is in contrast to a dynamical formulation of perception and action as 
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a set of skilled sensorimotor process that explicitly deal with the world in time (section 3.3) for 
which the present thesis provides an experimental paradigm in the real world (section 4). On the 
other hand, a static picture is not by necessity entailed in the computational core of the cognitivist 
program but may rather be a practical consequence of the formal tools of computation historically 
available as well as a consequence of the accompanying problems of higher-level abstract thinking 
to which there are particularly suitable.  
3.1.4 Critique 
The cognitivist program has seen an extremely influential rise, yet even main proponents 
speak of the failure of artificial intelligence (Fodor, 2000; in Rohde, 2008). Conceptual critique 
partly stems from the very conundrum cognitivism should resolve once first-order cybernetics had 
been considered a failure before: the intentionality of the mental. There is now a rising disbelief 
that syntactic representational analysis can do intentionality justice, so that despite all hopes, 
cognitivism in the end also would not address this central property of the mental just as first-order 
cybernetics (Froese, 2010). Given symbolic analysis, the symbol grounding problem formulates 
the question of how symbols and abstract representations could acquire their meaning within a 
concrete given context (Harnard, 1990). Providing solutions for symbol grounding is one of the 
central aspects of the embodiment literature. However, the Chinese room argument questions the 
central unification between meaning and intentionality and syntactic representations per se, 
arguing that the application of unintentional rules to unintentional symbols can only end up in 
equally unintentional results (Searle, 1980). Thereby it also renders any solution of the symbol 
grounding within a context-free representational program misguided.  
Other problems stem from the concrete computational implementation. They form 
empirical-conceptual problems if conceptual problems addressed by computer science are taken as 
an empirical inquiry (Newell & Simon, 1976). The frame problem denotes the difficulty of 
tracking only relevant changes to the representational database after an action. Roughly speaking, 
updating a logical knowledgebase after action requires explicit update for all potential entries, 
even if most are untouched by the action. The binding problem is the difficulty of reconstructing 
objects in time and space based on free-floating features parsed in parallel from the world, the 
challenges of object segmentation, and differences in processing times of individual features 
(Treisman, 2003).  
To give just two of the psychological empirical controversial points, it first is now argued 
that general problem solving is only a small fraction of what humans and biological organisms do 
in natural life. And further even humans are not particularly good at it but rather rely on heuristic 
strategies and ecologically bounded rationality also in the cases when they are faced with formal 
rational problems (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1972; Wason, 1966).  
3.1.5 Two Classes of Embodiment Responses: Embodied Cognitive Science vs. 
Enactivism 
Two broad classes of responses to cognitivism have been apparent. One is the idea of 
embodiment (section 3.3): to integrate the description of bodily and ecological context as well as 
their interaction into an analytic, computational theory of cognition. Including the context leads to 
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cognitive models that are embodied, distributed, situated or extended (Agre, 1997; Anderson, 
2003; Brooks, 1991; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 1997; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 1996; Pfeifer 
& Bongard, 2006; Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999). Embodied extensions of the analytic program 
however may not be enough to ease Searle’s above worries about intentionality if they remain 
meaningless elements of a now extended but nevertheless analytic and functionalist theory of 
cognition (Sharkey & Ziemke, 2001).  
A more fundamental response is in the program of enactivism: the attempt to naturalize 
intentionality with a variant of second-order-cybernetic embodied theorizing (section 3.4). 
Enactivism is formulated in a non-representational manner that is closer to hermeneutical than the 
analytical tradition of inquiry (Froese, 2010; Kurthen, 1994; Stewart, Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2011; 
Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and to the systems biology of the organism (Froese & Ziemke, 
2009). The enactive approach is influenced by work that has been termed dynamical (Beer, 2000; 
Port & van Gelder, 1994; Thelen & Smith, 1994), ecological (Gibson, 1979; Greeno, 1994; D. Lee 
& Kalmus, 1980), or situated (Clancey, 1997; Dewey, 1896). While clearly not all of these 
approaches share the enactive goal to naturalize intentionality, core enactivism in particular 
reflects a contemporary renaissance of the second-order cybernetic program with the wish to 
naturalize intentionality in a non-representational research program (Froese, 2010, 2011; Stewart 
et al., 2011; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991). 
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3.2  Research Programs in Vision Research 
This section illustrates the influence of the cognitivist area on physiological research of 
vision. Initial experiments and models in sensory physiology were developed within the larger 
theoretical context of signal processing and holistic constructivism (section 3.2.1). But vision 
research has also made enormous use of cognitivist computational schemes of object recognition 
and information processing accounts of attention later on (section 3.2.2) and signal processing and 
computer vision approaches have developed in parallel over the years. This section argues that in 
particular the prominent salience model of visual attention (section 3.2.3) may be seen as a direct 
attempt to combine the physiology of feature detecting neurons with a computational solution to 
problems of cognitivist object formation.  
The following section 3.3 aims to ground a sensorimotor account of visual attention in 
signal processing and embodiment rather than computer vision. Section 3.4 reflects on perception 
and attention within the constructivist program of enactivism. Both approaches suggest to 
complement laboratory experiments with experiments in real-world settings. The main 
experimental part of this thesis presents experiments within a novel approach to gaze-tracking in 
real-world settings, summarized in section 4. 
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3.2.1 Sensory Physiology of Vision 
 
3.2.1.1 Holistic Feature Detectors and Ecological Vision15 
Early experimental physiologists approached neuronal activity not as an implementation of 
logic, but as a signal-processing problem with its own right as an explanatory approach. They 
probed the activity in early sensory neurons for a correlation with the intensity of (spots of) light in 
order to understand sensory transduction principles (Barlow, 1953; Daniel & Whitteridge, 1961; 
Kuffler, 1953). Barlow launched the feature detector doctrine, but in contrast to truth-objective 
cognitivist representational thinking, he subscribed to an ecological mantra16 and considered 
feature detectors as holistic discriminators matched by evolution to the ecological structure of the 
world and relevant for individual behaviour (Martin, 1994).  
A little later, another influential group approached neuronal activity directly within 
behavioural loops. Their famous experiments on fly detectors in the frog retina showed a role of 
spatio-temporal response characteristics of the frog retinal ganglia in the action-perception cycle of 
the frog catching a fly (Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, & Pitts, 1959).  
 
Similar to enactivism and embodiment, both groups considered feature detectors holistic in 
that from the vast amount of ecologically available invariances, only those invariances that emerge 
in full behavioural loops are of discriminatory relevance and thus of interest to the nervous system. 
The function of the (sensory part of the) nervous system thus is to discriminate aspects of the 
world of the organism within its actions. 
From the signal processing view the central physiological problem is how a nervous 
system can detect meaningful invariances in the presence of noise. Internal sensory and effector 
signals are not exact, and also situational affordances themselves contain a substantial amount of 
ambiguity that shows up as noise to the processing problem of the nervous system. For instance, 
even in the limited Umwelt of a frog only a subset of small moving things turn out to be flies that 
can be eaten. Barlow hence employed signal processing under noise and information theoretic 
analysis as computational approach to the functioning of the nervous system (Barlow, 1961; 
Martin, 1994).  
The concept of information Barlow uses is not that of syntactic symbols in cognitivist 
artificial intelligence but Shannon’s concept of information as a quantifier of the information 
transmitted in communication channels (Shannon, 1948). Barlow follows a representational 
explanatory strategy in subscribing information, in Shannon’s sense, to an activity of the brain 
such as asserting spatio-temporal information to the frog ganglion cells. As Shannon information 
is related to signal transduction rather than to syntax, information theory and the naturally 
accompanying probabilistic approaches yield non-syntactic (minimally) representational 
approaches of embodiment.  
                                                      
15 Much of this section is taken from Kevin A. Martin’s historical analysis of the feature detector 
(Martin, 1994). 
16 Unfortunately, I could not find the reference for the term ecological mantra in this context 
anymore. 
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In contrast to Barlow, the group of Lettvin and Maturana espoused a constructivist, non-
representational metaphysical interpretation of neuronal activity (Martin, 1994). In their view, the 
role of feature detectors is not and cannot be to represent information, knowledge or signals. 
Rather knowledge is constructed in the sensorimotor activities of the organisms and its 
environment in which feature detectors and nervous system participate y allowing more complex 
discriminations. Taken up in particular by Maturana and Varela (Maturana & Varela, 1992) this 
program today is continued under the headline of enactivism that might also be seen as a  
successor of second-order cybernetics (Froese, 2010).  
3.2.1.2 Local Feature Detectors and Computational Vision  
With Hubel & Wiesel’s seminal discovery that oriented bars or edges were much better 
stimuli than patches of light for sensory cells in the cortex (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959), the relation 
between the detailed structure of stimuli features to neuronal features (rather than to behaviour) 
moved into the centre of physiological interest. Departing from holistic features and behavioural 
loops, Hubel and Wiesel switched the focus to local aspects of stimuli such as bars, edges, colour, 
depth, and so on. Their research strategy presented parametric variations of simple artificial stimuli 
and derived many important properties of sensory neurons, such as the precise mappings of many 
receptive field properties (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988). Receptive field mapping still has a large 
influence on the field. Hubel & Wiesel’s choice of simplified stimuli (e.g. only one spatial 
frequency at a time) and the apparent lack of behaviour (animals were fixed to allow precise 
recordings) had reasons in the technical limitations of the period. Artificial stimuli are 
comparatively simple to generate and mathematically well described. However, leading 
commentators (Martin, 1994) see a main reason for the use of artificial stimuli  also in a 
compositional conceptualization of perceptual neuronal activity that eventually emerged. Hubel 
and Wiesel assumed that the nervous system decomposes the natural world into atomistic 
components and a set of rules of grouping (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988). It is not fully clear from 
Martin’s work whether or not Hubel & Wiesel themselves made reference to artificial intelligence 
and Martin strongly suggests that they had an exceptional level of cautious reluctance to interpret 
their own work beyond the experimental evidence given. Yet, a compositional strategy in 
physiology of course did go well with the compositional cognitivist explanatory strategy being 
made prominent by artificial intelligence not much after. Indeed, compositional vision had been 
worked out on theoretic grounds as a means to derive arbitrary complexity from the limited 
resources of physiological hardware (Minsky, 1961; Neisser, 1967; Pitts & McCulloch, 1947, see 
section 3.2.2). In the seventies linear systems theory described cells in primary visual cortex as 
linear convolution filters for the spatial frequencies of stimulus patches (Campbell & Maffei, 
1974; Shapley & Lennie, 1985), and this lay a ground to combine feature detectors and 
computational vision explicitly. Marr and Poggio’s symbolic compositional-representational 
theory of vision suggested elements of logic and artificial intelligence for mainstream visual 
neuroscience (Marr, 1976). Similar to Newell and Simon’s physical symbol hypothesis, Marr 
established a symbolic computational level of analysis as the level of abstraction that explains 
what neuronal physiology is doing (Marr, 1976). Today the influence of Marr’s work on the 
computational analysis of experimental research continues to foster the fields of computational and 
cognitive neuroscience (Willems, 2011) albeit making use of different forms of (non-syntactic) 
computation and with more appreciation for the importance of physiological detail for the 
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computation being performed (Abbott, 2008). Equally, the cognitivist predicament of 
decomposing everyday perception into neuronal responses to simple artificial stimuli continues to 
inform large parts of mainstream neuroscience of vision in important ways (Riesenhuber & 
Poggio, 1999). 
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3.2.2 Attention and Perception in Cognitive Psychology 
This section highlights how information processing considerations influenced models of 
perception of attention. The concept of attention, in vision and otherwise, has a long history within 
psychology, mostly formulated as a way of managing mental resources that are limited. In the 
introspective words of William James, attention is the   
“taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization [and] concentration of 
consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others, and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, 
scatterbrain state” (James, 1890, p. 403-404).  
Psychoanalysis developed the idea of resource management into a model of attention as a 
way of channelling limited amounts of psychic energy (Neisser, 1967). Similarly, cognitivist 
research interpreted the metaphor of limited resources, within its own metaphysical background, as 
a way of dealing with limited computational resources in the processing of information (for an 
early but still influential review see Neisser, 1967).  
3.2.2.1 Early Filter Models of Attention 
Information processing models of attention begin from an obvious starting point: it is 
certainly true that sensory systems, in information theoretic terms, provide an excess of signals. 
The eyes alone may deliver about 10 million bit/s to the nervous system (Norretranders, 2002). 
The filter model was the first conceptual proposal of how attention processes help the brain to deal 
with this overabundance of information. The rationale was that if the resources of semantic 
processing are limited to a fixed capacity, attention needs to filter out irrelevant signals in early 
sensory channels based on pre-cognitive sensory features such as source location, bandwidth or 
intensity (Broadbent, 1958). Initial experiments in dichotic listening supported the suppression of 
unattended signals (Cherry, 1953), but later experiments revealed semantic analysis of unattended 
messages (Treisman, 1964) rendering the envisioned model of an early filter too simple. On the 
one hand, to the degree to which a signal filter is based on complex measures of 
relevance/irrelevance, it is likely to require the semantic processes of normal perception in the first 
place, pushing the filter to late stages of the processing chain (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). On the 
other hand, late filtering looses its economic effect of cleaning out massive amounts of sensory 
data before cognitive processing, such that is seemed more plausible to assume that a filter would 
only attenuate rather than block sensory signals to lower their signal-to-noise ratio (Treisman, 
1964). Semantic analysis then could employ a signal-detection process to define a perceptual 
threshold along dimensions relevant to the current state of semantic processing and reject signals 
below the threshold as noise. Yet if the threshold for filtering would be lowered along another 
dimension, for instance by contextual information, signals would no longer be rejected as noise but 
passed on to further processing.   
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3.2.2.2 Hierarchical Models of Attention and Perception 
The debate about attention as a filter was eventually transformed by the formulation of 
hierarchical models of perception. Hierarchical models aimed to resolve a mirror debate between 
analytic (~ bottom up) and synthetic (~ top-down) approaches to perception. Gestalt psychologist 
argued that the perceptual whole precedes its parts, but found it difficult to explain how Gestalts 
are established. Prominent analytical perceptual models in physiology (Hebb, 1949; Klein, 2011) 
or machine learning  (Selfridge, 1958) showed prospects for  the recognition of individual objects 
but failed in the sensory presence of multiple objects as simple as two triangles. The hierarchical 
combination of both approaches sequentially restricts object segmentation to one location of the 
image at a time such that a later synthetic integration stage can bind current sensory features of 
objects making in sequence, also making use of prior hypothesis about typical forms of objects 
(Minsky, 1961).  
In this hierarchical approach, attention is not a filter, but a sequential mechanism that 
directs the limited capacities of synthetic binding processes to a few objects at a time (Neisser, 
1967). Local stimulus features reach the level of perception when bound into the current percept, 
but can remain “free floating” in the system otherwise without being actively filtered out or 
suppressed. Evidence for sequential physiological activation dates again to Hebb in his 
formulation of “phase sequences”, the suggestion that sequential activation of neuronal cell 
assemblies forms the neuronal correlates of conscious thought (Hebb, 1949; Klein, 2011). 
Psychophysical evidence for sequential processes in vision comes from the highly influential 
Feature Integration Theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Experiments show that a location only 
captures attention automatically, such that it “pops-out” in awareness, if the location is distinctive 
by bottom-up analysis of its low-level features alone. However, if the feature set is homogeneous 
over the entire visual field, sequential direction of focal attention over the stimulus is required to 
perceive objects in sequence. This confirmed a sequential synthetic integration of features into 
coherent wholes for each location in turn on the psychological level, after it had been introduced 
for computational reasons in Minsky’s model of object recognition (Minsky, 1961). 
Research on attention has now formed a huge field of its own, in particular with respect to 
its neuronal underpinnings (Treue, 2001). A broad majority of the neuroscientific research 
paradigms on attention are essentially founded in the legacy of the information-processing 
conceptualization of attention. They for instance draw their operationalization of attention from 
behavioural increases or decreases of task performance that are related to processing capacities of 
serials bottlenecks and they often perform experiments in artificial paradigms shaping the 
questions asked in experiments and the answers found in information-processing ways (Cosmelli, 
2009).  
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3.2.3 Visual Attention and Eye-Movement Control via Saliency Maps 
With respect to visual attention, a central contemporary topic concerns how attention 
sequentially selects one region over another. The most prominent control model is the salience 
model of Ullman and Koch (Koch & Ullman, 1985). Merging the physiology of Hubel & Wiesel’s 
feature detectors with the computational arguments for hierarchical object recognition, the saliency 
model computes low-level features as sequential filters in parallel channels and at various spatial 
scales. Contrary to Treisman’s psychological model, however, in the absence of attention features 
do not end up as free-floating representations but are always spatially bound into a global map 
within pre-attentive parts of the visual processing chain. Given the centre-surround receptive field 
principles of neuronal feature detectors, these maps represent how much a region differs from its 
neighbouring regions in an information theoretic measure of interestingness of the respective part 
of the (visual) world. Salience maps represent the parts of the visual stimulus where pre-attentive 
bottom-up analysis predicts most information. Focal attention shifts in a winner-takes-all 
mechanism to the most interesting location as predicted exclusively by such bottom-up salience. 
The selected location then enters synthetic object processing and perception. Subsequent 
inhibition-of-return principles deactivate the current position, and focal attention directs 
processing to the second most salient region, and so forth. Hence, the saliency model is a bottom-
up generative model for sequences of visual attention shifts, which in every shift select the region 
that according to the saliency representation of the world should yield most information. The claim 
is that bottom up salience is a physiological mechanisms that determines what regions of space 
capture visual attention.  
3.2.3.1 Covert Visual Attention and Eve-Movement Control 
There is a strikingly obvious parallel between computational arguments for sequential 
focal attention in visual processing and the biology of sense organs, which, surprisingly, has been 
explicated only relatively recently. Computational arguments instigated hierarchical models of 
perception with sequential local processing of individual regions such as the salience model. 
Likewise, many mammalian species in fact have a region of highest retinal acuity that covers a 
small focal part of their visual field (e.g. in cats about 5° and in humans about 1° visual angle) and 
dominates the input into in the adult visual system (Rapaport & Stone, 1984). This requires a 
movement of gaze to pick up detailed information from the environment already at the level of the 
sense organ, which mirrors shifts in covert focal attention at the level of perceptual processing. 
Hence, recently the attention concept of saliency has been suggested as a computational generative 
model for eye movements was well (Itti & Koch, 2001; Moore, Armstrong, & Fallah, 2003; Treue, 
2003). In turn, observed overt attention (shifts of the sense organ) haven been taken as an 
operational proxy for covert attention (shifts in internal focus) in experiments on visual attention. 
This argument takes computational constraints to interpret the functional role of the fovea. 
However, the interpretation from a certain (cognitivist) computational theory in a restricted 
domain (of object representation) might over-emphasis the actual dominance of both the fovea and 
visual object perception for behaviour. From a pragmatic theoretical perspective that sees the 
major role of the brain not in object perception but in organizing whole-body behaviour, for 
instance peripheral retinal signals for movement or the coarse orientation of gaze via movements 
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of body and head are likely to play a major role in visual behaviour of the organism as well. Part 
of a pragmatic view is that computational modelling should be guided by the phenomenon as it 
naturally occurs in order to obtain realistic models, for instance in studying visual attention in 
behaviour at the systems level.  
In fact, the salience model has been confirmed as a model of eye-movement control in a 
vast number of empirical studies that find that gaze locations on natural images correlate with the 
presence of low-level features such as luminance contrast (Reinagel & Zador, 1999), edge density 
(Mannan, Ruddock, & Wooding, 1996, 1997; Tatler, Baddeley, & Vincent, 2006) and texture 
contrast (Einhäuser & König, 2003; Parkhurst & Niebur, 2004). Saliency maps to some extend 
even can predict gaze allocation on images exclusively on the basis of stimulus features 
(Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002; Peters, Iyer, Itti, & Koch, 2005; Wilming, Betz, Kietzmann, & 
Ko, 2011). But nevertheless, salience researchers currently recognize that bottom-up signal 
processing is only one source in a complex mechanism of visual-spatial attention that also includes 
top-down factors such as task, history, semantics and prior experiences of the organism. Hence in 
recent years a decisive role in eye-movement control has been given to higher-order correlations 
within images (Krieger, Rentschler, Hauske, Schill, & Zetzsche, 2000), contextual cues (Torralba, 
Oliva, Castelhano, & Henderson, 2006), and objects such as faces (Cerf, Harel, Einhäuser, & 
Koch, 2008). Similarly, early studies demonstrated the importance of tasks for eye movements on 
images (Buswell, 1935; Yarbus, 1967) and recent experiments show that modern bottom-up 
models may lose all their predictive power (Henderson, Brockmole, Castelhano, & Mack, 2006; 
Rothkopf, Ballard, & Hayhoe, 2007) and bottom-up cues may be immediately overruled or even 
reversed (Einhäuser, Rutishauser, & Koch, 2008). In consequence, very recent work on saliency 
mapping of images concerns the combination of bottom-up saliency with top-down biases 
considering the task of the system (Hamker, 2006; Navalpakkam & Itti, 2007; Pomplun, 2006; 
Rutishauser & Koch, 2007).  
3.2.3.2 Restrictions to the “Ecological Validity” of Salience Research in the 
Laboratory 
Also, the “ecological validity”, or representative design17 of salience research - the degree 
to which it reflects processes of visual attention and gaze control in natural settings - is under 
serious debate. Tests of salience models are typically performed in head-restrained laboratories, 
which are restricted to eye-in-head movements, do not allow real-world interactions, involve a 
potentially biased choice of stimuli (e.g. photographers bias), which are mostly static, presented in 
a restricted field of view, and contain a highly unnatural frequency of scene onsets due to the 
sequential presentation of static images (Torralba et al., 2006).  
Similar restrictions are part of salience models themselves. Salience models assume visual 
input to be a sequence of quasi-stable saccades, and in consequence yield a quasi-static rendition 
of attention. Saliency maps provide a representationalist mapping of the world in terms of 
atomistic visual features derived in a bottom up manner on top of which a minimal cognitive 
                                                      
17 The term “ecological validity“ was originally applied by Brunswick as a statistical measure for 
the correlation between a proximal stimulus cue (which the nervous system can detect by it’s senses) and an 
aspect of the distal stimulus (the origin of the cue in the world). It is now often used to describe what 
Brunswick termed representative design - the degree to which an experiment transfers to real-life settings 
(Brunswik, 1955; Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). I am thankful to Frank Jäkel for this reference. 
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process, a winner-takes-all decision rule, instructs the behavioural output of the eyes. This in 
essence is the cognitivist input-output sandwich in operation, which puts cognition in between 
perceptual representations and instructions for action (Hurley, 1998). The winner-takes-all-ruling 
on the spatial saliency map is neutral with respect to intentional action, does not address how the 
direction of gaze coordinates body and head with eyes while each is interacting non-visually with 
the world on their own generating interactive motor constraints on gaze allocation. The principle 
of inhibition-of-return is only computationally but not empirically motivated as people do 
frequently return to or stay at visited locations without entering circular loops (Tatler, Hayhoe, 
Land, & Ballard, 2011). Saliency theory is uni-modal in its theoretical formulation as well as in 
laboratory experiments despite the multimodal nature of spatial processing and prefrontal action 
control (see 3.3.2) where in particular vestibular information is of crucial importance (Andersen, 
Snyder, Bradley, & Xing, 1997; Angelaki & Cullen, 2008; Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 2006). In 
addition, goal-directed ecological behaviour in natural environments suggests more fluid and 
embodied concepts of attention and perception that challenge a simple representational picture of 
vision per se (see section 3.3). Ecological vision involves dynamical spatial processing and 
continuous task-driven coordinate transformations that go beyond the passive image-based 
representational assumptions of saliency mapping (section 3.3.2). Lastly, eye movements are a 
core part of almost all of everyday actions also on higher-level cognitive and social levels (Land & 
Hayhoe, 2001). Thus they have been characterized as a “window to the mind”18 rather than as 
window to (bottom-up) salience of the world. Hence in natural behaviour movements of gaze are 
likely directed by sensory features that are actively picked up in the light of procedural task 
knowledge that is currently being played out (see section 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2, 3.3.4). These pragmatic 
considerations demand salience-based models of gaze allocation to modified for and tested within 
in less restrained settings within natural environments.  All of these pragmatic aspects will be 
explicated in more detail in the next section. 
 
                                                      
18 Unfortunately I could not find the definite source of this common expression.  
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3.3 Embodied Cognitive Science and Ecological Vision Research 
The following section introduces a predominant response to the various critiques of the 
syntactic-cognitivist research program: the inclusion of body and world into an analytic and 
computational theory of cognition. One of the roots of pragmatic thinking is a famous paper by 
19th century pragmatic psychologist John Dewey, arguing that 
“[perception] begin[s] not with a sensory stimulus, but with a 
sensorimotor coordination … and that in a certain sense it is the movement which 
is primary and the sensation which is secondary, the movement of the body, head 
and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. In other words, 
the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of 
light” (Dewey, 1896, p. p358-359) 
Another root is in phenomenology, such as the work of Merleau-Ponty, who derives that 
“since all the stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been 
possible only by its preceding movements which have culminated in exposing the 
receptor organ to external influences, one could also say that behaviour is the first 
cause of all stimulations. Thus the form of the excitant is created by the organism 
itself“ (Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  1962,	  p.	  211).	  
The following presents attempts to re-connect the program of the mechanization of 
thought by information processing to a long history of pragmatic and ecological traditions, with a 
concept of information derived from signal processing and theories of optimal coding. In its 
conclusion, this section outlines a pragmatic sensorimotor-account of visual attention and gaze-
control. 
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3.3.1 Ontogenetic Sensory Development19  
Barlow’s ecological take on physiology in section 3.2.1 proposed that the brain develops 
as an optimization of the signals neurons are exposed to at evolutionary, developmental and 
behavioural timescales. Describing optimization in information theoretic terms lead to the field of 
optimal coding which, as Simoncelli & Olshausen point out (Simoncelli & Olshausen, 2001), 
considers sensory development as an ontogenetic learning process that aims to optimize neuronal 
responses to a set of three fundamental constraints: (1) the statistical properties of the natural 
environment of an organism, (2) the physiological properties of the neural hardware, and (3) the 
tasks and the statistical (sensory-) consequences of the organism’s behaviour. All three aspects in 
particular may be developed into an information processing account of the pragmatic program of 
Dewey and Merleau-Ponty. Each aspect will be considered in turn. 
3.3.1.1 Sensory Development in the Light of Natural Stimuli 
 
3.3.1.1.1 Statistical Properties of Natural Stimuli  
Barlow’s signal processing approach to sensory physiology is based on the fact that the 
natural (visual) world is not a random combination of pixels but consists of complex structures and 
redundancies in first- and in particular in higher-order statistics to which the brain is likely to adapt 
its processing (Barlow, 1961). For instance, the power spectrum of natural images is not uniform 
but typically falls with a 1 𝑓! relation for higher frequencies. Barlow was among the first to 
suggest that in an information theoretic sense, the brain uses its signal processing resources in a 
statistically optimal way when it reduces this redundancy such that each neuron carries the same 
amount of information about its domain, a view known as sparse coding. Subsequent research 
could empirically demonstrate this coding principle, for instance with the finding that the LGN de-
correlates the 1 𝑓! relation, with the consequence that neuronal responses are modulated to better 
differentiate between those frequencies more commonly found in natural images (e.g. Dan, Atick, 
& Reid, 1996). Similar de-correlation and sparse coding has been found in other parts of the visual 
hierarchy as well, such as for example for the orientation of bars in V1 (e.g. Vinje & Gallant, 
2000).  
Barlow envisioned that the spatial statistical structure of the natural environment would 
lead to massive contextual modulations of neuronal processing (Barlow, 1961). Work of the last 
decade indicates that single neuron behaviour is not defined in isolation by properties of the world 
but subject to modulation by contextual occurrence of other stimuli outside classical receptive 
fields, and also by global top-down factors and on-going internal activity in non-linear manners 
(e.g. Salinas & Sejnowski, 2001; Trotter & Celebrini, 1999; Vinje & Gallant, 2000). This means 
that in direct violation of Hubel & Wiesel’s compositionality assumption (section 3.2.1.2), 
neuronal responses to natural stimuli are not well predicted by what has been learned about 
                                                      
19 A substantial part of this section is taken from my final draft of the grant proposal for the 
feelSpace project „Sensory enhancement — learning a new sense“ to Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(DFG). 
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responses to simple stimuli (for a review see Moldonado, Ossandon, & Flores, 2009; Yen, Baker, 
& Gray, 2007).  
3.3.1.1.2 Optimal Coding: Sensory Neurons as a Consequence of Natural Stimuli  
Since the time of Barlow, much progress has been made on the theoretical side of neuronal 
signal processing using technical possibilities only recently available. Important neuronal 
properties could be theoretically derived as a statistical consequence of the structure of natural 
images. Learning the spatial correlations of natural images in an unsupervised manner can reveal 
non-trivial receptive field properties of simple cells (Bell & Sejnowski, 1997; Lewicki & 
Olshausen, 1999; Olshausen & Field, 1996, 1997; van Hateren & van der Schaaf, 1998) and 
complex cells (Hyvärinen & Hoyer, 2001; Körding, Kayser, Einhäuser, & König, 2004). 
Unsupervised learning of other (e.g. temporal) statistical properties in natural visual input could 
give rise to many of the response properties in distinct layers of hierarchical models as one moves 
upward in the ventral visual system (Kayser, Körding, & König, 2004). A very recent discovery is 
the unsupervised formation of location sensitive cells akin to hippocampal place cell or head-
direction cells from the statistics of natural visual input of a behaving agent (Franzius, Sprekeler, 
& Wiskott, 2007; Wyss, König, & Verschure, 2006). Also sensory development in non-visual 
modalities has been modelled by unsupervised learning of the respective input statistics. Learning 
the properties of natural sounds leads to non-trivial predictions of auditory neurons’ receptive 
fields (E. C. Smith & Lewicki, 2006). In the whisker system, some properties of neurons in the 
barrel cortex can be predicted by learning the properties of whisker signals, and used for texture 
discrimination (Hafner, Fend, König, & Körding, 2004; Hipp, Einhäuser, Conradt, & König, 
2005). 
3.3.1.2 Activity-Dependent Plasticity as a Physiological Basis of Sensory 
Development  
Complementary to the advances of models of unsupervised coding of the statistics of 
natural stimuli, substantial progress has also been made regarding the underlying physiological 
mechanisms. Pivotal work was the postulate by D.O. Hebb (1949) that effective connectivity 
changes according to the success of one neuron in activating another neuron; or in colloquial terms 
“what fires together wires together”. Spurred by the discovery of activity dependent plasticity 
(Bliss & Lomo, 1970) and the characterization of the role of back-propagating action potentials in 
this process (Markram, 1997) interest in this area exploded (Pascual-Leone, Amedi, Fregni, & 
Merabet, 2005). The following selects relevant aspects of plasticity for a sensorimotor account of 
perception and attention.  
3.3.1.2.1 Plasticity of Single Neurons 
At the cellular level, an important aspect of plasticity and sensorimotor learning is the 
relative separation of different signal integration sites. The coincidence of a back-propagating 
action potential with input to the apical dendritic tree leads to a sequence of events separating 
inputs from different sources (Larkum, Zhu, & Sakmann, 1999; Siegel, Körding, & König, 2000; 
Stuart & Sakmann, 1994). Furthermore, local synaptic mechanisms are subject to global influences 
from nonspecific modulatory systems (Kilgard & Merzenich, 1998). These phenomena are 
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naturally described by learning rules based on individual neurons with two sites of integration that 
lead to an interaction of local and global processes (Sanchez-Montanes, Verschure, & König, 
2000).  
3.3.1.2.2 Plasticity of Neuronal Populations 
On the population level, cortical (re-)organization in response to input activity has been 
shown in all sensory domains. Cortical representations change due to passive sensory experience, 
deprivation of input by peripheral lesions, and training on sensory tasks (Buonomano & 
Merzenich, 1998; Feldman & Brecht, 2005; Kaas, 1991). To give a few prominent examples, in 
the somatosensory system the representational sites of rat whiskers and finger digits in monkeys 
and professional musicians grow with experience (Elbert, Junghöfer, Scholz, & Schneider, 1995; 
Jenkins, Merzenich, Ochs, Allard, & Guíc-Robles, 1990). Similarly, extensive training of pitch 
discrimination in the auditory system increases the volume of the Herschel gyrus (P. Schneider et 
al., 2002, 2005). In the visual system, lesioning retinal input changes the retinotopic organization 
from the LGN upwards to primary and extrastriate visual cortex, with neurons taking over retinal 
areas adjacent to the lesion (Eysel, 1982; Heinen & Skavenski, 1991; Kaas, 1991; Krubitzer & 
Kaas, 1989). Plastic processes also underlie the development of the olfactory and the gustatory 
system (Hill, 2004; Wilson & Mainen, 2006). Hence, plastic processes that dynamically organize 
neural topography have been demonstrated in all sensory systems, and may form a general 
principle of neural functioning. 
3.3.1.2.3 Cross-Cortical and Multi-Modal Plasticity 
Further, sensorimotor relations are inherently multi-modal, and also interactions between 
cross-cortical multimodal areas are formed by signal-driven plasticity. Studies rerouting visual 
connections into auditory structures at early processing levels suggest that orientation- and 
direction-specific ‘visual’ cells arranged in an orderly retinotopic map can develop even in the 
auditory cortex (Sur, Garraghty, & Roe, 1988). Remarkably, these rewired ferrets respond to the 
visual stimuli as if they perceive the stimuli to be visual rather than auditory (Von Melchner, 
Pallas, & Sur, 2000). Similarly not only the auditory but also the visual cortex can learn new 
functionality given different input (Gilbert & Walsh, 2004). In congenitally blind humans, the 
primary visual cortex processes somatosensory information (Büchel, Price, Frackowiak, & Friston, 
1998; Büchel, 1998; Cohen et al., 1997; Kupers et al., 2006), while extrastriate visual areas are 
involved in the processing of auditory information about space (Collignon, Lassonde, Lepore, 
Bastien, & Veraart, 2007). Moreover, involvement of the visual cortex in language and memory 
can be demonstrated in the congenitally blind (Amedi, Floel, Knecht, Zohary, & Cohen, 2004; 
Amedi, Raz, Pianka, Malach, & Zohary, 2003). Even in sighted individuals the visual cortex can 
engage in tactile processing, given extensive training (Merabet et al., 2007; Saito, Okada, Honda, 
Yonekura, & Sadato, 2006). These studies reveal a remarkable plasticity and thereby flexibility in 
the involvement of cortical areas in the processing of different modalities. 
The picture that emerges is that development of cortical areas to a large extend relies on 
ontogenetic learning of the respective activity-patterns of (cross-modal) signal statistics, drawing 
upon the anatomy provided phylogenetically (Horng & Sur, 2006; Sur & Leamey, 2001). 
Consequently, the functionality and connectivity within the brain is not primarily defined by 
anatomy or sensory apparatus but by the properties of the information being processed.  
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As a corollary, what sensory features of the world an animal is likely to be well-adapted to 
detecting is an empirical-statistical matter as well. In part defined by the structure of the 
organism’s natural world, and in part by the learning possibilities provided by brain physiology.  
 
3.3.1.3 Sensory Development in the Light of Actions 
 
3.3.1.3.1 Sensory Plasticity as Sensorimotor Plasticity 
The following will show the influence of behaviour on the structural and functional 
plasticity of the sensory system. Active, self-initiated behaviour is a major source of the signal 
statistics neurons adapt to. But the mere exposition to signals in the (multimodal) sensory space 
seems not enough for many aspects of neuronal development, and hence active behaviour seems a 
more foundational requirement for essential aspects of sensory plasticity. The much-cited 
experiments of Held indicate that passively moved kittens that are prevented from active self-
exploration do not develop normal sensory processing abilities, even if they received identical 
sensory stimulation than a self-exploring kitten (Held, 1965). The implication is that the major part 
of sensory plasticity and development is in fact not only of a sensory nature but instead a process 
of sensorimotor plasticity that is only triggered given sufficient self-guided experience. A similar 
finding comes in Kohler’s equally well-known experiments on inverting prism adaption (Kohler, 
1962) where the initial distortion of perception induced by a prism can, remarkably, slowly revert 
back to normal in some (but not in all) aspects of perception. Also prism adaption requires 
sufficient active exploration of the altered sensorimotor relations. The paradigm of sensory 
substitution showed that it is possible to deliver signals of one modality (e.g. vision) to the brain 
via a second interface modality (e.g. tactile), and that the perception of the signal can re-establish 
perceptual qualities of the source modality, but again only with sufficient active exercise of the 
novel sensorimotor relations (Bach-y-Rita, 1972, 2004). Active also seems essential for sensory 
enhancement (see section 6.2), where a novel signal such as the direction of magnetic north 
(Nagel, Carl, Kringe, Märtin, & König, 2005) or a measure of spatial distance (Cassinelli, 
Reynolds, & Ishikawa, 2006; Froese, McGann, Bigge, Spiers, & Seth, 2011; Siegle & Warren, 
2010) is supplied over an interface modality and can yield a novel perceptual quality, but only 
with active exploration of the relations between the novel sensory signal and action. 
3.3.1.3.2 Predictive Coding and Sensorimotor Contingencies 
Much like the structure in the natural world, the relations between sensory signals and 
actions are not random, but inherit common transformation structures that have recently been 
termed “sensorimotor contingencies”. Gibson’s work on optic flow describes how perception 
actively uses these dependencies between behaviour and sensation as ecological control variables 
(Gibson, 1979). In an recent influential paper, O’Regan and Noë extended this hypothesis and 
suggest that skilled mastery of knowledge about changes in sensory activity is a general principle 
that constitutes the perception of objects (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). O’Regan & Noë posit the 
concept of skilled mastery of sensorimotor relations in contrast to representational sensory 
processing, in particular to the syntactic symbols of artificial intelligence.  
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However their central notion of knowledge about sensorimotor contingencies does in fact 
suggest a representation of (sensorimotor) knowledge within the sensorimotor system (Clark, 
2006) and has been fruitfully approached in computational neuroscience. Learning sensorimotor 
contingencies can for instance connect grasping movements associated with objects to their visual 
representation to help perception infer the shape of an object (Hoffmann et al., 2005; Hoffmann, 
2007). Organisms can extract fundamental properties of space without prior knowledge from 
regularities in their sensorimotor space (Philipona et al., 2003, 2004). Unsupervised learning with 
objective functions for optimal coding can directly be extended to learn predictions about activity 
changes in lower (König & Krüger, 2006) or higher sensory areas (Weiller, Märtin, Dähne, Engel, 
& König, 2010). For instance, the higher-level concept of place fields can not only be derived 
“bottom up” by optimizing stability of sensory input in a learning hierarchy (Wyss et al., 2006) but 
also “top down” by optimizing predictions of the sensory consequences of actions. Following 
sensorimotor optimization, action effects are more predictable than when using sensory data alone 
(Weiller, Märtin, et al., 2010).  
A unified sensorimotor state space derived from both sensory and motor processes may 
serve as a computational basis for embodied theories of action planning (Weiller, Läer, Engel, & 
König, 2010). The psychological theory of event-coding finds that perception and action are 
processed in a common space of action and perception (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz, 2001). Microstimulation of motor neurons at behavioural timescales (i.e. longer than usual) 
20 elicits full behavioural patterns rather than individual muscle responses, suggesting that neurons 
in motor cortex do not operate by coding instructions for individual muscles but complete 
behaviourally relevant patterns such as grasping. This has been taken as a confirmation of the 
anticipation of perceptual end-positions in a perceptual space (Graziano, Patel, & Taylor, 2004; 
Graziano, 2006; Meier, Aflalo, Kastner, & Graziano, 2008)21 in inverse and forward models of 
action planning that close the sensorimotor loop (e.g. Novick & Vaadia, 2011; Shadmehr, Smith, 
& Krakauer, 2010). The concept of predictability - optimizing the predictions of action effects – 
may serve as an unsupervised computational scheme to extract such sensorimotor contingencies 
from sensorimotor space (Clark, 2012; Friston, 2010). 
3.3.1.3.3 Intrinsic Motivation to Predict 
However, learning to predict may not be sufficient to explain why sensory development 
requires active self-exploration. If the only computational objective of self-exploration would be to 
maximize predictions, the organism would quickly avoid the unknown unpredictable aspects of its 
environment. For instance, visual stimulation is optimally predictable when the organisms simply 
remain still in a dark room with eyes closed, but behavioural data on sensory development, prism 
adaption and sensory substitution argues that self-exploration behaviour samples the space of 
                                                      
20 However, a critique of Granziano’s conclusion has been that longer stimulation times may in fact 
elicit neuronal networks rather then single cells, rendering the derived statements about single cell coding 
invalid. Graziano stimulated with impulse lengths of 500ms, while traditional microstimulation operates in 
the order of milliseconds, hence a functional organization of the motor cortex may be established only at the 
network level. I am thankful to Julius Verrel for pointing this out. 
21 But also explicitly separate cortical structures for action and perception in the cortex have been 
found (Schwartz et al., 2004). 
. 
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possibilities. Hence predictive mechanisms have been extended with unsupervised mechanisms 
that optimize the progress of how the organism learns to predict as a higher-level objective. 
Optimizing the learning progress leads to an intrinsic drive to select among novel situations for 
those that are neither fully unpredictable nor predictable and thus allow further development. Such 
unsupervised sensorimotor schemes have been developed in robotics and may form a 
computational basis for the psychological concept of intrinsic motivation (Oudeyer, Kaplan, & 
Hafner, 2007). Intrinsic motivation in this sense may illustrate unsupervised higher-order 
sensorimotor objectives of that form a top-down guidance of behaviour via emotion and 
motivation. Prior to explicit tasks, what may motivate the brain is to learn to predict the 
consequences of its actions. If this is true, sensory development is in part emotional and or 
motivational. 
3.3.1.3.4 Reafferents and Forward Models  
Physiological experiments show that predictions about action consequences (also called 
forward models in the literature) are generated in motor areas of cortex and cerebellum and allow 
the system to distinguish self-generated sensory changes from external changes via top-down 
reafferent signals (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001; Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; 
Desmurget & Grafton, 2000). Such a disentangling of internal and external sources of sensory 
input is important for the interpretation of sensory stimuli, for instance to differentiate if a change 
of the visual scene was caused by self-movement or by movement in the world (Crapse & 
Sommer, 2008), in the integration of signals about space (Angelaki & Cullen, 2008), and in the 
control of eye movements (Gallant, Connor, & Van Essen, 1998) or grasping movements 
(Hoffmann, Schenck, & Möller, 2005). Use of reafferent signals is a general principle in motor 
control (Diedrichsen, Shadmehr, & Ivry, 2010; Flash & Sejnowski, 2001; Shadmehr, Smith, & 
Krakauer, 2010), in language comprehension (Pickering & Garrod, 2007), in social interaction 
(Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). Reafferents are supposed to underlie our inability to tickle ourselves 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998) and of the development of a self (Gallagher, 2000). 
Disturbances of forward predictions have been suggested in a variety of sensorimotor disorders 
such as phantom limbs, delusions of control & agency (Blakemore et al., 2001; Roskies, 2010; 
Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010) or schizophrenia (Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 2002). Updating forward models is crucial to stabilize and adapt action predictions 
(Synofzik, Lindner, & Thier, 2008), may help in treatment of the pathologies (Ramachandran, 
Rogers-Ramachandran, & Cobb, 1995), and is important for the calibration both of idiothetic and 
allothetic space  as well as the ability to locate oneself in space (Whishaw & Brooks, 1999). Hence 
reafferent signals are foundational to many actions and perceptions in interacting with a world.  
3.3.1.3.5 Higher-Level and Motor Areas vs. Lower Level Areas in Perception  
Motor processes in perception have recently led to a discussion on the distinction between 
low- and high level areas of perception. Although primary areas are extensively studied, a direct 
role of the activity in primary areas or of the feed forward sweep of signals from primary into 
higher-level areas for perceptual awareness is highly controversial, as activity in primary areas is 
immensely shaped by the massive recurrent connections from higher level visual areas (Tong, 
2003; Fiser et al., 2004; Olshausen & Field, 2005). In contrast, studies on binocular rivalry and 
perceptual category learning have suggested that higher-level areas are direct correlates of 
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perceptual awareness. Increases in perceptual sensitivity in visual category learning correlate 
directly with the learning of discriminative features in inferior temporal cortex but not with 
activity in early visual areas (Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). Similarly, while low-level areas do 
reflect perceptual processes in binocular rivalry (Wunderlich et al., 2005; Tong et al., 2006), in 
other experiments the alternations in subjective perception correlate strongest with activity in 
higher-level areas (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). Further, certain cases of experiential blindness 
after restoration of retinal signalling have been interpreted to originate not from absence of visual 
sensations22 but from a lack of functional sensorimotor integration of sensory signals (Noë, 2004). 
In this picture, perception is a holistic activity in which central and motor programming 
areas that integrate sensory with non-sensory information may initiate reorganization of activity in 
many levels of the visual system (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). Hence, top-down influences on 
perception may be conceived of as a special type of predictive behaviour related to attention, 
‘active sensing’, aiming for a change in perception to guide perceptual organization (Ballard, 
2009; Leopold & Logothetis, 1999).  
 
3.3.2 Visual-Spatial Attention of Acting Agents 
 
3.3.2.1 Premotor Theory of (Visual) Attention 
Also attention has recently been explicitly linked to motor behaviour. The “premotor 
theory of attention” grounds covert attention in a minimal form of action, such that attention is 
thought of as a motor intention whose action effect is not a change in sensory input as such but a 
modulation of processing at the attended location (for a review see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2010)23. A number of studies suggest to describe shifts in visual attention during fixation as 
planned saccades that are not executed. Neuroimaging results show that visual attention shares 
cortical networks with the eye movement system. Directing attention towards a location activates 
the ocular motor system even if no movement is required. And in some experiments, when the 
eyes could not move to a certain location, neither could visual attention. Further, direct 
microstimulation of the frontal eye fields, a primary motor area for eye-movement control, 
modulates both spatial attention as well as gain factors in higher-level visual areas, leading to 
enhanced processing of the intended location.  
                                                      
22 Although it is not clear in Noë’s writing whether visual sensations refer to pure visual signals or 
entail some form of basic visual awareness, the more general valid point is the observation that visual 
signals seem to require sensorimotor integration for normal visual perception. I am thankful to Mike Beaton 
for discussing this. 
23 A tight interdependency between motor behavior and the ontogenetic development of perceptual 
processing and attention has already been noted in Ulric Neisser’s classic text book on cognitive psychology 
(Gyr, Brown, Willey, & Zivian, 1966; in Neisser, 1967), albeit not further explored. 
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3.3.2.2 A Sensorimotor Account of Visual Salience 
The argumentation so far should not be taken to question a contribution of salient visual 
features to visual attention in principle. Rather, models and experiments above (and below) 
suggest an embodied reframing of the salience model. The original salience model adheres to the 
(input part of) the input-output sandwich that has been associated with artificial intelligence 
(Hurley, 1998). Sensory processing forms a suitable input representation (the salience map) in a 
pre-attentive processing step (Tatler et al., 2011). On the basis of which a minimal stage in the 
form of a winner-takes-all decision rule instructs a subsequent shift of attention or a subsequent 
motor orientation towards a region of space. While the original salience model can be sandwiched 
within a sensorimotor loop, it does neither consider the motor system nor cognition as constitutive 
part of the attention model per se (section 3.2.3 above).  
 
By contrast, a premotor model of visual attention suggests a constitutive role of (whole- 
body) motor processes both in the definition of salient features and in the decision processes that 
guide attention. In goal-directed natural movement, gaze is adjusted by movement of the head and 
torso in addition to movements of the eyes. If the respective motor idiosyncrasies play a 
constitutive role also in a pre-motor theory of visual attention, salience-based models need to be 
modified beyond an obvious increase of the degrees of freedom for the adjustment of gaze 
provided by the additional movements of head and body. First, in basic motor control it has been 
suggested that individual effectors are not defined and controlled by the nervous system in 
structural/anatomical but in context-dependent functional terms of a respective motor activity as a 
whole (Graziano, 2006). Thus basic motor control suggests a role of pre-motor processes 
depending on individual functional actions of the entire body for a premotor theory of attention as 
well. These mechanisms for instance likely include individual spatial coordinate transformations 
(Salinas & Abbott, 2001; Snyder, 2000; see also the next paragraph) and challenge the retinotopic 
reference frame implied by typical salience model and suggest functional or even situation-
depended frames of references. Second, at the systems level, motor behaviour is goal-directed in 
the service of tasks. In consequence, visual attention has been conceptualized as a motoric way of 
intending an engagement with the world in an orienting response of the body to functional points 
of action that are not yet observable in movement (Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Hayhoe & Rothkopf, 
2011). Taken together, two acts of shifting (covert) visual attention or gaze to a point in space 
might be realized via different motor-processes when performed within different functional motor 
contexts and with different effectors, leading to distinctive internal dynamics of the two attention 
shifts despite the common reference point in and thus a common bottom-up salience of the world. 
Third, as a consequence, the feature space for salience may turn out to be of sensorimotor rather 
then exclusively sensory nature. In this scheme, salient features would mark invariances in the 
sensorimotor space that are informative for action. From an optimal coding point of view, 
sensorimotor aspects are an extension to bottom-up feed forward influence as in the classical 
salience model, rather than an exclusion thereof. Normative principles are likely to establish an 
automatic assignment of salience to sensorimotor discriminations that are most useful in a 
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statistical sense over the broad variety of natural behaviour24. The contribution of the respective 
sources to a sensorimotor salience model at a systems level is an interesting question on embodied 
perception and attention not addressed in the original salience models or in typical laboratory eye-
tracking paradigms. This highlights the potential of experiments in natural settings to trigger and 
identify the complexities of a sensorimotor attention system that is fine-tuned to natural 
behaviours. 
3.3.2.3 Embodied Spatial Processing In a Three-Dimensional Action Space 
A most important aspect of sensorimotor processes is the coordination of the respective 
reference frames of body parts and action points in the world. Spatial reference frames and spatial 
processing also develop by activity-driven principles in embodied interaction with environments. 
While at the level of the body, spatial idiothetic reference frames are hard-wired in the biology of 
the muscles and effectors as well as the sense organs, the neuronal representations of idiothetic 
frames at later stages are re-learned by plastic learning. For instance retinotopy, the spatial 
reference frame of the retina, is not preserved anatomically by a precise retinotopic mapping to 
cortical areas but lost in the optic nerve and then re-established in self-organization processes on 
the basis of spatial correlations in visual input (Chklovskii & Koulakov, 2004). Similarly, although 
it is not entirely clear how much of the processing machinery for allocentric reference frames is 
hard-wired, allothetic representations such as hippocampal place, grid and head direction cells can 
be learned on the basis of the sensory signals (Franzius, Sprekeler, & Wiskott, 2007; Wyss, König, 
& Verschure, 2006) and actions (Weiller, Märtin, Dähne, Engel, & König, 2010) of a moving 
agent. Compatible with this, crawling behaviour affords active exploration and a new ecological 
perspective of the world to the infant, which are both important in the formation of cross-cortical 
connections and the development of the hippocampus, which is important in allocentric processing 
(Bell & Fox, 1996). Further, spatial processing is essentially a multimodal process, with a crucial 
role of vestibular sensorimotor contingencies (Angelaki & Cullen, 2008). Adding vestibular 
sensation to the acting agent in the above learning models allows the system to differentiate frames 
for the position (place cells) and the direction of the head (head direction cells) (Franzius et al., 
2007). And again, active exploration is necessary, for instance for the calibration of the 
multimodal idiothetic and allothetic sources of spatial signals (Whishaw & Brooks, 1999).  
Once spatial reference frames are established, maintaining spatial consistency and stability 
in the dynamic flow of sensory and motor signals is a major challenge for behaving nervous 
systems (Noë, 2002). The retinotopic input from the retina changes substantially with every 
movement of the eyes, but unnoticed in our perception, which is stable over time. Forward 
mechanisms support spatial consistency by gaze-centred remapping of target locations across 
saccades during saccadic eye-movements already in retinotopic coordinates (Medendorp, 2011). 
However, spatiotopic transformation is supposedly relatively slow compared to the speed of 
saccadic eye-movements, necessitating further stabilization mechanisms. Spatiotopic stabilization 
is aided by transient mechanisms around the time of the saccade. For instance, selective 
suppression of motion-properties of the stimulus reduces the perception of saccade elicited motion.  
                                                      
24 Konrad Körding, in personal communication at the workshop “Neural Coding, Decision Making 
& Integration in Time“, 2012. 
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Location shifts in dependence of saccade direction or by compression of space around the saccade 
support trans-saccadic alignment of stimuli patches (Burr & Morrone, 2011). Yet the complexity 
of the stability problem increases with the degrees of freedom provided by additional movement of 
head and body. In addition to eye-proprioceptive input, further input from other body parts such as 
neck-proprioceptive input provide massive signals for spatial processing and attention (Gramann, 
Gwin, Bigdely-Shamlo, Ferris, & Makeig, 2010), which also play an important role in achieving 
stability. Given that the extended occulo-motor system coordinates movements of gaze by 
movement of eyes, head and body, it is likely that visual consistency and stability rely on sensory 
feedback and efference copies from the whole body. A recent review, on which this paragraph 
relies, concludes that three-dimensional action space is “an evolving representation whose internal 
metric is updated in a non-linear way, by optimally integrating noisy and ambiguous afferent and 
efferent signals” (Medendorp, 2011). Given a premotor theory of attention and a general principle 
of circuit sharing (section 3.3.4), this characterization is likely to transfer to visual-spatial attention 
as well. 
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3.3.3 Spontaneous Attention25 
Following phenomenology, the consideration of selective attention so far has not 
addressed another aspect of the nature of attention: spontaneous attention (for a review see 
Cosmelli, 2009). Already William James was aware that spontaneous and transitive shifts of 
attention directed to internal rather than external events in the stream of consciousness are 
overabundant in everyday life (e.g. Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). This spontaneous aspect of 
attention seems vital in natural behaviour and understanding it may shed important insights on the 
nature of attention in general. Spontaneous attention has been (and is) difficult to systematically 
examine for reasons related to experimental design, and neuroscience has only very recently begun 
to address spontaneous shifts of attention in paradigms on stimulus-independent day-dreaming and 
mind-wandering (e.g. Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009). First studies 
could link some aspects of spontaneous attention to the supposedly spontaneous activity of 
stimulus independent components of so called default networks in the brain. However, these 
studies also suffer from ecological irrelevance as spontaneous attention usually occurs in the 
context of the complex situations of everyday life. Alternative experimental strategies provide 
experiments in rich and varied environments with several tasks from which the subject can 
spontaneously choose, paired with markers of the concrete behaviour chosen individually 
(Cosmelli, 2009). Gaze movements are markers of externally directed attention that are easy to 
register. Gaze movements in social interaction in real world scenes offers such a variety of tasks 
on the basis of a multiplicity of bodily cues available to the subject (Smilek, Birmingham, 
Cameron, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2006). Gaze movements have also been used as a potential 
marker of free attention in laboratory studies on free viewing behaviour (Reinagel & Zador, 1999). 
Again, measuring shifts of gaze in whole body movements within natural environments that offer 
a variety of spontaneous behavioural options is also a promising paradigm for the study of 
spontaneous attention in the absence of laboratory restrictions. A larger description of this 
methodology is given in section 3.3.5. 
3.3.4 Circuit Sharing in the Sensorimotor System: Embodiment of Higher-Level 
Concepts, Social Interaction and Language 
Since Yarbus (1967) realized the role of eye movements in cognition, their relation to 
higher-level processes such as planning, problem solving, memory or social interaction has been a 
major source for the saying that eye-movements are “a window to the mind” (section 3.2.3). 
Within the embodied turn the sensorimotor loop has been implicated in higher-level cognition in 
all major fields ranging from artificial intelligence to cognitive psychology and linguistics, mainly 
in attempts to provide symbol grounding (Anderson, 2003; Clancey, 1997; Clark, 1997; Sheets-
Johnstone, 1990). Hence embodied grounding of higher-level cognition is likely to provide 
architectures that are informative for the control of eye-movement in natural cognition as well 
(Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997; Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Hayhoe & Rothkopf, 2011). 
 
                                                      
25 I am thankful to Evan Thompson for pointing me towards the work of Diego Cosmelli about this 
important aspect of attention (Cosmelli, 2009). 
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New, or behavioural, artificial intelligence (AI) attempts to derive physical grounding of 
cognition via subsumption architectures of independent, de-centralised and domain specific 
sensorimotor processes. Behavioural AI spells out symbols in terms of behavioural affordances 
and the sensorimotor discriminations necessary to perform the related actions rather than in terms 
of objective representations and their formally semantic truth relations to the state of affairs in the 
world (Brooks, 1991)26. Outside behavioural robotics, new AI also on theoretical grounds 
described higher-level abilities such as categorisation or declarative memory as sensorimotor 
processes (Clancey, 1997; Winograd & Flores, 1986). 
3.3.4.1 Sensorimotor Metaphors in Language 
At the centre of Lakoff & Johnson’s influential program of an embodied linguistics is the 
idea of cross-domain mappings between sensorimotor and conceptual domains. Everyday 
language heavily adopts metaphorical usage of spatial sensorimotor concepts, and Lakoff & 
Johnson were among the first to hypothesize that this is not only a manner of speaking but may 
reflect the underlying architecture of the conceptual system. If everyday sensorimotor praxis gives 
meaning to our understanding of the world, our general inferential systems should make use of 
knowledge about sensorimotor practices as well (Anderson, 2003; Johnson, 1980). Further, from a 
language-action perspective, language itself is a skilled action that maps back to the sensorimotor 
system and organizes sensorimotor processes by means of conceptualization (Clancey, 1997).  
3.3.4.2 Memory as Categorizing the Sensorimotor Space 
A sensorimotor conceptualization also drives Glenberg’s (1997) skill-based re-formulation 
of (declarative) memory that gained influence in cognitive psychology. In his view, memory 
developed not for memorization of declarative facts but to aid categorizations in the sensorimotor 
system that “mesh” constraints given by the body and the situation in categorical actions. While 
Glenberg erroneously seems to assert to the cognitivist notion that categorization would have to 
occur in symbolic format, the novel terminology of “meshing” clearly is reminiscent to recent 
machine learning approaches for learning and clustering in the sensorimotor space. 
3.3.4.3 The Perceptual Symbol Hypothesis  
Borrowing from Newell and Simon’s metaphor of the Physical Symbol Hypothesis, 
Barsalou phrased a Perceptual Symbol Hypothesis (Barsalou, 1999, 2008, 2010) as a guideline for 
sensorimotor research on higher-level concepts. Drawing in part on the above role of feedback 
from motor areas for object perception (section 3.3.1.3), he suggests that concepts are created by 
re-activation of (multi-) modal lower-level sensory areas from higher-level motor areas. The 
perceptual symbol hypothesis is intended to spur research on the phenomena cognitivism 
classically described as propositions, declarative memory or productivity via simulations of 
sensorimotor processes (a form of prediction).  
Neuroscientific evidence for sensorimotor grounding of higher level processes 
accumulated vastly within the last decade (Barsalou, 2010) and can not be reviewed here beyond 
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some representative studies. Imaging studies in language comprehension could relate semantic 
networks that are active when understanding a word to the sensorimotor circuits of the physical 
object or action to which the word refers to, for instance to body parts performing an action, to the 
form and colour of typical objects involved, or to their touch properties (Just, Cherkassky, Aryal, 
& Mitchell, 2010; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). While much of this work is informal or 
demonstrational, computational neuroscience has begun to move towards predictive modelling of 
higher-level processes in sensorimotor terms (Pezzulo et al., 2011). Recently, machine learning 
started to build computational models for neuronal activity, and found that observing the neuronal 
activity of a set of sensorimotor words predicts the neuronal activation to unseen words much 
better than do abstract predictor words. This lead to the conclusion that “concrete nouns in part are 
grounded in sensory-motor features” (Mitchell et al., 2008). On this basis, neuro-semantic 
approaches are pushing the field of embodied language understanding from a pre-theoretical stage 
towards computational modelling. This exciting approach may yield a data-driven method of 
integrating neuronal semantics, understood in terms of motor aspects, and linguistic semantics, 
understood e.g. in terms of word co-occurrence frequencies in spoken language, for the 
sensorimotor analysis of higher-level concepts (Just et al., 2010).  
3.3.4.4 Circuit Sharing and Connectivity Analysis 
Meta-analysis of common brain areas that are co-active over a broad variety of domains 
from perception and attention to action and language not only argues for a sharing of neuronal 
circuits but also for the redeployment of existing pathways when novel functions develop 
ontogenetically or phylogenetically (Anderson, 2008, 2010). In consequence, higher-level tasks 
such as language seem more widely distributed over the cortex than the processes of perception 
and action that develop earlier. This analysis suggests that brain organisation may be neither 
modular in a cognitivist sense, nor holistic, but hierarchical. Increasingly graph theoretic methods 
prove promising in identifying information flow, size, or connectedness between hierarchies in 
both real and modelled sensorimotor networks (Kaiser, Hilgetag, & Kötter, 2010; Lungarella & 
Sporns, 2006; Sporns, 2011; Zhou, Zemanová, Zamora, Hilgetag, & Kurths, 2006). 
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3.3.5 Free Spontaneous Behaviour and Natural Data Recording - Methodologies 
for Ecological Neuroscience 
 
“A process cannot be understood by stopping it. Understanding must 
move with the flow of the process, must join and flow with it”.  
- Frank Herbert, Dune (First Law of Mentat) 
 
If the brain organises dynamic action in complex sensorimotor loops within natural 
environments, and is shaped by activity-dependent plasticity a result thereof, methods of 
investigating the brain in consequence benefit from complementing controlled laboratory 
experiments with real-world strategies that sufficiently approximate natural complexity. One novel 
strategy extends the natural stimulus approach (section 3.3.1) to the temporal structure of natural 
stimuli. This approach has been applied in recent physiological recordings of brain dynamics in 
the presence of the spatio-temporal information in natural movies (Einhäuser & König, 2010; 
Kayser, 2004; Olshausen & Field, 2005; Onat, König, & Jancke, 2011), aided by the development 
of massively parallel recording of large-scale brain activity (Kording, 2011; Stevenson & Kording, 
2011).  
The present thesis implements a second strategy for sensorimotor research on visual 
attention: the analysis of natural behaviour in spontaneously chosen tasks within real-world 
contexts. There are a number of recent examples of this general approach. Multichannel mobile 
brain imaging systems (MoBi) register mobile recordings of EEG together with body movements, 
auditory and visual scene to examine the links between distributed brain systems and motivated 
natural behaviour (Makeig, Gramann, Jung, Sejnowski, & Poizner, 2009). Systems for monitoring 
natural speech and behaviour track child language development, for instance to relate the 
ontogenetic onset of individual word usage to necessary prior sensorimotor experiences (Lazer et 
al., 2009; Roy, 2005). Electronic second skin attempts everyday tracking of physiological markers 
of the body (Ma, 2011), and mobile miniature positron-emission-topography (PET) systems 
(RatCap) move brain imaging towards the simultaneous assessment of rodent behaviour and 
molecular neurochemistry (Schulz et al., 2011). Mobile eye-tracking has been used to study eye-
movement behaviour in freely moving and socially housed monkeys to investigate the interaction 
of sensory, motor, motivational and social aspects of eye-movements (Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 
2006; Shepherd & Platt, 2006). 
Experimental designs in these scenarios make use off subjects that rare less restrained to 
allow for free behaviour with self-generated, spontaneously motivated tasks. They grant sufficient 
liberty so that natural mechanisms of cognition can play out under the multiplicity of external and 
internal processes of the organism (Engel, 2011).  
When behavioural variables are not known and in consequence not operationalized in full 
detail in advance, studying spontaneous behaviour also poses novel demands on data analysis that 
complement classic a priori hypothesis testing. Machine learning approaches allow post-hoc 
pattern identification within massive amounts of multi-channel data (Buzsáki, 2004; Kording, 
2011; Mitchell, 2009; Reed & Kaas, 2010), or the assessment of connectivity in the sensorimotor 
information flow and neuronal pathways (Lungarella & Sporns, 2006; Sporns, 2011). Recent 
advances in statistics complement linear dependency measures such as correlation with nonlinear 
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information theoretic dependency measures based on mutual information (Reshef et al., 2011). 
Novel event-based techniques may be able to analyse spontaneous behaviour on the basis of low-
frequency, or even single-trial events (Churchland, Yu, Sahani, & Shenoy, 2007; Cosmelli, 2009; 
Debener, Ullsperger, Siegel, & Engel, 2007; Mazaika, 2007; Müller et al., 2008). Finally, 
neurophenomenological approaches have the potential to revive first-person introspection as a data 
source. First- or second person descriptions of trained observers during behaviour have already 
been taken as informative subjective markers for post-hoc categorization of spontaneous events 
that can feed into physiological data analysis (Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela, 2002), and this 
strategy might eventually be developed into a novel form of higher-level psychophysics (see 
section 6.2.9) that allows relating internal markers of conceptual, emotional or motivational 
processes to physiological and behavioural records of natural behaviour. 
  
   66 
3.3.6 Intermediate Summary 
This section summarises the signal processing approach to embodiment presented so far. It 
suggests a sensorimotor account of visual salience and attention and motivates gaze-tracking 
research in the real world under natural whole-body activity. 
 
Neuroscience developed its roots in signal processing (Barlow, 1961) and begins to shift 
of the role of feedback loops back into focus in a renaissance of pragmatic philosophical thinking 
in cognitive science  (e.g. O’Regan & Noë, 2001). In general, the resulting framework shapes a 
representational approach, yet in sensorimotor rather than abstract truth-functional terms: 
• Minds, brains and cognition organize embodied action within a world. 
• Ecological and bodily contexts are part of the object of analysis, that is, part of the 
computational and explanatory loops. Cognition manipulates the action-oriented 
structuring of the concrete sensorimotor system that is adapting to the world.  
• Abstract representations are thought of as high-level sensorimotor representations, such 
that cognition does not manipulate abstract formal representations of the world that are 
independent of the sensorimotor context, and internal processing is highly context-
sensitive and domain specific. On the other hand, a normative goal of sensorimotor 
cognition is to develop more abstract forms of clustering, such as hierarchical 
sensorimotor contingencies. There is hope to eventually spell out Barlow’s vision that 
symbols are an abstract form of signal processing in sensorimotor terms (König & Krüger, 
2006) resulting from the activity in the sensorimotor space.  
• Research emphasizes how concrete internal processing is a consequence of the (statistical) 
structure in the ecological world, the physiology of the agent’s sense organs, and the 
intentional actions of the organism. These aspects are interrelated in that activity-based 
sensory clustering of the sensorimotor space is, among other things, a basis for more 
complex behaviour and thereby creates novel sensorimotor contingencies that in turn feed 
back into sensation. There is a general interest on how a more abstract internal processing 
develops from concrete processing over time by the reuse of neuronal structures. 
• Pragmatic sensorimotor paradigms seem to reject the cognitivist notion that conceptual 
knowledge is different in principle from know-how and sensorimotor skills. Higher-level 
processes of memory and categorization are approached conceptually and experimentally 
in terms of their role in sensorimotor couplings. From a more cognitivist point of view, the 
distinction remains important however, and it is an empirical question to what degree also 
sensorimotor accounts of abstract concepts will require cognitivistic elements for instance 
of categorization. 
• Experimental settings make use of spontaneous behaviour to elicit the multitude of 
naturally interdependent processes.  
• The temporal nature of the situation suggests a temporal organization of brain and mind. 
This temporal aspect should play a foundational role in models and experiments. Novel 
methods of data recording aim to co-register cognition and neuronal activity in relation to 
the functional aspects of a situational unfolding rather than in relation to stimuli in 
isolation. 
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• The complexity involved in operationalizing spontaneous behaviour in natural situations 
necessitates complementary data-driven strategies for data analysis, for instance involving 
machine learning, information theory or Bayesian approaches and somewhat restricts the 
possibilities for classical hypothesis generation and testing. 
 
With respect to perception and attention, the analysis suggests that: 
• It is an empirical matter to which sensory features the brain responds to, dependent on the 
sensorimotor signal statistics of the behaving agent in the natural world and the 
physiology for plastic learning provided by evolution. Processes of sensory plasticity are 
better described as a special case of sensorimotor plasticity. Sensory signal processing 
principles such as optimal coding are better understood as a special case of sensorimotor 
coding schemes. Hence, sensory features are likely a sensorimotor rather than a purely 
sensory property. In consequence, visual salience is likely to single out features in the 
visual sensorimotor space rather than the purely sensory visual space.  
• Attention, perception and spatial processing involve a large number of re-afferent signals 
and should be thought of as a consequence of sensorimotor processes that couple with the 
world. Relevant sensorimotor processes include intentional goal-directed action (higher-
level cognition) as well as perceptual sensorimotor goals such as image stabilization, 
spatial consistency, three-dimensional vision or perceptual organization. 
• Directing gaze is a whole-body process within the world rather than a function of eye-
movements within head-coordinates. This implies that other body parts that aid the 
orientation in space, such as torso, shoulder or hips need to be coordinated to direct gaze, 
introducing various forms of coordinate transformations and other embodied constraints to 
the control of gaze-movements.   
• Attention, perception and spatial processing are inherently temporal phenomena. Their 
temporal characteristics should be explicitly considered in models and experiments.  
• Gaze-movements play a constitutive role in a broad variety of aspects of everyday 
behaviour that go beyond the selection of salient information from a visual display. 
Examples are whole-body orientation, hand and tool use, aspects of higher-level cognition 
as well as social interaction. Thus, eye-movements are a window into natural cognition 
and reflect many processes of embodied life, which models and tests should consider. 
• Visual salience in a sensorimotor space might entail discriminative features that relate to 
prior hypothesis about the possible unfolding of actions given the current situation and 
goals.  
• The methodological challenge of embodied neuroscience naturally applies to vision and 
attention: how to obtain data of the real visual processes at work. This somewhat restricts 
the methodology of artificial laboratory experiments on isolated components. The current 
thesis takes a complementary methodology and records massive amounts of data in natural 
visual behaviour in an unobtrusive way. This allows the natural processes to play their role 
and is a prerequisite for their identification and examination. 
• Generally, analysis will rely on machine learning to find patterns that link visual input and 
behaviour but are likely unknown in advance or merely hinted at. In this sense, pragmatic 
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visual neuroscience in natural settings is a call to extract hypotheses from large datasets 
themselves (given the assumptions of the particular machine learning framework).  
 
In sum, the presented approach provides elements for an information theoretic 
computational and experimental implementation of Dewey’s or Merleau-Ponty’s notion that 
perception originates in action. 
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3.4 Enactive Cognition and Perception 
The next section briefly sketches a non-representational alternative strand of embodiment. 
The enactive approach to cognition has roots in part in the early physiological work of Maturana 
and Lettvin (Lettvin et al., 1959) as well as in second-order cybernetic constructivism (Di Paolo, 
Rohde, & Jaegher, 2010; Froese, 2011; Thompson, 2004; Varela et al., 1991), the biology of life 
(Maturana & Varela, 1992) and in hermeneutical philosophy (Morley & Hunt, 2000). It argues that 
genuine cognition and meaning are constructed or enacted in activity without representation.  
 
3.4.1 Enactive Metaphysics: Neuro-Hermeneutics, Constructivism and Holistic 
Top-Down Causation 
Enactivism may be seen as a radical alternative to cognitivism and traditional embodiment 
due to the alternate metaphysical core of the program (Di Paolo et al., 2010; Schumann, 2004). In 
broad summary, the enactive program attempts an analysis of cognition in an appraisal of 
relational processes of structural coupling that can form genuine, self-constituting cognitive 
identities that normatively constrain their individual parts. A main motivation is that structures that 
constitute themselves in their own activity may have genuine purpose for themselves in the inner 
perspective of the system, as opposed to a representation of meaning that is assigned from an 
outside observer or scientific theory. Thus at its core enactive theory is a take on intentionality and 
sets out for a naturalization of genuine meaning in a physical world. In some sense enactivism 
thereby revives the cognitivist idea of genuine artificial intelligence that has been part of strong 
semantic information processing, yet without the notion of information and representation (Lasse 
Scherfig, personal communication, 2012). In contrast to artificial intelligence, enactivism 
originates in the biology of life, and from this basis challenges classical views on what counts as a 
system but instead explicates biological ways of system formation. Neither world nor body are 
taken as given, neither as clearly identifiable parts of the natural world nor as objects of scientific 
analysis, but rather are taken as interrelated aspects of an on-going co-creation of what is system 
and what environment. The driving intuition is that once a science of cognition can explicate how 
system and context are established in activity, a genuine explanation of meaning and cognition and 
the interrelated aspect of what is life follows from there.  
Following the enactive take on embodiment, the representational embodiment work of 
above attempts a non-syntactic dynamical reformulation of functionalism, partly because it 
includes aspects of the body and the situation only as context for extended computational-
representational engines or minds (Clark, 2006; Di Paolo et al., 2010). Partly also because 
representational embodiment shares the cognitivist metaphysics of teleological mapping between a 
meaningful world and brain mechanisms and thus likewise can not address the problem of 
grounding in a fundamental way as it does not address how system and world and value and 
meaning originate interdependently (Stewart et al., 2011).  
The contrast between enactivism and representational embodiment / cognitivism reflects a 
major division in philosophy between two broad classes of approaches to knowledge and inquiry: 
the analytic and the hermeneutic tradition (Morley & Hunt, 2000). Section 3.1 argued that the 
natural sciences in general and cognitivism in particular follow the analytical strategy that seeks to 
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find a set of elements and rules that can fully describe a situation without further context. 
Enactivism, albeit also aiming for lawful explanations, does not follow the general analytic 
approach. By contrast, it views the analytic focus on the delineation of system and environment 
liable to miss the conceptualization of identity creation in relational processes that are inseparable 
(Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008). In this sense, enactive thinking follows that general approach of 
hermeneutics. Thus the program of enactivism is closer to continental philosophy and 
phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the late work of Wittgenstein 
and to second-order cybernetics than to the analytic tradition in the metaphysics of logic, 
cognitivism or the early work of Wittgenstein (Morley & Hunt, 2000). The wish for a 
naturalization of hermeneutics is clear in the term “neuro-hermeneutics” Varela used prior to the 
terms “enactivism” and “neuro-phenomenology” (Varela et al., 1991). Yet unlike the philosophical 
foundation, enactivism aims for naturalization in “precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist“ 
theory (Di Paolo, 2008). Central to the strategy of naturalization is a focus on mechanisms of top-
down causation (Thompson & Varela, 2001; Thompson, 2007) that allow autonomous identities to 
set their own normative laws while obeying the laws of physics (Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008). The 
notion of self-constituted normativity formalizes two central hermeneutical tents: the creation of 
objects in the interaction of the system as a whole and the importance of the history of this activity 
for the constitution of the system (Morley & Hunt, 2000). 
3.4.2 Autopoiesis, Autonomy, Adaption, Intrinsic Teleology, and Meaning 
Creation through Sense-Making 
Maturana and Varela historically formulated enactivism to bootstrap cognition from the 
dynamical processes that create systems and boundaries they had established in their work on the 
biology of life (Froese & Stewart, 2010). In the centre lies the concept of autopoiesis: the idea of 
networks of closed metabolic feedback loops that refer back only to processes within themselves 
and thereby self-produce and maintain their own identity as a system. Autopoiesis offers an 
explanation of cells as a basic form of a living, self-sustaining dynamic identity. A foundation of 
enactivism was in the application of autopoiesis idea also to a biological explanation of cognition 
(Maturana & Varela, 1992).  
Recent extensions generalize autopoiesis to the concept of autonomy. One aspect is that a 
system can be autonomous without being autopoietic in a metabolic sense. Broadly speaking, a 
system is autonomous if it follows laws established by its own activity that have become 
normative constraints for further existence of the system. This requires the self-generation of the 
system as a distinct identity that follows laws given by its own constitution rather than by external 
design. An identity, metabolic or non-metabolic, is created if a network of processes is 
operationally closed, i.e. if the system’s enabling conditions in part always refer to other processes 
within the system such that an identifiable unity can be defined, and if the system operates to 
adaptively maintain its own autonomy under environmental pressure (Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008; Di 
Paolo et al., 2010).  
Autonomy and adaption have been taken as foundations for systems with intrinsic 
teleology (Di Paolo, 2006). Enactivism spells out a genuinely meaningful perspective on the world 
for the system in reference to the norms established under the maintenance of the systems’ 
autonomy under pressure, a process dubbed as sense-making (Di Paolo et al., 2010; Thompson, 
2007; Varela et al., 1991).  
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3.4.3 Mind-Life Continuity 
Since the conceptual tools of autonomous identities, adaptation and sense-making, are 
based in the biology of life, they have been taken to imply a continuity between the domains of 
cognition and life. Hence enactive analysis has been applied to many aspects of living organisms 
such as their metabolism, the immune system, the nervous system or social groups (Varela, 1979). 
The mind-life continuity hypothesis argues that these levels are in principle inseparable once they 
emerge, since sense-making processes occur in relation to autonomous processes that are 
constituted across levels of analysis (Froese & Paolo, Di, 2011). To give an example, enactivists 
argue that cognition-as-sense-making provides a value basis for emotional valence, which co-
constitutes intentional behaviour, which co-constitutes personal identities and social-worlds. Given 
that the sense-making behaviour is taken to occur at the metabolic, bodily, emotional and social 
levels at once, and that autonomy entails operational closure, also cognition, emotion and the 
social fundamentally integrated rather than modular aspects of neuronal, metabolic and 
psychological processes of sense-making (e.g. Colombetti, 2010; Colombetti & Thompson, 2007). 
The mind-life continuity hypothesis challenges the functionalist explanations in the programs of 
cognitivist / embodied / or extended minds that describe the living system only as a contingent 
substrate of the functionalistic level of cognition. From the argument that functionalism can not 
explain autonomy, it can not explain cognition as well (Froese, 2012). If processes of autonomy 
and cognition-as-sense-making are mutually constitutive, they cannot be separated for analysis, 
which explains why a functionalist explanation of intentionality in cognitivism or representational 
embodiment must fail (Di Paolo, 2008)27. Instead, processes of a living body are required as an 
originating source of autonomous organization and cognition (for a discussion see Thompson & 
Stapleton, 2008).  
On the other hand the enactive approach does not necessarily constrain processes of life to 
biology but explicitly adheres to the possibility of artificial life (Froese & Ziemke, 2009; 
Thompson, 1997).  
3.4.4 Computational Implementations of Enactivism 
Enactivism seeks operational explanations, and mathematical and computational 
modelling remains a crucial tool at hand. The initial publication of the enactive paradigm 
discussed self-organisation schemes such as cellular automata, genetic algorithms, and 
connectionist models (Varela et al., 1991). In his later life Varela started to approach enactivism 
with the tools of complex systems theory (Froese & Stewart, 2010). Since then in particular the 
complex and adaptive systems group at the University of Sussex has approached enactive 
processes with the methodology of evolutionary modelling of minimal control architectures 
(Harvey, Di Paolo, Wood, Quinn, & Tuci, 2005). Enactive theory poses novel constraints to 
models of cognition in the modelling of conditions for evolutionary development. Enactivism 
argues that models can only instantiate cognition if they are autonomous, and that in consequence, 
artificial models of cognition cannot be fully set up by a designer. At some level, processes of 
cognition must define their own constituency in laws established in their own activity also in the 
                                                      
27 I am thankful to Tom Froese and Miriam Kyselo for pointing me to the literature on contrasting 
functionalism and enactivism.  
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model, otherwise they will not meet the autonomy requirement (Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008; Froese 
& Ziemke, 2009). Thus a major motivation for evolutionary robotics is to limit the modelling of a 
systems by design to the modelling of developmental constraints under which autonomous systems 
can form in simulation, and the solutions found by artificial evolution often transgress classical 
system boundaries (Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008). To give just one example, enactive evolutionary 
simulations can evolve systems capable of plasticity and learning in the state space of dynamical 
systems in the absence of plastic changes at the hardware level (Di Paolo & Iizuka, 2008). This 
may provide an operationalization of the hermeneutical precedence of the relational and historical 
level of analysis over individual structural analysis and design of a system.  
Very recently the topic of computational measures for enactive analysis of physiological 
data has emerged. The 2011 meeting on the “Future of the Embodied Mind” intensively discussed 
the use of information theory and signal processing to capture enactive concepts such as 
autonomy, agency and adaption for instance by identification of (closed-loop) information-flow 
(see also Seth, 2010).  
3.4.5 Enactive Perception 
Enactive accounts have been among the first in cognitive science to implement the 
phenomenological and pragmatic traditions that see perception not as passive acts of 
representation but as an activity. Similar to the representational sensorimotor picture of above, 
much of the inspiration has come from research on sensorimotor plasticity and sensory 
substitution. Enactivism maintains that perceptual content is constituted by implicit sensorimotor 
skills in the use of the sensory consequences of movements. Yet in contrast to representational 
embodiment, the enactive explanatory toolkit conceptualizes sensorimotor skills in terms of 
autonomy and sense-making rather than in terms of embodied sensorimotor representations.  
What follows is that enactivism considers it impossible to differentiate clearly between 
internal and external forces of perceptual couplings. Enactivism focuses on on-going functional 
relations also in the account of perception because “cognition is a relational phenomenon and 
thereby has no location” (Di Paolo, 2008). The program searching for neural correlates as 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the mental has mistaken this to presume that enactivism 
would thereby deny a causal role of neurons in perception and cognition (Koch, 2004). This is 
clearly an internalist overstatement of the enactive position. What is meant is that enactive 
feedback loops extend beyond brain, body and skull, thereby denying the internalist and often 
representationalist supposition that perceptual processes are exclusively internal. Yet this does not 
entail that enactivism embraces strong externalism instead, nor that it denies a role of neuronal 
processing in perception as such. A core enactivist argument is that the very division is misguided 
in the prior assumptions on what is internal and external (Di Paolo, 2008; Thompson & Stapleton, 
2008). If top-down causation can render the whole more than the sum of its parts via the 
generation of its own laws, enactivism argues, the minimal supervenience base of conscious 
perception is not restricted to the internal neuronal stages of sensorimotor loops but in holistic 
processes that include the body and the world, and in inseparable, co-constituting ways (Hurley, 
2006).  
Enactive sense-making thereby poses a conceptual challenge for physiological work that 
seeks to find atomic individual properties down towards all levels of physiological analysis. In the 
traditional view, local neuronal modulation may be a result of local mechanisms that neurons 
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provide for interfacing with other neurons, such as expression or basic physiological rules for 
bottom-up and top-down synaptic integration (see also section 3.3.1.2). In the enactive view, 
relational processes of identity-formation across levels of analysis applies to neuronal activity as 
well, rendering an analysis of atomistic individual properties of neurons impossible without their 
constitutive contexts and self-generated activity laws. While the viability of the enactive approach 
can not be explored in this thesis, similar considerations have inspired temporal attempts to 
neuronal coding via synchronous cell assemblies (Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001; Engel, 2011; 
Thompson & Varela, 2001). If such processes extend beyond the skull, the enactive theory in 
consequence requires novel physiological experiments and relational methods of data analysis 
within active sensorimotor loops. In this view also eye-movements may form part of the 
supervenience base of visual perception. 
 
Similarly, second, the mind-life continuity hypothesis implies that the minimal 
supervenience base of perceptual consciousness is not exclusively related to the processes of 
sensory perception but requires an account of creature consciousness - the inner awareness of a 
living body as a self-sustaining system (Thompson, 2007). The intuition is that consciousness, 
including perceptual consciousness, is in essence a life-regulation process that non-trivially 
depends on a living body in its world (for a summary of this view see also Thompson, 2005). 
Perception, cognition, and action are understood as aspects of sense-making that occur at multiple 
levels of a living organism including its metabolism, immune systems, emotion, nervous systems 
or sociocultural identity. Therefore, for many enactivists it seems misleading to distinguish 
between higher-level and lower level perceptual areas, as perception is not a linked chain of events 
between areas close to sensory input and areas close to muscle output. Perception, cognition and 
action rather are “fused, inseparable and complementary aspects” of the agents sense-making 
(McGann, 2010, p.18). The important and far-reaching implication is that without a lived 
intentional action context and processes of adaptive sense-making, there would not be anything to 
perceive as such (McGann, 2010). Following Anderson’s terminology the mind and life continuity 
hypothesis might been seen as an argument against a hierarchical and in favour of a holistic 
architecture of the brain (Anderson, 2008), a debate that dates back to the early beginnings of 
sensory physiology (Martin, 1994). Still, an interesting question is whether hierarchical 
sensorimotor networks can implement the enactive theory when they include classically non-
sensory-motor areas such as emotion (Thompson & Stapleton, 2008), leading to a holistic yet 
hierarchical architecture of the brain.  
 
Third, enactivism challenges sensor-driven definitions of a modality and the possibility of 
purely uni-modal perception (McGann, 2010). Enactivism sees what we perceive as occurring 
within a modality not as fixed by the particular sense organs in which a given sensory signal 
originates. A modality rather emerges at the integrated level of perception in “areas of stability 
within the space of possibilities” (p.14) that are invariant over different live contexts of goal-
directed sense-making processes, in part by the sets of sensorimotor skills involved. In other words 
what constitutes a modality in the enactive view is the specific sensorimotor activity, not the 
sensory source. And therefore, the usage of visual sensorimotor devices may derive vision-like 
perceptions from tactile signals via vision-like engagement with the world. A radical implication is 
that aiming for a theory of uni-modal processing may be misleading as a strategy for a general 
theory of perception. Even though it is useful to differentiate between visual or auditory aspects of 
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perception, between sense organs and between their specific sets of sensorimotor laws, the 
enactive prediction is that any single percept is always multi- or transmodal and never based on 
only visual or only auditory afferent signals (McGann, 2010). 
3.4.6 Transmodal Inter-Subjective Perception 
Transmodal non-verbal social experience yields a useful illustrative example for a role of 
the concept of sense-making and the bridging of levels of analysis in attention and perception. 
Social interaction plays a viable role in the early infants life, but following developmental 
psychology, early social interaction does neither require sophisticated perceptual abilities nor 
elaborated motor skills (Stern, 2002, 2009). In Stern’s social interactionist view, early parent-child 
communication occurs via social contingencies in an overall temporal flow of patterns of intensity 
differences. Such differences in the intensity of experience could for instance be uttered in sound 
and answered in touch by relating to the velocity or pitch envelope of the sound in the dynamics of 
touch, establishing inter-subjective contact. Stern argues that the infant initially does not perceive 
these signals as visual or kinaesthetic but rather as a transmodal “dynamic of living” in a space 
spanned without clear distinction between the modalities by external and internal sensations. Stern 
argues that a transmodal mode of perception allows the infant to make contact with its social world 
in relation to her needs long before she can properly hear, see or move. Transmodal mother-child 
communication may be seen as a primary form of sense-making, and once established, it becomes 
a major emotional-motivational source that supplies movement intentions for goal-directed motor 
learning and the transition from pre-reflexive to reflexive communication and the experience of 
life (Stern, 2009). Recently, experiments on perceptual crossing have been established to 
investigate such a minimal form of sense-making in social interaction dynamics. Perceptual 
crossing denotes the mutual recognition of human observers in an interactive setting such as 
making eye contact. Experiments on tactile perceptual crossing via movement dynamics in a 
shared uni-dimensional tactile space highlight that mutual-recognition in these experiments is not a 
passive perceptual act of either observer but arises from a circular interaction dynamics that is 
elicited by the mutual engagement in recognition activity (Auvray, Lenay, & Stewart, 2009; Di 
Paolo, Rohde, & Iizuka, 2008). 
3.4.7 Enactive Attention And Salience 
Interestingly, albeit attention is a major topic in mainstream cognitive science, it has not been 
addressed systematically within enactive work28. One reason may be that the program is in a 
transition from a theoretical-conceptual level to experimental research (Bechtel, 1988; Di Paolo et 
al., 2010; Schumann, 2004). The following brief sketch indicates that the enactive framework 
poses the need for a novel conceptualization of attention in reference to autonomy, adaptivity and 
sense-making, with the particular to work out an account of spontaneous attention (section 3.3.3). 
 
                                                      
28 I am thankful to Diego Cosmelli, Evan Thomson, Michel le van Quyen and Jean-Philippe 
Lachaux for information on enactive accounts of attention.  
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What is the role of salient features in sense-making in an enactive account of (visual) salience? 
The basic assumptions for this outline are that enactivism construes perception and action as 
aspects of sense-making processes; that moving gaze is one fundamental way to engage in sense-
making; that visual salience singles out discriminatory features in the visual-spatial sensorimotor 
space, and that discriminatory features are a useful concept also in enactive analysis. Then 
enactive theory suggests that visual salience is related to a spatial-visual differentiation of meaning 
that is created in sense-making within a three-dimensional space. Therefore the function of 
salience would not be to represent objective properties of the spatial world as in bottom-up manner 
information processing accounts. If visual features result from discriminations in sense-making 
processes, they rather reflect meaningful discriminations in relation to the full spectrum of 
meaning contexts involved. From the mind-life continuity hypothesis, relevant contexts include 
motivational, emotional or social levels of analysis. Enactive work on the concept of salience will 
thus, as Marek McGann points out (in personal communication, 2012), require a theory of context. 
To the degree to which sense-making is a skilful activity, enactive work on salience will also 
address the embedding of salience in the learning of skills as well. Skilled training within a context 
leads to novel abilities for discrimination, which become salient and attract attention once 
established within the respective context. An enactive theory will also address the difference 
between salience in the point of view of the observer (i.e. the scientist) and salience in the point of 
view of the perceiver (i.e. the subject), as the concept of enactive autonomy wishes to naturalize 
genuine meaning in the perspective of the observer. Hence if salient processes occur as an aspect 
of sense-making, salience is specific to the individual perspective and meaning contexts of the 
observer. In this respect, one particularly interesting question is whether third person principles 
can serve as third-person constraints for first-person visual sense-making behaviour, and if this 
link shows potential to link classical and enactive approaches to salience and attention. 
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4 Summary and Discussion of Papers Represented in This 
Thesis 
 
We use an innovative eye-tracking system (EyeSeeCam, Schneider et al., 2009) to record 
the visual input of human observers in gaze-contingent and head-contingent video recordings. 
Gaze is measured as a function of whole body movements in the world during spontaneously 
occurring motor behaviour. Observers explore and navigate through real-world environments in 
the absence of a specific experimentally given task. The obtained visual stimulation approximates 
the observer’s perspective and thus is at the same time a result of past and an origin of future 
spontaneous behaviour. We analyse spatial and temporal aspects of human gaze movements in 
natural situations and compare natural human eye movements to the laboratory as well as to 
similarly recorded natural eye movements of the cat.   
4.1 Salient Features at Gaze 
In our main result, we find that local salient image structures accumulate at the centre of 
the gaze-centred video recording. Hence during natural exploration behaviour, human observers 
actively direct gaze to structural aspects of the world. This demonstrates that the concept of feature 
salience transfers from laboratory settings to real word scenarios (Study 1). 
To directly compare eye movements in free exploration and laboratory, we replayed the 
head-centred video recordings in a standard eye-tracking setup. Eye positions obtained under 
continuous replay predict the corresponding real world gaze better than eye positions on static 
images (of 1s duration). This deviation may be explained by the time a bottom-up signal needs to 
be processed and to trigger an eye movement with the frequent onset of a novel stimulus in the 
display of static images. In addition, a bottom-up salience model predicts observers’ eye positions 
better with dynamic stimuli, demonstrating that preserving natural temporal stimulus properties 
improves the ecological validity of experiments and models (Study 3).  
4.2 Spatial Biases  
The analysis of spatial feature distributions reveals that in head-based coordinates, local 
features in the real-world data exhibit off-centre spatial biases that depend on the specific 
environment, which eye-in-head movements centre in gaze-coordinates. Therefore central feature 
biases in “natural” photographs are likely a result of already-gaze centred images by the 
photographer (photographer bias). A centring of off-centre biases in head-coordinates by the eyes 
also indicates that the central biases in subjects fixation distributions do not result form a pure re-
centring of the eyes in orbit, as suggested previously (Tatler, 2007). The analysis of the camera-
control signals however does show a weak central bias of gaze-direction also during natural 
exploration (Study 1 and Study 3). With naturalistic interaction of body, head and eyes within the 
demands of the world, these may however not result from a re-centring of the eyes in their head-
based orbit per se, but from a frequent co-alignment of gaze- and head direction in whole-body 
actions.  
In the laboratory replay, the static 1s replay condition shows the highest inter-observer 
consistency of eye positions, but also the strongest central bias of fixations, such that the inter-
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observer consistency can mostly be explained by spatial biases that are independent of the stimuli 
shown. Further, the time course of this central bias suggests that the (unnatural) stimulus onset of a 
novel picture triggers a reset of the eyes to centre, potentially for an optimal starting location for 
early scene processing when the screen is limited (Tatler, 2007).  
In sharp contrast, the distribution of gaze in free exploration suggests a spatial bias 
towards the path walked on. This task-dependent bias is found to be weaker and of less contextual 
relevance in the laboratory condition. Thus naturally occurring behavioural tasks may form 
specific implicit priors for the distribution of the eyes, consistent with a function of gaze 
movements in picking up task-relevant information at anticipated points-of action (Hayhoe & 
Ballard, 2005) (Study 3).  
These results implicate that research on visual attention that focuses on eye-in-head 
movements should use biased stimuli with realistic biases obtained in natural recordings in human 
head-centred coordinates. Further, spatial biases from tasks and motor planning should be 
incorporated in future sensorimotor models of visual attention. 
4.3 Distinct Roles for Eyes- and Head in Allocating Gaze 
Global power spectra revealed distinct classes of scene layouts in the environments 
recorded. Closed and indoor environments show anisotropic signatures with emphasized 
horizontal and vertical spatial frequencies and spatial constraining by large buildings and walls. In 
contrast, open environments show more equally distributed power spectra along frequencies of all 
orientations. These results confirm image-based scene-categorization (Torralba & Oliva, 2003) in 
natural human visual input. However, we could not observe differences in global power spectra 
between head- and eye coordinate systems, suggesting that scene layout of natural visual input 
operates on a large spatial scale compared to eye-in-head-movements and is a consequence of 
head-in-world rather than eye-in-head movements (Study 1). 
 
We find a higher-level feature, defined in true and false positive responses of a face 
detection algorithm, to accumulate near the centre of both head and gaze recordings, but with 
different function of eye and head. From the comparison of environments with few or numerous 
true faces, we infer that spurious responses of the higher-level face feature are centred primarily in 
a coarse allocation of gaze via head-in-world movements up to only several degrees of retinal 
eccentricity. Eye-in-head movements then accomplished finer gaze-allocation for true faces. We 
speculate that eye-in-head movements only refine gaze after additional stages of processing, such 
that candidates of faces are determined in periphery and centred by head-movements but finer 
gaze-allocation by eye-in-head movements only occurs if candidates are confirmed as true faces. 
From the present data we cannot confirm that spurious face detection or a correlation with lower-
level features is the causal factor attracting attention and gaze. Notwithstanding, our results 
indicate distinct roles for eye- and head movements and thus highlight the importance of extending 
computational models to a definition of gaze adjustment that includes the movements of body, 
head in addition to the movements of the eyes (Study 3). 
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4.4 Temporal Dynamics of Eye-Head Integration 
As expected, the analysis of the temporal movements characteristics in both cameras 
demonstrated that the largest fraction of co-occurring eye- and head movements shows opposing, 
compensatory movement directions that can serve to stabilize gaze. Yet, movement of gaze is only 
slightly more stable than movement of the eye and head alone. Surprisingly, a substantial fraction 
(about 20%) of reflexive (non-saccadic) eye movements act synergistically in the same direction to 
adjust gaze. Hence during natural exploration behaviour, input to the human retina cannot be 
adequately modelled using fixations and saccades alone. Instead the dynamics of eye and head 
movements in gaze allocation has explicitly to be taken into account in models based on natural 
visual stimuli (Study 4).  
As the cat visual system is frequently taken as a proxy of human vision, we repeated our 
temporal analysis of eye movements with earlier data of the cat to directly compare eye-head 
integration between both species. As in humans, the relative contribution of eye-in-head and head-
in-world movements in cats was measured during free natural exploration of a natural environment 
using a lightweight custom-made head-mounted video setup (CatCam). Basic eye-movement 
characteristics such as velocity were remarkably similar in both species, despite substantial 
differences for instance in ecological niche, photoreceptor density, and saccade frequency. 
Coordinated eye and head movements dominate the dynamics of the retinal input also in the cat, 
yet head movements of the cat operate on a substantially different timescale, showing an 
approximately 5-fold faster dynamics. The distribution of eye velocities, similar as in humans, 
shows a bias towards movements that oppose the direction of the head. However, cat eye-
movements that oppose the direction of the head are of short duration and low velocities. 
Considering the asymmetry in these data, many of the potentially compensatory movements in cats 
cannot be expected to stabilize the image on the retina within short timescales. Hence our data also 
argue against a primarily gaze-stabilizing role of eye movements in cats during free exploration 
behaviour (Study 5).  
In summary, we find that human eye-head coordination entails a substantial fraction of 
synergetic non-stabilizing movements. Compensatory eye-movements that stabilize gaze do play 
an even less dominant role in cats. In consequence models and laboratory experiments need to 
account for the respective input dynamics to obtain validity for ecologically realistic settings for 
both species. 
 
4.5 Outlook 
It is important to point out that while the present findings indicate a role of salient features 
in sensory processing in natural behaviour, they do not validate a causal role of bottom up salience 
mapping in attention and eye movement control. In contrast, bottom up models of visual attention 
may borrow too much from the conceptualization of attention as a pre-processing stage of object 
recognition in computer vision and the classical salience model may in fact need to be replaced, 
for instance by the by unsupervised learning of predictive features or by reinforcement learning of 
task-features in the sensorimotor space (Tatler et al., 2011). This thesis suggests a role of salience 
and salient features in a sensorimotor account of visual attention. Discriminative sensory features 
are a fundamental way to relate both brain and perceptual processes to the world. However, they 
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should be approached as sensorimotor features that discriminate aspects of the world in intentional 
behaviour. From a signal-processing view, salience in a sensorimotor space might then be a result 
of prior hypothesis about both the world and about the possible unfolding of actions in a context of 
the situation, task intentions and the available action repertoire. From an enactive view, salient 
features may emerge as a result of skilled sense-making processes of the organism as a whole. 
Future sensorimotor models of salience should thus be approached at the systems level and include 
motivational as well as affective and individual motor processes and task-hypothesis for eye, head, 
and body movements in both their temporal and spatial characteristics.  
 
The data of human retinal input during real-world exploration reported in the first study 
(Schumann et al., 2008) has been frequently requested for further analysis by institutions around 
the world, including McGill University; Redwood Centre for Theoretical Neuroscience, UC 
Berkeley; DeWeese Lab, UC Berkeley; University of Sydney; Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), New York University (NYU); MPI for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen and 
the University of California San Diego (UCSD).  
Topics include tests scenarios for predictive attention models on real-world data; the 
analysis of differences in the feature statistics at different regions of the retina; the analysis of 
receptive field properties in relation to properties of natural stimuli in fMRI; receptive field 
categorizations of IT neurons; and the comparison of natural visual statistics during object 
exploration with the statistics during social interaction with other humans. Further, the presented 
paradigm allows to quantify the visual input statistics of pathologies such as Parkinson, 
hemineglect or deficiencies in colour vision (see section 6.1.1), and to investigate the effect of 
different tasks on visual input within the same real-world environment.  
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5.1 Study 1: 
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viewing conditions. 
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Human Eye-Head Co-Ordination in Natural Exploration. 
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5.5 Study 5: 
Eye-Head Coordination During Free Exploration in Human and Cat. 
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6 Appendix B: Other Projects 
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6.1 Visual Attention 
6.1.1 EyeSeeCam “Colour-Blind”29 
Colour perception in primate vision is often explained by an evolutionary advantage of 
detecting ripe fruit within the red-green colour axis. We used the methodology and analysis 
developed in Schumann et al. (2008) to demonstrate the benefit of the red-green colour axis in 
fruit search in a natural setting. In a pre-experiment, we investigated search in a field of ripe 
strawberries. Compared to matched healthy control subjects, red-green “colour-blind” subjects 
indicated a broader distribution of red-green colour features at the centre of gaze. This indicated 
that colour-blinds made less dominant and less precise use of red-green contrasts when searching 
for strawberries. 
 Strawberry fields, however, are structurally dominated by the alignment of strawberry 
plants in parallel rows across the field. The presence of these prominent colour-independent spatial 
cues may dominate the search procedure and thus does not allow to single out feature- over spatial 
effects of “colour-blindness” in visual search.  
Hence the main experiment conducted visual search in the presence of a spatially 
heterogeneous distribution of colours in the experimental field to enhance the discriminatory 
power of colour features in the search. The revised experiment distributed colourful “Smarties” as 
targets and “M&Ms” as distractors evenly on a lawn. Preliminary analysis revealed that colour-
blinds could use yellow distractors for positive but not for negative pre-selection, suggesting that 
colour-blinds are impaired in the use of avoidance strategies in colour-based search. 
 
 
 
Publications (Posters): 
 
Kugler, G., ‘t Hart B.M., Kohlbecher, S., Bartl, K.; Schumann, F., König, P.,  Einhäuser, W., 
Brandt, T., Schneider, E. (2011): Deuteranomaly in natural visual search. Society for Neuroscience 
Meeting (SfN), Washington, USA, 12.-16.11.2011 
 
‘t Hart, B.M., Kugler, G., Bartl, K., Kohlbecher, S., Schumann, F., Brandt, T., König, P., 
Einhäuser, W., Schneider, E. (2011): Real-world search strategies with normal and deficient color-
vision, 34th European Conference on Visual Perception, Toulouse, France, 28.8. 1.09.2011 
 
Kugler, G.,‘t Hart, B.M., Kohlbecher, S., Bartl, K., Schumann, F., Einhäuser, W., Brandt, T., 
Schneider, E. (2011): Eye Movements in the real world during visual search for colored candies, 
Basic and clinical oculomotor research – A tribute to John Leigh, Puerto Madera, Argentinia, 25–
27.3.2011. 
 
                                                      
29 Contribution: experimental design, conducted, analysied and interpreted pre-experiment, 
provided data analysis methods.  
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Schneider, E. (2011) Looking for Candy: Real World, feature based search, 9th Meeting of the 
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natürlicher Umgbung, 55. Jahrestagung der DGKN, Münster, 16-19.3.2011. 
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6.1.2 Empirical Salience Matlab Toolbox 
My master thesis presented a data-driven Bayesian model for the influence of individual 
visual and their integration on visual attention. The methods proofed viable as a standard analysis 
across a major number of eye-tracking studies conducted within the laboratory. To ensure 
comparability between these projects and to reduce errors and implementation time, we developed 
a Matlab toolbox for Bayesian estimation of empirical feature-salience functions including a 
detailed documentation. 
 
6.1.3 Empirical Salience Baseline Study  
We also conducted a baseline study to obtain salience models for a substantial number of 
visual features in the absence of experimental tasks or stimulus modulations on a large set of 
natural images. The latter aspect has been performed in the Bachelor’s thesis of Anke Walter, 
supervised by Peter König and Selim Onat, and unofficially by myself. The Empirical Salience 
Toolbox as well as the image set and baseline data have been used in many experiments in the 
Neurobiopsychology Lab since.  
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6.2 Sensory Enhancement (feelSpace)30 
The following provides an overview of my work as project leader within the feelSpace 
project (see also Figure 1-1: Contribution to the feelSpace project. It is not intended as a 
comprehensive documentation and should not be taken as such. Further documentation is provided 
elsewhere internally. 
 
Sensorimotor approaches to perception have gained a substantial part of their experimental 
support in studies on sensory substitution (Bach-y-Rita & Kercel, 2003). Sensorimotor accounts 
argue that a modality such as vision is not specified by a specific cortical area that gives e.g. a 
visual perceptual interpretation to the signals of the eye, but by specific sensorimotor 
contingencies that create a specific mode of visual sensorimotor organization. Consistent with this, 
sensory substitution experiments could show that some aspects of visual perception can be 
achieved via a presentation of visual signals over another sense organ like the skin (Bach-y-Rita, 
2004) or the ears (Auvray, Hanneton, & O’Regan, 2007). However, a problematic aspect of the 
argument from sensory substitution is that even in congenital blindness, some innate cortical 
specialization for vision may still be in place and responsible for the perceptual quality achieved 
through the substitution. A previous pilot study investigated sensory enhancement as a novel 
experimental paradigm to overcome this limitation. Adult subjects receive novel orientation 
information unavailable through the natural senses, obtained by a magnetic compass, via vibro-
tactile stimulation around the waist (Nagel et al., 2005). The results provide conceptual prove that 
it is possible to influence physiological reflexes and the quality of perception by an introduction of 
novel perceptual sensorimotor contingencies.  
The follow up projects presented here study the neural substrate of newly acquired 
perceptual sensorimotor contingencies with physiological techniques; introduce quantitative 
measures of cross-modal integration into the sensory enhancement paradigm; test the usefulness of 
the directional information for congenitally blind individuals; and characterize changes in the 
perceptual quality induced by the novel sensory information using novel methods for the 
acquisition of data about subjective experience. In summary, these projects present the unique 
opportunity to relate the neural substrate of novel spatial sensorimotor contingencies and their 
influence on behavioural performance and perception.  
 
 
 
Publiations (Posters): 
 
König, S.U., Brunsch, V., Ebert, M., Fleck, S., Gameiro, R., Gasse, S., Goeke, C., Hanke- Uhe, 
M., Kaspar, K., Keyser, J., Krause, C., Lytochkin, A., Muil, R., Numonov, A., Sieveritz, B., 
Schmitz, M., Wache, S., Nagel, S.K., Schumann, F., Meilinger, T., Bülthoff, H., Wolbers, T., 
                                                      
30 This section is based on my final draft for the grant proposal „Sensory enhancement – learning a 
new sense“ to Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the abstract „Sensory-enhancement with a 
haptic compass (feelSpace) in a congenitally blind subject” by Anna-Antonia Pape, Frank Schumann, Anna 
Best, Brigitte Röder, Peter König (submitted to ASSC). 
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6.2.1 Hypothesis 
Providing information on the environment not covered by an existing sensory organ raises 
many questions, which we formalize in six hypotheses: 
1. Weak Integration  
The information provided by the belt with respect to magnetic north is 
processed and leads to an improvement in performance in some situations 
that are adequately described in an allocentric coordinate system. 
 
2. Strong Integration  
The information on orientation with respect to magnetic north is firmly 
integrated into sensory information provided by all the senses. Sensory 
signals of the belt inconsistent with sensory inputs provided by the other 
modalities produce measurable responses. 
 
3. Automatic Processing 
The information provided by the belt with respect to magnetic north can 
be processed at least in part without the need for attention, and is of 
behavioural consequences expressed in alterations of reflexes. 
 
4. New Modality 
The information provided by the belt leads in interaction with overt 
behaviour to qualitatively new sensory experiences beyond the tactile 
stimulation proper. 
5.a Low-level modality specific processing  
The physiological and psychological effects are mediated by alterations in 
primary sensory areas. As a corollary, the effects are limited to part of the 
somatosensory topographic maps, as predicted in the enactivist account of 
O’Reagan and Noë (2001). 
 
5.b High-level modality invariant processing  
The physiological and psychological effects are mediated by alterations in 
multimodal areas beyond primary sensory areas. As a corollary, the effects 
extend beyond the sensory sheet involved in training and encompass a 
larger part of the topographic maps, as predicted by hierarchical accounts 
of sensorimotor contingency learning. 
6. Correlation 
Individual differences in cortical integration of the information about 
north lead to individual differences in the psychological utilization of the 
information about north. 
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The following provides a short overview of the experiments that were developed for this ambitious 
project.  
6.2.2 Belt Development 
We developed a novel piezo-electric variant of the belt that is electromagnetically 
compatible with magnetic resonance imaging environments. As we are particular interested in the 
physiological correlates of mastery of the directional information within the belt stimulation, a 
concomitant mobile version of the belt uses identical piezo-electric actuators. This ensures that the 
purely tactile aspect of the vibro-tactile stimulation is identical in daily training and fMRI 
experiments. Hence found effects are not dominated by surprise or adaption to a novel, different 
type of vibro-tactile stimulation that subjects encounter only during fMRI measurements.  
 
Belt development followed an iterative process in particular with respect to 
electromagnetic artefact reduction in the MRI environment and with respect to providing 
mechanically stable housings to the fragile piezo-ceramic actuators chosen. A detailed description 
of the development process is given in a bachelors thesis (Keyser, 2010) and the report of the 
study project feelSpace II (Ebert & Muil, 2010), both supervised by Peter König and myself. 
 
6.2.2.1 Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Compatible Piezo Belt 
 
6.2.2.1.1 Tactile Actuators 
MRI actuation methods are an important field of medical robotic applications in the MRI 
environment. For MRI compatibility (Gassert et al., 2006; Tse et al., 2009), we replaced 
conventional electrical pager motors by MRI compatible piezo-electric bending actuators (PL 
140.10 Bending Actuators, PI Physikinstrumente GmbH, Karlsruhe). Among the MR compatible 
actuation devices (Gassert et al., 2006), piezo-electric vibration elements have been used in fMRI 
studies of the somatosensory system with need of repeatable and controllable vibro-tactile 
stimulation with respect to stimulus frequency and intensity (Francis et al., 2000; Harrington & 
Hunter Downs, 2001; Harrington, Wright, & Downs, 2000). Due to their comparatively low 
driving voltage of 0-60V, PL140.10 piezo actuators are recommended for medical usage while still 
providing a high nominal displacement of 1000 µm. Additionally, a fast activation onset below 
10ms ensures almost instantaneous update of the tactile signal free of noticeable latencies.  
 
6.2.2.1.2 Piezo-Housings 
 We developed customary housings to provide a stable case for the mechanically fragile 
piezo-ceramic elements and for physical mounting of actuators in the belt. Housings contain 
soldering points, provide additional electronic insulation and enhanced stress relief to handle the 
special MRI cabling (Figure 6-1).  
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Figure 6-1: Piezo Actuator Housings. 
Custom made housings to provide electrical mounting with mechanical stability to fragile PL 140.11 piezo bending 
actuators. (A) Early variants of the piezo housings based on aluminium and PCB material. (B) Mounting kit of final 
piezo housing based on robust PCB material. (C) Piezo actuator with shielded coax-cable and high-quality LEMO 
connectors for use in the MRI environment. 
 
6.2.2.1.3 MRI-Compatible Cabling 
To minimize electromagnetic interference, in the MRI-environment piezo actuators are 
cabled with two coaxial cables of 5 meters length and the MRI control electronics and power 
supply are placed at a maximum distance from the scanner coil. The wiring keeps the two power 
signal lines of the piezo (+ and -) separate to further minimize electromagnetic interference (Figure 
6-1 C).   
 
6.2.2.1.4 MRI-Belt-Electronics & Electromagnetic Shielding 
The core electronics of the MRI-belt is electrically isolated from the experimental control 
setup outside the scanner via an optical cable. The housing provides efficient shielding against 
electromagnetic disturbances of both the belt-control electronics as well as the fMRI equipment. 
Hardware shielding is achieved via multiple solid aluminium boxes for each core component that 
are placed within a closed aluminium box. The core electronics contains the piezo power supply 
via lead acid batteries, an optical receiver to decode the optical outside control signal, a 
microprocessor, optical relays to generate the piezo-driving signal, an optical relay board to switch 
on the respective piezo actuator (Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3). Electrical shielding against 
electromagnetic disturbance is achieved via 60 dB low-pass filters at 120 MHz (approximately the 
1 Development of a new feelSpace belt 3
noise and reducing tactile stimulation. Thus it was tried to reduce the noise with fabrics and to
elevate the element with a small socket, allowing for free vibration.
A slightly more advanced prototype can be seen on the left of figure 1.1: An aluminum plate
with an elevated socket (most of the plate’s surface was milled away) onto which the element
would have to be glued on. A similar plate was also made of plastic, however both were too thin
and hence could be easily deformed (in the case of aluminium, deformations were permanent).
Further experience with these prototypes showed that they did not yet address accidental forces
from the side, which may for example occur during donning and adjusting the belt around one’s
waist.
Figure 1.1: From left to right, top to bottom: 1) Aluminium plate with elevated socket. 2) First “O”
shaped plate made from PCB material, with a cavity for gluing the piezo element into it. 3) First
externally manufactured protection. In addition to 2), it comes with dedicated solder pads to connect
internal and external wires, and three holes to hold the piezo’s solder pads. Instead of gluing, the piezo
element is mounted into it by a 4) clamping piece and 5) foamed rubber.
O–shaped prototypes To provide protection also from the sides, a family of“O”–shaped pro-
totypes was built, which visible in figures 1.1. The version in the middle was produced in the
inhouse workshops. On the right hand side you see a slightly advanced version, which were the
first to be designed using the CAD software Target 3001! 3 and produced externally. These
cases, made of resilient PCB4 material would have to be completed with a bottom plate. For
this purpose, plates of acrylic glass and copper were tested and initially meant to be glued on,
3Ing.-Buero FRIEDRICH, Eichenzell, Germany, http://www.ibfriedrich.com/
4Printed Circuit Board. PCBs are often made of fiber–reinforced plastics such as epoxy reinforced with glass
fiber.
A
B
C
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magnetic resonance frequency of protons at 3 Tesla (T)) on each piezo channel. Filters are build of 
3 terminal capacitor T-filters and lead-through chassis PI- filters that connect the signal ground to 
the shielding aluminium case. A further BCN connector in turn yields low-impedance grounding 
of the aluminium case on the Faraday cage oft the scanning room, such that high-frequency noise 
can be effectively grounded. Piezo cables are connected via high-functional LEMO connectors. 
 
6.2.2.1.5 Optical-Control-Electronics 
 Custom made electronics takes control signals via a serial-interace from the experiment 
computer and delivers a pulse-width modulated optical control signal to the MRI-belt-electronics 
(Figure 6-2 B) . 
 
6.2.2.1.6 MRI-Compatibility Testing 
In iterative electronics development cycles, we excluded further sources of artefacts in 
each iteration by tests at the UKE MRI scanning facility in Hamburg. The final development 
operates without noticeable disturbing cross-influences between scanner and belt equipment 
(Figure 6-4). 
 
6.2.2.1.7 MRI-Safety 
The belt proper has been designed considering MR-safety requirements (Schenck, 2000). 
While for outdoor application the belt is operated via the attached control unit and compass, in the 
MR setting the belt proper is placed in the scanning room on its own and interfaced from outside 
via optical signalling. Potential heating of piezo-ceramics induced by electromagnetic 
interferences has been tested with an infrared camera system and yielded no increase in the piezo 
temperature above body temperature during operation (Figure 6-4 E).  
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Figure 6-2: fMRI-Electronics and fMRI Belt.  
 
(A) Aluminium shielded control electronics containing lead acid batteries, microprocessor, optical signal receiver and 
60 dB electromagnetic filters. Control electronics is placed inside scanner room. (B) The complete fMRI belt setup with 
outside scanning room optical signal generator, optical cable, inside scanning room control electronics, BNC cable for 
grounding on the scanners Faraday cage.  
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Figure 6-3: fMRI feelSpace Belt Setup for Electromagnetic Testing 
fMRI feelSpace belt placed in the scanner prior to electromagnetic testing using an artificial glass head and a BNC cable 
simulation of the human body.  
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6.2.2.2 Mobile Piezo Belt 
A concomitant mobile variant of the piezo belt ensures an identical nature of the tactile 
aspect of the vibro-tactile stimulation during both learning and experiment. The mobile belt 
electronics has been developed with respect to size, mobility, electrical protection, data logging 
and battery lifetime. The required electronics is split into a to casing, a piezo driver and a control 
electronics case (Figure 6-5).  
6.2.2.2.1 Control-Electronics 
The electronics has been prototyped based on the based on the ARDUINO rapid-
prototyping platform31. It uses an Atmel ATmega328p microprocessor running at 16Mhz at 5V. In 
the final version, the circuitry has been miniaturized in a custom board layout and custom made 
casings. The control electronics takes input from the compass, delivers output to the piezo relay 
electronics, contains power management as well transformation from the battery voltage to the 
piezo-driving voltage, a GPS sensor, as well as a real-time clock and microSD-card for data 
logging.  
 
Figure 6-4: Tests of Electromagnetic Artefacts or Heating of fMRI feelSpace Belt.  
(A) Baseline sequence without radio pulses. (B) Electromechanical artefacts induced by the first prototype MRI belt. (C) 
No visible artefacts in the final belt with a spin-echo sequence. (D) No visible artefacts in the final belt with a spin-echo 
sequence and increased pulse energy. (E) Baseline temperature measurement via an infrared camera. General scanner 
room temperature is ~ 23°C. In the simulation of a broken piezo or cable, a worst-case scenario potentially leading to 
heating effects, piezo element remains colder than a human hand. 
                                                      
31 http://www.arduino.cc/ 
A B
C D
E
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6.2.2.2.2 Compass 
Microstrain’s 3DM-GX3-25 compass serves as the directional sensing unit. It stabilizes 
the orientation estimate with addition three-axis gyro and accelerometer data integrated via on-
board Kalman filtering. According to Microstrain, the GX3 series provides the smallest orientation 
sensor of its kind and also lower power consumption than the previous model.  
   
6.2.2.2.3 Piezo-Driving-Electronics 
 As in the fMRI variant of the belt, piezo actuators are driven by a separate relay circuitry 
via a pulse-with modulated control signal. On the one hand, this design consideration stems from 
the separation of piezo-driving electronics via optical cable in the scanning environment. On the 
other hand, it provides an easy way to distributed the electronics in size and weight around the 
belt. The vibro-tactile stimulation is nominally provided by a 30 Hz rectangular signal generated 
by two optical relays that alternatively distribute the piezo voltage and yield high electrical 
insulation. The signal frequency has been optimized for low power uptake as well as tactile 
sensibility via prior testing. Current limiters and appropriate resistances secure safe usage of the 
device. 
6.2.2.2.4 Power Supply & Management 
 The power supply uses three non-magnetic lithium-polymer battery backs with a nominal 
voltage of 7,4 V and a charge of 2200 mAh each. These are transformed via highly insulated 
DC/AC adapters to the piezo driving voltage of 22V for electrical insulation and voltage stability. 
The intensity of piezo actuation is stable over the entire battery lifetime. A power management 
circuit detects low-voltage state of the battery and triggers an ordered shot down of the electronics 
when the battery voltage drops below 18V. Shot-down ensure enough battery lifetime to safely 
close the logging data files on the microSD card as well as a deep de-charging that is damaging to 
lithium polymer-polymer batteries.  
Conventional batteries act as magnets. To not disturb the magnetic sensitivity of the 
compass with respect to the magnetic field of the earth, various battery options and magnetic 
shielding have been tested and eliminated before choosing the non-magnetic lithium-polymer 
batteries used. Additional safety-precautions had to be taken for a safe usage of the lithium-
polymer packs in case of accidents. The theoretical current uptake of the piezo actuators given the 
piezo capacitances, voltage and frequency is 14.4 mA, in practical measurements around 20 mA. 
This allows a full wake day of belt operation without recharging.  
6.2.2.2.5 GPS 
GPS data is acquired using the common EM-406A unit from USGlobalSat Incorporated 
and interfaces directly with the microprocessor via hardware serial TTL connection. 
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Figure 6-5: Prototypes and Final Version of Mobile Piezo Actuator Belts.  
(A) Rapid-prototype as a conceptual proof. (B) Fully functional prototype. (C) Final miniaturized belt design, including 
compass, piezo-driving electronics, control electronics, 30 piezo actuators in custom made housings, and 1 (of 3) 
lithium-polymer batteries. Not depicted are LiPo-Safety Bags. 
 
6.2.2.2.6 Mobile-Piezo-Housings 
As in the fMRI variant of the belt, robust custom-made housings of the piezo-ceramics 
were manufactured out of robust PCB material. Further adapted fMRI housings for mobile 
requirements to provide better stress relief of the cabling and smaller housings. 
 
6.2.2.2.7 Electrical Insulation 
Piezo-actuators were electrically insulated using an acrylic thin film coating (Bectron® PL 
9915/220-6 VP) at a professional external conformal coating service provider. Both the total 
voltage isolation of the lacquer and the long-term applicability were tested also via external testing 
services in electrical breakdown tests (UN Gerätebau, Osnabrück) and long-term mist chamber 
tests (ELANTAS Beck Electrical Insulation, Hamburg), respectively. All exposed electrical 
contact points such as soldering points were isolated using the lacquer.  
 
A B C
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6.2.2.2.8 Fire Protection 
Under certain seldom circumstances broken piezo elements can produce sparks that 
potentially may ignite fire. This risk was taken serious by testing all materials in close contact with 
the piezo for flammability. The PCB material of the piezo housing is non-flammable by design, 
only the Velcro used to mount piezo housings into the belt were flammable under contact with 
bare flames. To further reduce the risk of propagating sparks by braking a potential spreading 
chain of the sparks, a flame-retardant industry paper (Nomex©) is placed between Velcro and the 
piezo ceramic.    
6.2.2.2.9 Water Protection 
The entire piezo belt is protected against splash water using a flexible water resistant 
Lycra textile (LY242DX, Toray International) in a custom made design. 
 
6.2.2.3 Mobile Pager Belt 
A design goal of the entire development process has been the subsequent development of a 
next generation pager motor belts with minimal changes to the central hardware, software and data 
logging abilities. Partly motivated by this future aspect, much work has been invested into the 
miniaturization of the control electronics and the division between general (e.g. compass, GPS, 
logging, power management) and piezo-specific (e.g. relay board, fall out detection) hardware.  
6.2.2.4 Setup of Electronic Workshop and Internal / External Collaborations 
For a conceptual proof I extended the original feelSpace belt with piezo-electric actuators 
in rapid prototyping by myself. Further iterations of the belt have been developed in close 
cooperation with the electronics- and mechanics workshop of the University of Osnabrück and  
within a study project of Robert Muil as well as the bachelor thesis of Johannes Keyser. I 
maintained contact with experts in magnetic resonance imaging electronics (Mr:confon, 
Magdeburg) and electric insulation security (Staabsstelle für Arbeitssicherheit, Universität 
Osnabrück; BueroVeritas, Zertifizierungsstelle für Medizingeräte, Türkheim; ELANTAS Beck 
Electrical Insulation, Hamburg; UN Gerätebau, Osnabrück). The mass production of belts was 
performed by student research assistants and by myself. I was involved as organizer, supervisor 
and practical worker in all major and the vast majority of minor design decisions during the entire 
development and also the production cycle. 
 

   
 215 
6.2.3 Training 
To give behavioural relevance to the information provided by the belt, a training period of 
6 weeks begins immediately after the pre-training tests. Experimental subjects are required to wear 
the belt during waking hours over the entire training period and exert a substantial amount of 
outdoor activity each day. They are also encouraged to take daytime sleep periods when they feel 
the need of sleep to foster cortical learning processes. A part of the required usage time consists of 
additional outdoor training sessions. Because we expect most noticeable effects in the beginning, 
the additional training will initially be scheduled tight with two daily training session in the first 
five days, followed by a two-day resting period free of training, and a second five day period with 
additional training twice daily. For the rest of the training period, additional training (beyond 
usage in normal behaviour) will be only once a day to encourage natural usage of the new device. 
A simple training task is directional pointing, but more complex tasks have been evaluated in 
addition following Awareness Through Movement principles. These tasks are documented 
internally elsewhere. In the exemplary pointing task participants have to stand at a starting position 
in an empty area facing a clearly visible reference point. Afterwards they are blindfolded and have 
to move around, following the verbal instructions of a supervisor, such as ‘Turn 45° to the left, 
now walk 10 steps.’ The numbers of instructions in each run varies, leading to different 
complexities of runs. After each run, subjects will be asked to point to the direction of the 
reference point they faced in the beginning. Then they are allowed to remove the blindfold to see 
how they had performed. 
More intense daily practice and usage of the belt during training should lead to more 
intense learning of the belt sensorimotor contingencies. We aim to relate the learning performance 
to the natural daily usage of the belt and log the compass signals as indicator of daytime 
movement activity. Further we use a medical activity monitoring system (Cambridge 
Neurotechnology Ltd, Cambridge) to quantify sleep as well as daytime napping periods. 
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6.2.4 Physiological Integration: Sleep Electroencephalography (EEG) 
There is ample evidence that rich stimulation and learning during wakefulness induces 
regionally specific and use-dependent sleep processes important in synaptic reorganization 
(Finelli, Baumann, Borbély, & Achermann, 2000; Vyazovskiy, Borbély, & Tobler, 2000). REM 
and non-REM sleep phases in particular have been related to procedural and declarative learning, 
respectively (Plihal & Born, 1997; C. Smith & Lapp, 1991). Furthermore, recent findings in sleep 
research demonstrate that performance in learning tasks improves with sleep, and that this 
improvement correlates with changes in local slow-wave and spindle activity in sleep EEG over 
the circumscribed brain areas that are active in the task itself. Hence, we aim to measure local 
changes in sleep phases and sleep EEG activity as a physiological correlate of the learning induced 
by training with the belt (Correlation Hypothesis). 
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6.2.5 Behavioural Integration: Homing 
We use the well-known homing task to test whether the additional information provided 
by the belt helps to update observers spatial position during path-integration (Loomis et al., 1993; 
Riecke, Bülthoff, & Veen, 2002; Stepankova, Pastalkova, Kalova, Kalina, & Bures, 2003). The 
pilot study (Nagel et al., 2005) could show that training with the direction information provided by 
the belt can improve performance in homing. This part aims to replicate these previous results 
using a refined experimental design.  
 
Humans and most animals are able to update their spatial position to be able to return to a 
starting point relying on multimodal self-motion cues only. This process is referred to as path 
integration. Path integration combines visual cues or localized sounds as well as internal 
proprioceptive and vestibular signals into a homing vector that points to the starting point 
(“home”) and is continuously updated during their entire outbound journey. The homing vector 
allows to home back on a self-generated path without using learned landmarks or an allocentric 
survey representation of the path travelled (Etienne & Jeffery, 2004; Etienne et al., 1998; Etienne, 
Maurer, & Séguinot, 1996; Sun, Campos, & Chan, 2004). 
However, humans have been found to prefer a configural strategy based on survey 
representations in classical homing tasks (Wiener, Berthoz, & Wolbers, 2011), rendering 
experimental designs for studies of human path integration more complex. Following the classic 
encoding-error model humans spontaneously decompose the travelled path of simple polygons 
into their elements and then reconstruct the homing vector based on a survey representation of the 
figure (Fujita, Klatzky, Loomis, & Golledge, 1993). Ego-centric path integration has been induced 
in humans by more complex figures and by explicit task instructions. First, increasing the number 
of segments in the homing figure surprisingly reduces the reaction time of the homing response 
with path length and total angular turning kept constant. Such shorter response times have been 
taken as an operationalization for a switch from a configural strategy to path integration processes 
with more complex figures. During path integration, the homing vector is continuously updated 
during the entire journey. The pointing response under path integration can rely on the homing 
direction in short-term memory without additional path reconstruction prior to pointing. 
Configural strategies by contrast should yield slower but not faster responses when the complexity 
of the figure and the reconstruction of their elements increase. Hence a switch from slow 
configural to faster path integration strategies with more complex figure explains the observed 
reduction of response times.  Curved elements reduce the clarity of the figure tremendously and 
render a configural solution more difficult, similarly to hexagon path layouts (Lafon, Vidal, & 
Berthoz, 2009) and layouts with crossing paths (Klatzky et al., 1999). Hence natural paths in urban 
environments with complex layouts and curved lines should induce a path integration strategy in 
humans as well. Lastly in a recent study could induce dissociable path integration vs. configural 
strategies by explicit verbal instructions. Instruction observers to continuously integrate the path 
during the journey yielded faster pointing responses, whereas a configural instruction yielded more 
precise estimate of the home direction but with slower responses (Wiener, Berthoz, & Wolbers, 
2011). 
  
   
220    
6.2.5.1 Methods 
To minimize confounding influences of the remaining modalities, path integration will be 
performed indoor in large quiet room to exclude external cues from wind direction or sunlight. 
Furthermore, participants will be blindfolded and hear auditory white noise via headphones. 
  
Triangular figures are frequently used in the homing literature and would allow direct comparison 
of homing with the belt to previous experiments. However, our primary concern is not in the 
comparison with the homing literature but in the comparison before and after training with the belt 
information. Hence to bias our subjects as strongly as possible towards path integration strategies, 
we will use complex figures with curved lines but without intersections and provide explicit task 
instructions for path integration. Walkers will be guided to a point in this space (the homing point) 
and asked to memorize its location. Afterwards, subjects will be lead along shapes of varying 
complexity. They are explicitly instructed to continuously imagine and update the location of 
home during the entire figure, and to quickly and accurately point towards the location of the 
homing point at the end of the figure. The ideal route is the edge connecting the current position 
directly back towards home. We measure the angular deviation between the indicated and ideal 
homing vectors and the reaction time of the response. We will use homing shapes of different 
complexity classes with 15-20 trials each with and without belt each. To avoid feedback about the 
end position of the previous trial, novel figures will start at a novel homing position different from 
the the previous figure. Conditions will be balanced with respect to the presence of belt input and 
order of the figures.  
 
6.2.5.2 Analysis 
The homing literature predicts an interaction between angular turning and path length after 
training. Homing errors accumulate over path length and over the size and number of angular 
turnings, while the belt signal gives more stable feedback selectively on angular turning but not 
path length. Further, within a configural strategy, the belt likely is useful for the separation of a 
figure into components. This predicts an increase in performance (smaller pointing errors) in trials 
with longer reaction times that are associated with a configural pointing strategy.  
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Figure 6-6: Indoor Homing Setup in Large Hall.  
Homing experiments assess the influence of the directional belt information into behaviour. Experiments will be 
performed in large-scale, quite and closed hall. Subjects will be blindfolded with blackened swimming goggles and wear 
earplugs to exclude external directional cues such as wind or temperature gradients, noise and sun light. Hence changes 
in homing performance can be related to mastery of the belt signals alone. 
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6.2.6 Optimal Multimodal Integration: Psychophysics32 
We developed a turning paradigm in a large-scale virtual environment to quantify if the 
integration of the belt signal follows the natural rules of sensory integration. Recent 
psychophysical experiments show that in the normal modalities, multimodal cues integrate in a 
statistically optimal scheme into perception (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). Such 
quantitative experimentation with multimodal integration requires precise control of the 
stimulation given by the multiple senses. Thus, we perform the orientation tasks in an immersive 
virtual reality environment: The Cyberneum was recently established for psychophysical 
experiments on human navigation and multimodal integration at the Max-Planck-Institute for 
Biological Cybernetics in Tübingen. The key question here is whether the belt information is 
integrated with information provided by other senses in a statistically optimal fashion. This 
constitutes a test of the Strong Integration Hypothesis. 
Optimal sensory integration predicts that the contribution of a given sensory signal to a 
multi-modal estimate such as size or location is determined by a linear sum of unimodal signals 
weighted by the inverse of their respective variance. Thus, if the belt signal is firmly integrated 
into the modalities by natural optimal integration rules, on the one hand the belt signal should 
become more influential in the final multimodal turning judgment when the reliability of the 
natural senses such as vision is decreased by noise. On the other hand, if noise is added to the 
directional information provided by the belt, the resulting reduction in reliability should decrease 
the influence of the belt signal in the multimodal estimation.  
6.2.6.1 Methods 
Participants must judge the angular size of two successive self-turnings in a 2-AFC task. 
Subjects turn to the left or right until a cue signals the end of the intended turning interval. The 
virtual environment provides visual flow via a limited-lifetime dot display on a head-mounted 
display and directional information by the belt signal as well as natural proprioceptive and 
vestibular information. We test for optimal integration of visual and belt information by adding 
angular noise to both signals to reduce their respective cue reliability. For both modalities, noise is 
generated as a parametric sum of Gaussians that is added to the speed of rotation as measured by 
the compass signal. Noise gradually decouples the angular feedback by belt or optic flow 
information from the actual angular displacement performed in a random, unpredictable manner. 
Three noise levels are defined using the parameters of the Gaussians. We determine a 
psychometric function and a just noticeable discrimination threshold (JND) for each modality in 
three reliability levels, which serve as unimodal baselines. We test optimal integration by the 
comparison between the measured bimodal behavioural data against the optimal prediction based 
on the unimodal baselines. The Strong Integration Hypothesis predicts that the belt signal will be 
integrated in a more optimal fashion after the training period.  
                                                      
32 This text is in part based on the study project feelSpace II (Ebert & Muil, 2010), conducted under 
the supervision of myself and Peter König, where also a more detailed report on the psychophysical 
investigation can be found. 
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6.2.6.2 Analysis33 
We use of a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure for the fitting of psychometric 
functions to handle stimulus execution errors as well as a differential log scaling to reduce 
variance inhomogeneity induced by our self-turning 2AFC paradigm. In self-executed paradigms 
standard and comparison stimuli are not exact because they result from subjects’ self-movement 
and contain execution error. With exact stimulus presentation, 2AFC tasks yield repetition samples 
of binomially distributed data for each of the stimulus intensities tested. Then a standard way of 
fitting a psychometric function uses a regression procedure and the associated goodness-of-fit. 
However, execution error in the stimuli presentation prohibits repetition sampling of a given 
stimulus intensity and yields data with one repetition per executed stimuli instead (distributed 
around the intended value). Hence, we use maximum-likelihood-estimation instead of regression 
to compute psychometric functions and the associated likelihood as a measure of fit. For the 
interpretation of the log-likelihood parameter we bootstrap the random distribution of log-
likelihoods under the given model (Wichmann & Hill, 2001a, 2001b). For psychometric fitting 
data will be represented in the two dimensional space between the difference in comparison and 
standard stimulus on the x-axis of the plot, and the probability P(Comparison > Standard) of the 
comparison stimuli being perceived larger than the standard stimulus on the y-axis. Hence values 
on the y-axis range between the probabilities of 0 and 1 and the JND depicted by the probability of 
0.5. Without bias, JNDs will be 0° in all conditions and the difference in conditions will be 
reflected in the steepness of the psychophysical curve alone.  
Second, variance inhomogeneity of our data affects the model fit. Psychophysical data 
analysis is based on the imperfect nature of the perception of a stimuli and the resulting variance in 
the perception of the presented stimulus. Hence, every 2AFC comparison in effect represents a 
signal-detection situation in which a perceptual decision of the observer about the comparison 
stimulus is modelled not only by the distance to the standard stimulus, but also by the variance in 
both stimuli. One way of describing the psychometrical function is by integration of signal-
detection probabilities over the space of comparison stimuli under the condition of homogeneous 
variances of all comparison stimuli (Wickens, 2002). However, given the angular turning estimate 
is likely to accumulate errors over the temporal integration of turning signals, we expect larger 
angles to have larger errors both in execution and perception and hence show inhomogeneous 
variances over the stimulus space. To reduce the resulting distortion in the psychometric function, 
we can transform potential multiplicative into additive noise processes by fitting the logarithm of 
the difference between comparison and standard stimulus on the x-axis.  
The psychophysical literature commonly uses about 400 trials to estimate the steepness of 
a psychophysical function. Given the 9 (3x3) visual-haptic noise level combinations and the total 
length of one trial, 400 trials per estimate are not practically applicable. Given the data shows no 
bias (i.e. all JNDs are around 0° on the x-axis), we can reduce the number of estimated parameters 
in the fitting model by fixing the JND to 0, effectively reducing the number of trials required for 
the fit. Maximum-likelihood-fitting of psychometric functions is described in (Wichmann & Hill, 
2001a, 2001b). We will use the implementation provided in the Python psignifit toolbox 
(http://psignifit.sourceforge.net/) for our data analysis. 
                                                      
33 I am thankful to Frank Jäkel for discussions about psychophysical data analysis methods for our 
turning paradigm and for suggesting the psignifit toolbox. 
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Figure 6-7: VR Setp for Angular Self-Turning Experiment in the Cyberneum.  
A head mounted display (HMD) provides optical flow via a minimal limited lifetime dot environment. Tracking uses a 
VISON system in the Cyberneum of the Max Plank Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen. The image depicts a 
prototype of the mobile piezo belt. A laptop on the back controls HMD and the belt stimulation. Image taken from the 
project report of Ebert & Muil (2010). 
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6.2.7 Physiological Integration: Nystagmography 
We test if the heading information provided by the belt can be integrated into human 
perception in the absence of attention, as predicted by the automated processing hypothesis. The 
pilot study could show that belt information can influence the vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR). 
Nystagmography is a technique related to orientation in space. It investigates the stabilization of 
visual stimuli on the retina during head rotational movements. The vestibulo-ocular reflex 
compensates for head rotation around the vertical axis. During head rotation in one direction, the 
eyes move in the opposite direction of the head movement to stabilize the image on the retina. This 
slow phase is followed by a rapid movement of the eyes in the direction of the head movement to 
account for the limited range of eye-movements. This quick phase is labelled the vestibular 
nystagmus. However, due to the hydrodynamics of the vestibular organ, the signals indicating a 
rotation and the eye movements habituate during sustained rotation. In a lit environment visual 
information supplements the vestibular system and the habituation is largely reduced (Kandel, 
Schwartz, & Jessel, 2000). The belt indicates rotations without habituation. Hence the Automatic 
Processing Hypothesis predicts an increase of eye movements during body rotation and a decrease 
of eye-movement in the phase after stopping body rotation. We analyse belt-induced differences in 
the gain factor between eye- and chair velocity in the acceleration phase, as well as in belt-induced 
differences in the exponential decay in the nystagmus frequency after the 
acceleration/deacceleration phases. 
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6.2.8 Cortical Integration: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
We use a recent path integration paradigm (Wolbers, Wiener, Mallot, & Büchel, 2007) to 
identify the cortical integration sites recruited by processing the information of the belt. Using our 
overall physiological measures of learning and behavioural utilization as regressors for strong 
learning effects allows to test the Correlation Hypothesis, i.e. that learning and behavioural 
utilization should increase with stronger cortical integration. Following the low-level processing 
hypothesis, physiological and psychological effects are mediated through part of the 
somatosensory topographic maps. By contrast, the high-level processing hypothesis predicts that 
behavioural utilization of the information relating to north requires integration in multimodal 
higher-level areas. In particular, according to the high-level processing hypothesis only subjects 
that establish the integration of the belt-stimulation into higher-level areas may report qualitative 
changes in sensory experiences that go beyond the tactile sensation proper. 
 
6.2.8.1 fMRI Hypothesis 
Sensory enhancement with new sensorimotor contingencies allows us to study the 
formation of a putative new sensory modality in the adult. Hence, the comparison of brain activity 
before and after training provides the rare opportunity to localize cortical areas related to a (new) 
modality without bias.  
As in our behavioural experiments, we make use of a path integration paradigm because 
path integration is especially important in determining our position in space from polysensory cues 
during movement. Visual path-integration has especially been related to the medial superior 
temporal (MST) and ventral intraparietal (VIP) areas in the macaque, which can extract heading 
information from optic flow (Bremmer, Duhamel, Ben Hamed, & Graf, 2002; Duffy, Page, & 
Froehler, 2005). Head-direction cells in retrosplenial cortex also respond to visual input (Vann & 
Aggleton, 2004), and the heading information in turn affects place cells in the hippocampus 
(Etienne & Jeffery, 2004). The hippocampal complex has an established role as a polysensory 
locus of spatial orientation (Burgess, Jeffery, & O’Keefe, 1999; O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996; Spiers 
& Maguire, 2004). To name just one additional, non-visual modality, the hippocampus also 
receives major input from the vestibular system (Brandt et al., 2005; Save, Cressant, Thinus-Blanc, 
& Poucet, 1998). As in vision, vestibular input to the hippocampus involves the retrosplenial head-
direction system, but also thalamo-cortical pathways (Russell, Horii, Smith, Darlington, & Bilkey, 
2006). Hippocampal place cells are modulated by the activity of the animal in space, for instance 
by the speed of running (O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996), which further indicates a role in the 
computation of homing vectors, that is, of where we are in space. Yet the discovery of grid cells 
(Hafting, Fyhn, Molden, Moser, & Moser, 2005) and path cells (Jacobs, Kahana, Ekstrom, 
Mollison, & Fried, 2010) suggests that computation of spatial information might also be computed 
upstream of the hippocampus in structures of the entorhinal cortex. Ultimately, sub regions of 
prefrontal cortex have been suggested to hold an integrated spatial signal in working memory 
(Jones & Wilson, 2005; I. Lee & Kesner, 2003). Recently Wolbers, Wiener, Mallot, & Büchel 
(2007), used fMRI to demonstrate the contribution of the hippocampus, the medial prefrontal 
cortex, and the human motion complex (hMT+) during path integration in humans. In 
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consequence, we hypothesize that the orientation information of the belt might interact with 
respective neural sources in the path integration task of (Wolbers et al., 2007). In addition 
navigation strategies of route following and way finding have been linked to an areas know as 
HC+, involving the pherirhinal cortex, and the caudatum (Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Burgess, 
2003; Wolbers & Büchel, 2005). Furthermore, the “parahippocampal place area” (PPA) has been 
directly related to the encoding of new information about local scene layout (R. Epstein, Harris, 
Stanley, & Kanwisher, 1999). As a direct consequence, we expect interaction between processing 
of novel local spatial layouts in the PPA and the processing of the global spatial information about 
north contained in the belt sensorimotor contingencies. In addition, similar to the hippocampus, 
also the right superior temporal gyrus (rSTG) has recently been suggested as important 
polysensory locus of spatial processing in humans and non-human (Husain & Nachev, 2007; 
Karnath, Ferber, & Himmelbach, 2001; Karnath, 2001). The rSTG is most frequently and 
profoundly affected among all types of neglect, including pure forms of neglect, and transforms 
converging input from multiple modalities including the vestibular, auditory, neck proprioceptive 
and visual input into higher order spatial representations (Karnath & Dieterich, 2006). 
Interestingly, the rSTG seems to contribute especially to spatial processing with respect to the 
orientation of the body in space. Kahane, Hoffmann, Minotti, & Berthoz (2003) applied electrical 
stimulation specifically in the STG in patients with epilepsy and observed illusionary rotary 
sensations around the longitudinal axis. In consequence, the rSTG is a further candidate area for 
interaction between processing of the information about north and multisensory processing of 
(body-) orientation in space. Moreover posterior parietal areas have been related to the functional 
mapping of reference schemes (Heed, Beurze, Toni, Röder, & Medendorp, 2011), to tracking of 
route progressions (Nitz, 2006) and to self motion (Bremmer, Duhamel, Ben Hamed, & Graf, 
2000), in which the belt signal might interaction given firm integration of the direction signal into 
spatial processing. Also the thalamus is involved in self-motion processing (Marlinski & McCrea, 
2008) and the insular cortex has been related to ego-centric spatial processing in interaction with 
proprioceptive information from neck muscles (Bottini et al., 2001). Hence both areas are further 
candidate areas involved in spatial processing that may interact with the belt information. Other 
candidate areas that might potentially be affected by the belt signals include the (right) temporal 
parietal junction, which has been related to the maintenance of a coherent body image (Arzy, Thut, 
Mohr, Michel, & Blanke, 2006; Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008) under essential input from 
the vestibular system (Lenggenhager, Smith, & Blanke, 2006), as well as to a sense of ownership 
of body parts (Preester & Tsakiris, 2009), which might indicate that the belt information is firmly 
integrated into the body scheme. Posterior parietal areas have been related to tool use (Culham & 
Valyear, 2006) as another neuronal mode of using the belt signal in behaviour. Further, Premotor 
cortex (Schwartz, Moran, & Reina, 2004) and cerebellum have been linked to predicting the 
sensory consequences of action (Blakemore et al., 2001; Synofzik et al., 2008). The tactile nature 
of the belt signal should induce processing in primary and secondary somatosensory cortices (Del 
Gratta et al., 2000; Delgratta et al., 2002; Itomi, Kakigi, Hoshiyama, & Watanabe, 2001; Maldjian 
et al., 1999; Nakamura et al., 1998) and a processing of tactile motion in the human middle 
temporal/V5 complex (Hagen et al., 2002). 
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Area Associated Function Exemplary Publication 
Hippocampus Place Cells (Burgess et al., 1999; O’Keefe & Burgess, 
1996; Spiers & Maguire, 2004) 
Entorhinal cortex Grid Cells / Path Cells (Hafting et al., 2005; Jacobs et al., 2010) 
 
hMT+ Motion Processing (Wolbers et al., 2007)  
 
MST, VIP Heading Direction From 
Optic Flow 
(Bremmer et al., 2002) 
Retrosplenial Heading Direction from 
Vestibular Signals 
(Vann & Aggleton, 2004) 
 
rSTG Polysensory Spatial Area (Karnath & Dieterich, 2006) 
 
rTPJ Coherent Body Model in  
Space, Sense of Ownership, 
Vestibular Integration 
(Arzy et al., 2006; Blanke et al., 2005; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2006; Preester & 
Tsakiris, 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2008) 
 
Posterior parietal Reference Schemes Mapping, 
Route Mapping, Self Motion, 
Tool Use 
(Bremmer et al., 2000; Culham & Valyear, 
2006; Heed et al., 2011; Nitz, 2006) 
Insular Vestibular Integration, Ego-
Centric Space 
(Bottini et al., 2001) 
 
Caudatum, HC+ 
Pherirhinal cortex 
Route Following, Way 
Finding  
(Hartley et al., 2003; Wolbers & Büchel, 
2005) 
  
 
PPA Local Scene Layout (R. Epstein et al., 1999) 
Premotor cortex Sensory Predictions  (Schwartz et al., 2004) 
 
Cerebellum Predictions about Sensory 
Consequences of Action, 
Sense of Agency 
(Blakemore et al., 2001; Synofzik et al., 
2008) 
 
Thalamus Self-Motion (Marlinski & McCrea, 2008) 
 
MT/V5 Tactile Motion  (Hagen et al., 2002) 
 
S1, S2 Early Tactile Processing (Del Gratta et al., 2000; Delgratta et al., 
2002; Itomi et al., 2001; Maldjian et al., 
1999; Nakamura et al., 1998) 
 
Table 6.2-1: Candidate Neuronal Sides of Integration of Belt Information 
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6.2.8.2 Setup 
We will use the paradigm of Wolbers, Wiener, Mallot, & Büchel (2007) to assess brain 
areas of path integration modulated through information of the belt. In short, participants will 
passively travel along two legs of a triangle and point toward the starting location with a joystick. 
Instead of remembering the staring location, during control trials subjects will be asked to 
memorize the ego-centric direction of an arrow presented before the onset of the trial, and to point 
towards the direction of this arrow again in ego-centric coordinates after traveling along the 
second leg. That is, in the control condition subjects will experience identical visual and belt 
stimulation and also perform an identical motor task, but do not take the changes in the heading 
direction into account that are necessary in the homing condition. 
As in the virtual reality experiments on multimodal integration, subjects will view a 
minimal visual environment from a first person perspective that provides only optic flow by a 
floor texture. However, as in (Wolbers et al., 2007), virtual motion will be passive to avoid 
confounding motor activations (by use of a joystick) and to ensure identical travel durations in 
each trial and subject. Eight outbound paths will be used both in the experimental conditions with 
correct belt information and without belt information and the control conditions. Paths will be 
comprised of one intermediate rotation and two translations. To ensure identical onsets of the 
translation period, the length of the first translation will be kept constant (at 8.5 m). Intermediate 
rotations differ in turning direction (left, right) and turning angle (30°, 60°, 90°, 120°). Since path 
integration in virtual environments is most accurate when displacement velocity resembles those 
of natural locomotion (Ellmore & McNaughton, 2004), a speed of moderate walking will be used 
for translation (maximum speed 2 m/s) and rotation (maximum speed 40°/s). Sequences of 
translation and rotation will follow the same trapezoid velocity profile with linear increases and 
decreases of velocity. The plateau of the trapezoid velocity profile will change according to the 
length of the translation or rotation angle. To keep total travel times constant over all trials, lengths 
of the second translation will be adjusted depending on the angle of the intermediate rotation, i.e. 
the second lag will be shorter for trials with longer rotations. 
 
6.2.8.3 Training 
 To ensure that participants are familiar with the homing paradigm outside the scanner 
before scanning, fMRI measurements will be preceded by our behavioural experiments. 
Furthermore, to minimize learning effects during the scanning and specifically to train the usage of 
the belt in virtual navigation in a horizontal body position, participants will also receive training in 
virtual triangle completion in the horizontal body position outside the scanner before the actual 
measurements. These training sessions will use a different set of 8 training triangles, in which the 
length of the first leg is also kept constant at 8.5 m as in the fMRI triangles, but with different 
turning angles (45°, 75°, 105°, and 135°). Only during training trials will responses be followed by 
instant feedback, i.e. by providing an arrow that indicates the correct direction towards the origin. 
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6.2.8.4 Procedure 
 Immediately before the actual measurements, participants will receive one additional 
training session of 16 trials within the fMRI environment but without concurrent fMRI recording. 
This will be followed by an experimental session and a separate final control session. In the 
experimental session, each path will be repeated five times with and five times without the belt 
information in pseudo-randomized order and with control of sequential effects. This yields a total 
of 160 trials (80 experimental, 80 control). In the horizontal position, virtual north will arbitrarily 
but consistently be defined in a virtual “magnetic field” spanned perpendicularly to the 
longitudinal body axis, as in the vertical usage of the belt. During travels on outbound paths, the 
belt signal will continually be updated with respect to the direction of virtual north from the 
current position in the virtual space. To prepare subjects, each trial will start with a passive 
presentation of the virtual environment for 4s that indicates the condition, followed by the outward 
journey that always lasts 11.9 s. At the endpoint of the second translation, subjects will use an 
MR-compatible joystick to point toward the origin of the travel within a 5 s interval. Pointing 
responses will be recorded when joystick deflection exceeds a virtual circle corresponding to 80% 
of maximal deflection. During a 4s interval after the pointing response, subjects will be rotated 
back to the orientation towards virtual north at the beginning of the trial, such that all trials (with 
and without belt) start with the same orientation with respect to virtual north. This re-orientation 
will always be in the opposite direction than the turning through the trial (i.e. backward). As the 
temporal duration of backward-turning depends on the size of the absolute angular displacement, 
the virtual setup will be shown for the remaining time until the 4s window is completed. During 
intertrial intervals, a black screen will be presented randomly for 4 or 5 s. This yields a net 
scanning time of 40 minutes for the experimental and the control conditions, respectively. 
Visual path integration involves both the processing of self-motion cues, as well as a 
working memory component for changes in distance and direction from the starting point. Hence, 
a control task is necessary that provides identical visual stimulation and motor responses, a 
working memory component unrelated to the path, as well as identical belt stimulation. In the final 
control session, subjects hence will travel along the same 40 paths as in the experiments. However, 
during the initial 4s starting period, an arrow will be presented in parallel to the ground plane, and 
subjects will be asked to remember its direction in an egocentric frame of reference, and then to 
pay attention to the outward journey. At the endpoint of the second translation, subjects will have 
to point into the direction of the arrow again in an egocentric reference frame, i.e. without taking 
into account the changes in heading throughout the travel. 
With the belt, path integration additionally requires somato-sensory processing of the belt 
stimulus. Therefore subjects will perform the control condition with and without the belt. In this 
control condition the global orientation aspect of the belt signal is irrelevant for the task, but the 
purely tactile aspect of the belt signal is preserved. 
Control tasks will deliberately be recorded in separate sessions to minimize the possibility 
that subjects engage in path integration during the control task. Yet it is possible that subjects do 
update their heading direction automatically. Then if the direction of the required pointing 
response (i.e. the direction of the arrow) differs from the direction of the homing vector to the 
starting location, this could potentially elicit a mismatch related activity. Hence to minimize this 
potentially confounding effect, in the control condition the required pointing direction of the arrow 
will always coincide with the homing vector toward the starting position. This design also allows 
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to completely match the distribution of required pointing responses between experimental and 
control trials. 
In summary, control trials provide identical visual and somatosensory stimulation, a 
working memory component that is unrelated to the travel path, as well as an identical motor 
response, but do not require subjects to path integrate. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Design of fMRI Homing Paradigm.  
(A) In the path integration condition, subjects are lead from a static scene on an outward journey and have to point to the 
starting point within a response interval. In a control conditions for optic flow and movement processing, subjects are 
asked to reproduce the direction of an arrow given prior to the outward journey instead of pointing home. (B) Minimal 
virtual environment with limited-lifetime dots. Subjects are asked to point using the green arrow. Figure B taken with 
permission from Johannes Keysers’ Bachelor Thesis. 
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Figure 6-9: Complete feelSpace fMRI Setup 
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6.2.8.5 Analysis 
After appropriate pre-processing, we will specify design matrixes containing four separate 
sessions (pre-training experimental and control, post-training experimental and control) to remove 
session specific effects. Triangle paths and pointing responses will be modelled as boxcar 
functions convolved with a hemodynamic response function (HRF). Trials in which participants 
fail to respond within the response interval of 5 s will be defined as separate regressor, which 
allows excluding them from analysis. Further regressors will be added for each turning angle (30°, 
60°, 90°, 120°), collapsing left and right turning angles, and the belt condition (with, without). 
Following our overall design, we analyse within-subjects performance to identify the 
neural sources recruited by path integration with the belt. We will add regressors in which the 
HRF of the path regressors, for both experimental and control sessions are parametrically 
modulated with the absolute pointing error on each trial. We add additional models for an overall 
habituation of the BOLD response across sessions. Specific effects will be tested with the 
appropriate linear contrasts of the parameter estimates, and the corresponding contrast images will 
subsequently be entered into a random effects analysis. We will test for main effects of the belt 
signal, of path integration, of training, as well as contrasts for the difference in path integration 
with and path integration without the belt after training and before training. 
Furthermore, we can also follow the between-subjects analysis of Wolbers, Wiener, 
Mallot, & Büchel (2007) and decompose each participant’s error into an overall bias (an overall 
tendency to undershoot or overshoot), random errors (fluctuations in response consistency) and 
systematic errors (in the individual ability to encode information about the pathway, as described 
in Wolbers, Wiener, Mallot, & Büchel, (2007). Between-subject multiple regression analysis then 
can identify the areas in which activation co- varies with each error type across subjects. 
Furthermore, it also allows identifying areas selectively engaged in with usage of the belt 
condition after training across subjects. 
At last, we will analyse fMRI data in relation to behavioural, physiological and subjective 
measures of the applied project as between-subjects regressors. This allows testing the correlation 
hypothesis, in which local neuronal changes should be related to the degree of learning within a 
subject, as measured by a subject’s degree of cortical plasticity during belt usage (sleep EEG), 
behavioural performance (homing), automatic processing (nystagmography), and subjective 
reports. 
6.2.8.6 Regions of Interest (ROI) 
 To take into account our a priori hypothesis, for multiple comparison correction we 
supplement whole-brain analysis with an analysis of anatomical ROI. We define entire structures 
of the hippocampus, the endorhinal cortex, the superior medial frontal gyrus, S1 and S2 using the 
Wake Forest University Pickatlas (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) and the anatomy 
toolbox of SPM (Eickhoff et al., 2005). As we are not aware of any precise definitions, we will 
create spherical volumes around previously reported coordinates of rSTG (Karnath, Fruhmann 
Berger, Küker, & Rorden, 2004), MST (Dukelow et al., 2001), VIP (Bremmer et al., 2001), 
retrosplenial cortex(Wolbers & Büchel, 2005). The PPA will be defined using functional localizer 
scans as regions in the posterior parahippocampal/collateral sulcus that correspond more strongly 
to scenes than to common objects (R. a Epstein, Parker, & Feiler, 2007). 
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6.2.8.7 fMRI Acquisition 
Experiments will be performed with a 3-T scanner (Trio, Siemens AG, Munich, Germany) 
using a standard head coil and standard imaging parameters (e.g. Wolbers & Büchel, 2005; 
Wolbers, Weiller, & Büchel, 2004). Participants head will be immobilized with foam cushions to 
reduce movement. Foam cushions will also be provided under the lumbar spine and the thighs to 
rest participants without pressure on the back of the belt. Data will be analysed using SPM5 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). High-resolution structural MRI images will be acquired for each 
participant. 
6.2.8.8 Voxel Based Morphometry 
In addition to functional measurements, we will use voxel based morphomentry (VBM) to 
identify structural plasticity due to usage of the belt information, as could be demonstrated for 
instance in the learning of sensorimotor tasks such as juggling, sensory discrimination training or 
meditation (Ashburner & Friston, 2000, 2001; Draganski & May, 2008; Driemeyer, Boyke, Gaser, 
Büchel, & May, 2008; Hölzel et al., 2008; Kwok et al., 2011; May & Gaser, 2006; May et al., 
2007). 
Two pre-treatment VBM measurements will be conducted prior to the experiment training 
phase to establish a stable baseline for comparison without random changes.  As large changes are 
expected in the early training phase, an early VBM measurement after 3-5 days of training would 
be of high interest if applicable given the practical logistics in this ambitious project. The critical 
VBM measurement is conducted immediately after training and is optionally followed by a post-
scan 6 months after training to show the development and decline of structural changes, 
respectively34. 
6.2.8.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, comparing the brain activity before and after training allows localizing the 
cortical  processing of the stimulation by the belt. Sensory enhancement thus gives the unique 
ability to investigate the brain activity before and after learning of a (new) sensory modality. 
Following the low-level processing hypothesis, areas recruited by the belt information in processes 
of path-integration should be constrained to the primary modality, i.e. S1 and S2. Following the 
high-level processing hypothesis, path integration with the belt should recruit higher-level areas 
involved in spatial processing such as the hippocampal structure, entorhinal cortex, retrosplenial, 
rSTG, PPA, or the medial-prefrontal cortex. We can relate fMRI data to a subject’s degree of 
learning, plasticity and change in subjective quality through belt usage. Since we learn a putatively 
new modality, this uniquely allows describing cortical changes related to the respective 
physiological and subjective changes. 
 
                                                      
34 I am thankful to Arne May for discussions and feedback about the design of VBM measurements. 
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Figure 6-10: Preliminary Analysis of feelSpace fMRI Pilot Data.  
Shown is the contrast in the hemodynamic response between belt on / belt off conditions over the entire experiment at a 
family wise comparison error (FWE) of 0.05. This contrast isolates tactile processing of the belt signal. 
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6.2.9 Qualitative Experience: Subjective Methods to Describe the View From 
Within 
Embodied theories of perception argue that perceptual awareness is established by mastery 
of sensorimotor contingencies. The new modality hypothesis predicts that after sufficient 
experience with the signals supplied by the belt during natural behaviour, a new quality of sensory 
experience will emerge. To study the sensory experiences of the subjects while wearing the belt, 
we have to take into account the private nature of perceptual experience.  
There is a growing recognition in the consciousness sciences that private aspects of 
consciousness, such as the experience of using sensory substitution and enhancement devices, are 
only partially suited for third-person investigation but necessitate the application of rigorous 
methods for the acquisition of first- and second person data (Froese, Gould, & Barrett, 2011; 
Petitmengin, 2009; Varela & Shear, 1999).  
We will take advantage of these recent developments and investigate the subjective quality 
as case reports using questionnaires, diaries, and through face-to-face interviews. We perform 
weekly interviews inspired by first- and second person methods for the acquisition of qualitative 
experience with subjects to cover all these aspects in depth. Upon completion of the training and 
finals tests we conduct comprehensive structured interviews.  
The following describes Varela’s general program of neurophenomenology, second- and 
first person techniques as well as the general qualitative data analysis approach of grounded theory 
for the context of research on sensory enhancement. 
6.2.9.1 Neurophenomenology as Higher-Level Psychophysics 
Neurophenomenology sets out to incorporate the first-person phenomenological and 
hermeneutic traditions of philosophical inquiry (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2006; Morley & Hunt, 2000) 
into modern cognitive science (Overgaard, Gallagher, & Ramsøy, 2008; Varela, 1996). In an 
important contribution, Varela and Shear (1999) argued that  
i. first-person experience cannot be derived from pure third-person data and is hence at 
least methodologically irreducible,  
ii. first- and third-person approaches should circulate in the program of naturalizing lived 
experience in a systematic and explicit manner 
iii. developing awareness to and reporting lived experience from the first person 
perspective is a skill that requires rigorous training and practice 
The first two points are reminiscent to the relation between first- and third person 
investigation in the domain of psychophysics going back to Fechner (1860). Fechner instigated a 
novel trans-disciplinary research program to develop a scientific method that relates the 
phenomenal to the physical world and thus anticipated a principal goal of neuroscience (Ehrenstein 
& Ehrenstein, 1999). Measuring phenomenal perception has two foundational aspects in the 
psychophysical discussion: the problem of access and the problem of description. Psychophysics 
generally assumes that access to phenomenal experience is direct and not part of the problems 
encountered during measurement. The main concern of the psychophysical program is the problem 
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of description and the development of scientific tools of measurement to share experience in a 
consistent manner (ibid).  
 
Figure 6-11: Circular Interaction in Neurophenomenology. 
Adapted from Froese, Gould, & Barrett, 2011. 
In contrast, the problem of access is an explicit part in the third point of Varela and 
Shear’s neurophenomenological proposal. While access to first-person content necessarily is direct 
once it occurs in the present, Varela & Shear draw on the phenomenological and Buddhist finding 
that becoming aware of subjective content, much like any other scientific method, is a skill that 
requires training. A major implication is that a scientific investigation of first-person experience 
requires substantial guidance and training for the observer and the scientist (Froese, Gould, et al., 
2011). It is also “folk wisdom” within psychophysics that training of naïve observers yields more 
precise and valid psychophysical estimates (Blackwell, 1952; Green & Swets, 1964; Jäkel & 
Wichmann, 2006). A number of reasons additionally suggest a rigorous training of the scientist. 
First, neurophenomenology goes beyond psychophysics in the content of what is observed. Lived 
experience, unlike perception, is not conceptualized as a result of passive physiological stimulation 
that can be systematically varied on the third-person level and reduced to the psychophysical 
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methodology for instance of perceptual decisions in n-alternative forced choice tasks. Lived 
experience results from all processes of live. If it should be considered within the sciences of 
consciousness, training the scientist in becoming aware is a requirement for the development of 
first-second and third person methods and experiments for its investigation.  
6.2.9.2 Explicitation Interview35  
Guiding observers through a process of becoming aware for scientific descriptions of 
subjective content is the main concern of the explicitation interview (EI) technique (Petitmengin, 
2006; Vermersch, 2009). Verbal reports are always reminiscent and occur after the event and rely 
on short- or long-term memory of the situation. Spontaneous autonoetic memories show that 
episodic memories can re-enact previous situations (Gardiner, 2001; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 
1997), but in the context of prompted verbal reports, the memory of naïve observers is often 
abstract and in a summary form that is biased by top-down assumptions on what is being asked for 
by the situation. Explicitation interview is a non-suggestive protocol to guide observers into a state 
that yields verbal descriptions of the episodic memories of the experience itself.  
The first step is to make contact with the situation by evoking episodic memory thereof. 
One lived experience occurs only in the singular of the present, and hence also authentic episodic 
memory of a situation is singular. EI guides observers to a singular chosen memory experience in 
the here and now of the interview situation. Nevertheless, lived experience occurs rapidly over 
time and with many sensations in parallel. Due to this complexity and the serial bottleneck of 
language, describing and experiencing are not concomitant. Memories must be continuously re-
called in a state of evocation for the detailed description of concrete aspects. As episodic 
experiences are sensorial or emotional, the subject needs to make contact to the sensory and 
emotional dimension of the experience. Evocation states are signalled by observable aspects such 
as the use of co-verbal gestures that signal contact to bodily sensations or a concrete and specific 
language in the present tense that includes the use of “I” in association with a detailed vocabulary.  
However, language interviews often prompt reports that entail knowledge or judgements 
or description of the context or goals involved in the experience. EI uses rephrasing and 
reinforcement techniques to guide observers from such satellite dimensions towards the concrete 
sensory memory of the situation. Repetition and rephrasing of what is being said reinforces a 
concrete language about the situation and creates a mode of concentration that animates subjects to 
give more of the echoed expression. Importantly, reformulation in contrast to a plain rejection of a 
subject’s satellite description yields a feeling of being understood. Combining reinforcement 
statements with subsequent questions allows to direct attention to concrete aspects of what has 
been uttered on the satellite aspect. Guiding questions can by synchronic and focus on a single 
point in time in parallel, or diachronic and focus on the sequential flow of events in the situation 
over time. For instance, if an object is named in a description, the interviewer could either ask 
about its size or colour, or alternatively about what happened before or after the object occurred. 
To avoid suggestive influences on the description, questions and guidance typically only repeat 
what has been said about the situation by the observers and take care to avoid the introduction of 
concrete knowledge or hypothesis about the situation on the part of the interviewer. Guidance 
                                                      
35 I wish to thank Thi Bich Doan for her workshop on the Explicitation Interview technique at the 
Key Issues in Sensory Augmentation workshop at the University of Sussex, March 2009. 
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makes use of the indirect Ericksonian hypnotic language patterns (Petitmengin, 2006). To given an 
example, the beginning sequence of an interview might aim to guide subjects into a mode of 
concrete sensory observation of the present. Instead of explicit goal-directed instructing to start 
concentrating on the present, an instruction naïve subjects have difficulty to perform, indirect 
Ericksonian language might suggest that “if it feels right”, the subject “for a moment might 
recognize the contact of the body to the chair”, opening space for a non-volitional becoming aware 
of a sensory situation that is present even without the subjects explicit act of focused 
concentration. Alternatively, the interviewer may offer other contextualization’s, such as that 
“while parts of” the subject “remain busy with thoughts, another part may already have noticed if 
the body gives more pressure to the chair on the right or the left sit bones”. Again, the instruction 
aims for an open and non-volitional guidance of attention to what is present in sensation in 
concrete ways. However, unlike in this example, guiding attention to memories of the past that 
have not been witnessed by the scientist can not make use of his direct knowledge about the 
situation. Unless the scientist has first-person experience and can engage in a full second-person 
interview setting within a shared domain of reference, attention guidance will be restricted to the 
process of becoming aware of concrete aspects of the situation in general. Both scenarios give 
different weights on either the reliability or the validity of the interview. 
Third, a main goal of explicitation interviews is to explicate pre-verbal reflexive and also 
non-reflexive experiences. Explicitation interviews respond to iconic, deictic or metaphoric 
gestures of the observer, asking to explicate the gesture via questions such as “what is opening like 
this?” or “what is separated in this way”. EI also states that it is possible to explicate pre-reflexive 
experience that have not been salient, i.e. that the subject has experienced without being aware of 
them, such as for instance the woman in the gorilla suit that escaped an observers perception in 
cases of inattentional blindness (Petitmengin et al., 2009). 
EI requires prior training of the interviewer and at best a piloting of the interview itself. 
The methodology also provides a quasi-formal notation system to model the data obtained.  
6.2.9.3 Focusing / Thinking-On-The-Edge36 
Following Gendlin’s epistemology of the implicit (Gendlin, 1962), the emergence of novel 
experiences is embodied and pre-verbal. Focusing is a methodology for a subsequent process of 
conceptualization and verbalisation of novel ideas (Gendlin, 2007; Hendricks, 2009). Reminiscent 
to the enactive mind-life continuity hypothesis (section 3.4.3), Gendlin argues that human 
epistemology occurs as a function of the full context of lived experience, including situational, 
bodily, emotional, sensory and perceptual aspects. Finding words for a situation is a process in 
which a bodily “Felt Sense” emerges in the present as soon as the verbal description found 
matches relevant aspects of the situation as judged by implicit epistemological processes. In 
contrast to EI, which focuses on explicating individual aspects of an experience in as much detail 
as possible, Focusing seeks to explicate the holistic whole of the situation.  
Focusing offers many elements useful for a first-person science. Focusing aims to 
establish “presence”, a contact to experience that is characterized by open awareness, interest, 
                                                      
36 I am thankful to Elmar Kruithoff’s workshop „Focusing – Die Zentralen Elemente“ at the 
interdisciplinary conference on „Leibgedächtnis & Therapy – Eine Begegnung zwischen Phänomenologie 
und Therapie“ at the University of Heidelberg, April 2011.  
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empathy and description rather than judgement. A state of presence is concrete, bodily and 
individual. Felt sensing is a process of identification with the present in which the observer at can 
know what an experience is (i.e. conceptualize and name) and at the same time continue to identify 
with how the experience is rather than to switch in perception to the description. Felt sensing of 
inner experiences is a mode of becoming aware that is independent of particular content and can 
hence be taught as a systematic skill, or guided by an experience interviewer. Similarly to EI, felt 
sensing is a mode of becoming aware that leads to a concrete language in the present tense. 
However, a particular concern of focusing is the conceptualization of situations that have not yet 
been transferred into proper words. Focusing interviews aid the transfer from the pre-verbal to the 
verbal by circling around aspects of a situation that can be delineated in the experience on a pre-
verbal level and thus can be part of non-verbal thought (e.g. non-verbal comparisons, implications 
or associations) but not yet explicated in precise words. When trying to explicate pre-verbal 
thought observers frequently make anonymous deictic references in their language such as “this 
thing” or “that what I meant earlier”. Once established by the observer, the interviewer can use the 
same reference to relate back to this aspect of the situation. As in EI, the interviewer can guide 
attention of the observer by rephrasing and reinforcement of what has been said without prior 
knowledge of the situation. With first-person experience about the domain, the interviewer can 
also engage in a genuine second-person interview and use self-knowledge about similar situations 
to guide the interview. 
Both latter aspects are useful methodological aspect for experiments on sensory 
enhancement. Focusing predicts that frequent and systematic use of anonymous referents 
accompanies the first verbal explications of genuinely novel experiences. Further, if available, first 
person experience of the interviewer can be used to guide observers to aspects of the sensory 
enhancement that may have escaped his attention. The interview then is no longer neutral, and 
feedback from the experience of the interviewer may be incorporated into training with the 
enhancement device. With such a second-person engagement with the observer over content, the 
scientific investigation can no longer unveil the results of unsupervised learning of with the 
device. However, if this is problematic for the scientific context depends on the question under 
investigation. Second-person person engagement does not necessarily render the observers 
experience untrustworthy, as long as, even thought developed with guidance beyond the process of 
becoming aware as such, they remain genuine experiences of the observer.  
6.2.9.4 Awareness-Trough-Movement 
The Awareness Through Movement (ATM) process offers a first person methodology for 
experiments on sensory enhancement. Awareness Trough Movement is applied in the context of 
non-verbal sensorimotor development (Feldenkrais, 2005; Ginsburg, 2010; R. Russel, 2004). It 
provides training of attention skills for the first-person exploration of the sensory consequences of 
movement in a kinaesthetic mode of action and perception. They key idea is to create a context in 
which observers detect or notice differences in perception resulting from self-initiated changes in 
actions. ATM can naturally be applied to the exploration of novel sensorimotor contingencies in 
sensory enhancement and will foster both training with the device as well as awareness of its 
changes to perception as both go hand in hand within an action-perception loop. 
Ina nutshell the general principle is to direct awareness for a systematic comparison of 
actual, self-initiated movements across conditions. On the sensory side conditions can be 
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established by guiding awareness to specific aspects of the sensory consequences of the 
movement, driven by hypothesis and prior experience or by what emerges as salient in the 
unfolding of the process. For instance, to become aware how specific body parts or global 
configurations participate in the movement, or to draw attention to the movement in an alterative 
frame of reference. On the motor side conditions for comparison can be established by changes in 
movement execution, for example by alterations of the body position or by the deliberate 
introduction of movement restrictions that block or reduce some movement options in order to 
render novel movement routes and their sensorimotor relations more salient.  
Importantly, the purpose of the ATM process is not in the execution or training of 
movement as such but in the discriminations in sensory experience afforded by becoming aware of 
sensory consequences of movement. The methodology draws on the logarithmic nature of many 
psychophysical relations and trains skills to reduce the overall sensory load and motor effort in 
order to increases the just-noticeable-difference (JND). Based on phenomenology and theories of 
embodiment, the in perception the differences explored do not occur as purely sensory or motor 
differences but as the differentiation of contingencies in the sensorimotor loop with respect to both 
the origination of movement and its resulting perceptions. Hence ATM can aid mastery of a 
sensory enhancement device in its usage and in its perceptual effects.  
Becoming aware in Awareness Trough Movement a skilled first-person process of 
directing attention while performing movements. It is not a verbal report technique but a method to 
become aware of current events in the present. An exciting option for sensory enhancement 
experiments is to combine first-person experiments in the present using ATM methodology with 
Explicitation Interviews for a scientific investigation of sensory enhancement. Instead of re-living 
a sensory enhancement experience from memory for its description in an interview situation, ATM 
provides a way of re-living the experience by experiments with the device in the present that could 
be guided by Explicitation Interview principles. 
6.2.9.5 PRISMA  
The PRISMA37 method (Pieper & Clénin, 2010) is a practical-theoretical 
phenomenological research approach for studies of embodied intersubjectivity. Similar to 
Explicitation Interviews and Focusing, PRISMA is concerned with the explicitation of preverbal 
experience both for the development of skilled expertise as well as for a science of lived bodily 
experience. Similar to Focusing, PRISMA is based on the phenomenological notion of a lived 
body – “Leib” – (as opposed to just sub-personal somatosensory/kinaesthetic processes) in inter-
subjective processes, and explicates Varela and Shears’ notion that the lived bodily experience of 
the scientist can and should be part of a science of consciousness as an object of study and as a 
source of experimental data (Varela & Shear, 1999). PRISMA relates to a “prismatic” uncovering 
of levels of analysis for inter-subjective experiences.  
One domain concerns the perspective of the experience, namely a first person perspective 
to of oneself when engaging in a situation (self-perception), a second person perspective about 
                                                      
37 PRISMA is collaborating with the 2012 Marie-Curie Initial Training Network, “TESIS: Towards 
an Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity” (FP7-PEOPLE-2010-ITN, 264828), 
http://tesisnetwork.wordpress.com, and the 2009 Marie-Curie Initial Training Network, “TESIS: Towards an 
Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity” (FP7-PEOPLE-2010-ITN, 264828), 
http://tesisnetwork.wordpress.com 
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another subject (perception of other) also engaging in the situation, and a third-person perspective 
(necessarily with intrinsic first-person components) when observing an inter-subjective exchange 
as an outside observer. In PRISMA first, second and third person perspectives are shifted, 
interlinked and varied in a consistent and re-traceable manner. The interactive situations 
investigated may consist of face-to-face interaction or of interactions recorded on video. Face-to-
face situations are performed by a group of three protagonists at present and could also include the 
researchers themselves in a first-person approach. Also to analyse former interaction on video, 
investigators form an interactive research team of three. The video could also be a recorded 
version of a face-to-face situation already experienced.  That means that within the prismatic 
process, inter-subjective episodes are embodied in all three roles - two agents and an observer - by 
each member of a group of three participants. 
A second domain of PRISMA concerns the mode of experience elicited by the situation, 
namely a focus on sensorimotor impressions (sensing), emotional feeling, or thinking. PRISMA 
methodology provides a short notation system for each aspect as well as a systematics for 
analysing the data gained during the process.  
With respect to sensory enhancement, PRISMA may be used in the context of 
intersubjective experimental settings. Intersubjective spatial tasks could be designed that either 
require usage of the directional information provided by the belt signal in inter-subjective ways, or 
allow communication about the task between participants. Video analysis may depict such belt 
related spatial episodes on video. Then the analysis can be performed with trained observers that 
have first-person experience with the belt signal, untrained naïve observes. One prediction is that 
observers with high confidence and training with the belt information will converge on more 
common notations in all level of analysis, in particular that they can engage more easily in a mode 
of sensing when describing common or video-displayed experiences with the belt. From the 
perspective of Focusing, such language may also contain episodes of searching for novel words or 
descriptions that can be clearly felt by observers, and which are content of a discourse, but initially 
only in vague and abstract terms. In Gendlin’s epistemology, such episodes would serve a 
indicators for genuine novel experiences outside what is available in the common language and 
conceptual system before training. By contrast naïve PRISMA participants or video observers, 
without access to the belt information or insufficient training, should show more heterogeneous 
notes and a more abstract mode of experience. 
6.2.9.6 Descriptive Experience Sampling 
The primary focus of Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) is on a random sampling of 
experience throughout everyday situations (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001). 
Observers are provided with beepers that signal in random intervals and prompt a quick notation 
of the experience directly prior to the beep. Within 24h, the DES protocol conducts a follow-up 
interview to explicate the experience.  
6.2.9.7 Grounded Theory 
The neurophenomenological program poses a circularity between physiological 
experiments and lived experience for a science of consciousness (Froese, Gould, et al., 2011; 
Varela & Shear, 1999; Varela, 1996). Experiments and experience both provide objects of 
investigation and constraints for the other, and similarly phenomenological second-person 
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interview techniques exploit personal experience of the scientist in the process of becoming aware 
(Froese, Gould, et al., 2011).  
Circularity between phenomenology, experiment and scientific interpretation is common 
to qualitative research methods. We use the standard qualitative approach of grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 2009) to investigate the subjective experience of sensory 
enhancement. Grounded theory specifies a systematic iterative qualitative data analysis approach 
to develop, test and revise theories from subjective data, from experiments, and from expert 
knowledge about the process under investigation. Grounded theory suggest a “theoretical 
sampling” by evaluating the processes of interest in detail in iterations of hypothesis-driven tests, 
mostly in the form of case studies. Hence grounded theory is a systematic way to derive at theories 
in a novel domain.  
Broadly speaking, in grounded theory the analysis is equivalent with the writing of the 
documentation. The first step of the analysis is a line-by-line transcription of an interview to allow 
constant comparison between parts of the text. This step ignores context to focus on the data as 
much as possible. Albeit a transcription can never be a verbatim representation of the interview, 
we follow the natural approach to transcription (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003) and 
transcribe the spoken word as closely to natural speech as possible. We include mispronunciations 
and grammatical errors as spoken without correction, and also nonverbal sounds, pauses, filler 
words and background noises (McLellan et al., 2003). In particular Gendlin’s Focusing predicts 
that the search for a verbal description of novel experiences is accompanied by unspecific deictic 
references in the interview that need to be preserved for analysis. The second step conducts a 
focussed coding in which larger parts of the text are synthesized to drive hypothesis. These are 
then compared to the data by going back to the text on a line-by-line basis to modify first 
impressions. The third step seeks to derive categories of common themes and adds axial coding of 
sub dimensions of a category to the text. A fourth step uses theoretical sampling to obtain more 
data that validate or follow specific aspects of the interpretation. Typically, the analysis is 
presented in the form of a case study. It can be validated by comparison against the literature; by 
increasing the procedural reliability with standardized interview procedures, rules of coding and 
training of interviewers; by triangulation across different qualitative methods or researchers; by 
generalisation of the results to compare conditions or cases: or by predictions via theoretical 
sampling. 
6.2.9.8 Subjective Methodology for Sensory Enhancement  
The methodology in the current considers elements of Explicitation Interviews, Focusing, 
Awareness Trough Movement and Descriptive Experience Sampling within the general iterative 
scheme of grounded theory. Diaries and interviews in the pilot experiments (Nagel et al., 2005) as 
well as personal first-personal experience of project members revealed first aspects of the 
subjective experience related to the belt, which will form a basis for further interviews: 
• Tidiness and sleepiness. Based on observations that sleep promotes plastic memory 
consolidation processes, we measure use-dependent activity changes in neural activity 
during sleep by means of sleep EEG recordings as a physiological quantification of 
learning. We also hypothesize that strong learning experiences with the belt are 
accompanied by a feeling of exhaustion and a larger subjective need of sleep, 
especially during the first days of training. Here, we asses subjective sleepiness via 
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self- reports like Karolinska Sleepiness Scale. An increased need of sleep should be an 
indicator of successful learning experiences, and KSS ratings have been seen to be a 
useful proxy for EEG or behavioural indicators of sleepiness (Kaida et al., 
2006).(O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996; Spiers & Maguire, 2006)  
• Concentration and awareness. The extent of effortful attention invoked when 
accessing the information provided by the belt is an indicator of the subjective 
engagement in the learning task, and initially may be a prerequisite for successful 
learning. However, with successful mastery, unattended and effortless usage of the 
belt indicates that the information of the belt can be processed automatically.  
 
• Spatial quality. In the pilot study, some subjects reported an experience the 
environment as more orderly with intuitively available reference points that helped in 
the understanding of relations between places. This lead to a subjective improvement 
in the ease of memorizing spatial relations, or in a switch from local clues to global 
navigation strategies. Some subjects felt the size of the spatial context to increase, and 
shrink back after they stopped wearing the belt. The reports of these subjects suggest 
that the sensation when wearing the belt reflected properties of the environment that 
go beyond the simple tactile stimulation. The high-level processing hypothesis 
predicts that qualitative changes in perception require multimodal, modality invariant 
processing. Hence, only subjects with increased high-level activity in fMRI should 
report about qualitative changes in their sensory experience.  
 
 
Within the feelSpace Blind project (section 6.2.10), we developed a variant of DES and EI 
that will be further used also in the current project 
• Subjects will be asked to file notes about their experience with the belt on a daily 
basis.  
• We conduct weekly interviews that take elements from Explication Interview and 
Focusing to explicitate these experiences in detail.  
• We also combine ATM with EI during training session, guiding the subject to perform 
navigation related movement with the belt while also guiding his awareness to the 
effect of the movement on his perception of space both in a first-person (i.e. within in 
his own awareness) and a second-person process (i.e. as verbal report).  
• To obtain a random sampling of daily experiences, we plan to modify the DES 
methodology by replacing the beeper with random calls on a mobile phone followed 
by short Explicitation Interviews about the experience directly prior to the call.  
6.2.9.9 Sense of Direction Scale 
We will use the German version (Münzer & Hölscher, 2011) of the Santa Barbara sense of 
direction scale (SOD) (Hegarty, Richardson, Montello, Lovelace, & Subbiah, 2002) to assess the 
sense of direction of subjects before and after training in self reports. The “global-egocentric-
subscale” has been related to abilities for spatial updating of oneself in space during of self-motion 
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in environmental space, and also for the acquisition of spatial knowledge via learning through self-
experience. A “survey-subscale” relates to processes of map formation. Most interestingly for the 
context of feelSpace, the “cardinal scale” is related to an absolute orientation by use of cardinal 
directions such as north or south (Münzer & Hölscher, 2011). All scales have been validated 
against respective behavioural data.  
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6.2.9.10 My First-Person Experiences with the feelSpace belt 
I was frequently wearing various prototypes of the feelSpace for longer periods of time. 
My own first-person experience with the signal has been that: 
• At initial contact, the belt stimulation felt like a purely tactile stimulation that moved 
counter-clock wise on the waist, i.e. an egocentric experience.  
• During later phases, I infrequently experienced spontaneous episodes of being 
touched by “something” from the outside. This feeling shared some similarity with the 
feeling of leaning my back against the edge of an open door or the edge of a wall. 
Here the perceived position of the edge is stable in space, despite the physical changes 
in the tactile contact of edge with the skin. Similarly, in these sporadic periods the belt 
stimulation felt solid and stable in space and moved around the waist without moving 
in space, as if I was in some sense “leaning” against it. The episodes occurred only 
spontaneously, and they were rare. I had the immediate urge to “make” or hold this 
mode of perception, as in holding one version of an ambiguous figure such as the 
Neckar cube, however, I could voluntarily neither influence the occurrence nor the 
duration of such periods.  
 
From the literature on spatial development (see section 3.3.2), these experiences suggest a 
beginning integration of the belt signal into an allocentric perception of space, switching back and 
forth between the initial egocentric and yet unstable allocentric mode of perceiving. This 
interpretation supports the new modality hypothesis, according to which the novel spatial 
information of the belt signal is recognized by the brain as a novel sensory source of information 
about space and experienced as a novel quality in perception. However, from this first-person data, 
the novel modality would occur at the level of the sense organ rather than at the level of the 
perception, on of the options suggested for the definition of a sensory modality (Auvray & Myin, 
2009). This qualitative data suggests an integration of the tactile surface signal via its higher-order 
spatial information into established allocentric modes of spatial perception, leading to a switch 
from an ego-centric tactile perception on the body to a tactile perception that has a direction within 
space.  
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6.2.10 feelSpace Blind 
A pilot study provided long-term sensory enhancement with directional information to an 
adult male congenitally blind subject for six weeks. We assessed the effects of training by pointing 
tasks in highly familiar and novel environments, a homing task, and subjective interviews.  
Behavioural data and verbal reports indicate that the vibro-tactile directional signal 
showed no obvious immediate usefulness the navigational skill set of the congenitally blind 
subject. In fact, the spatial-directional interpretation of the tactile signal seemed not intuitively 
available to him based on his self-exploration of space during an initial unsupervised training 
period alone. On the first presentation, the directional signal even strongly distorted his naturally 
superior ability for homing in small spatial scales. However, in a novel large-scale environment, 
training with the sensory enhancement device allowed him to keep his orientation calibrated 
relative to a local external reference point, a navigational skill that is extremely difficult for him 
without the belt signal when no known auditory or tactile landmarks are available. We observed no 
improvement in pointing from multiple locations during the early beginning of the training period, 
consistent with a lack of intuitive spatial interpretation of the vibro-tactile direction signal. Yet 
after cognitive grounding of the directional aspect of the tactile signals by a verbal description of 
scene relations, pointing performance benefited substantially. Orientation was far superior 
compared to baseline not only for the points described verbally, but also for novel locations within 
the scene. Even without the belt some improvement was observed. Without any need for 
intervention, the subject discovered new spatial relations by himself in highly familiar 
environments based on the information of the belt. At no point did the subject report qualitative 
changes of spatial perception. However, an unnoticed mal-function of the compass during a 
longer, twisted walk at the end of the training period triggered the erroneous impression of an 
unusually long path leading straight ahead, to which he spontaneously commented on in surprise 
before noticing the belt malfunction. 
In summary, after spatial grounding of the signal, this congenitally blind subject could 
stabilize the calibration of his orientation towards external reference points in a novel 
environment, and thereby improved pointing performance following a one-time explanation of 
scene layout. The results in the unsupervised training period are consistent with a spontaneous 
usage of the directional signal in am ego-centric route-based navigation strategy that many 
congenitally blind person’s are hypothesized to favour over an allocentric cognitive mapping of 
space. However, the supervised training period showed the unique potential of the belt signal to 
train a cognitive mapping of novel environments given sufficient and systematic exploration of 
how the belt signal behaves in the particular environment. This suggests that the belt signal can 
compensate for the lack of spatial stability otherwise provided by vision, and thereby the potential 
to enhance the navigational skill set of congenitally blind persons towards allocentric strategies, 
given sufficient training. Erroneous spatial self-localisation caused by an inconsistent belt signal 
after training indicates that the belt signal can be integrated into everyday spatial experience, and 
that it can dominate the directional information given by the natural senses. 
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Figure 6-12: feelSpace Blind Pilot Study.  
(A) Subject during training phase in Hamburg zoo. (B) Pointing locations in familiar environment. (C) Unfamiliar 
pointing locations in Hamburg zoo. (D) Test of orientation stability during a guided tour in the post training tests. Black 
dots indicate positions with stable orientation with respect to zoo layout. (F) Custom made pointing device. Figure 
adapted with permission from the Bachelors Thesis of Anna-Antonia Pape. 
 
2.4 Training 11
Figure 2.3: Zoo: Exemplary Target Location
This is one of the targets. The subject stands upon the agreed spot.
Path Integration Exercise
An exercise with which we hoped to increase the subject’s awareness and
improve his understanding of the properties of the belt signal we called
”path integration exercise”: At the agreed spot near the elephant bawn,
the experimenter called the subject’s attention to the belt signal by asking
questions about it such as “where does the belt vibrate right now?” After
some of these questions, a tour through the zoo was begun whilst the
subject focused on changes in the directional signal so as to form an idea
of his own position relative to that of the elephant bawn. The subject
internally had to find the airline direction by integrating the displacement
caused by walking to the left, right, up or down. At arbitrary points along
the route the experimenter queried the current positionwith questions like:
“Do you think we are now more left or more right of the elephants?”, “Do
you thinkwe aremoving away from the elephants or towards them?”, “Do
you believe we are moving up or down?”, “In your impression, have we
movedmore leftwards ormore upwards since we left the elephants?”. The
experimenter then gave him feedback based on his own intuition. With
this exercise, not only did the experimenter draw the subject’s attention
to changes in the directional signal but also tried to introduce the idea of
3.3 Pointing in a Familiar Environment 28
(a) PreNI (b) PostCI
Figure 3.8: Campus: Exemplary Airline Direction Estimation
This is the highly familiar environment in which the testing (and target lo-
cations) are marked with colored crosses. The figures show the exemplary
airline direction estimations made at the auditorium to the remaining four
targets before (3.8(a)) and after training (3.8(b)). A correct estimation is
ma e if the arrow matches the color of the cross it points to.
r ad o↵ the s imation value in degree. In addition, the subject assessed
the airline distance in meters between current testing location and target
location. As a reference the airline distance in meters between his home
and a bar was given to the subject.
3.3.4 Methods: Data Analysis
In each sessionwe collected 20 airline-direction estimations and 20distance
estimations, i.e. like in the zoo we collected separate estimations from
point B to A as from A to B. In the first session, the subject spontaneously
wanted tomake adistinctionbetween the airlinedirection and thedirection
of the path he would walk to arrive at the target and estimated both
directions. So far, we have only analyzed the airline direction estimations,
but neither airline distance nor walking directions. As in the zoo testings,
the performance measure is again the angular error \✏ which is defined
as the di↵erence between true direction and estimated direction. This
di↵erence is calculated in the same way as described in section 3.2.4 on
3.2 Pointing in an Unknown Environment 18
Figure 3.2: The Hand-held Compass
This is the hand-held compass that was used to measure the subject’s
airline direction estimations. It is attached to a wooden stick of about 30
cmwith wooden beads as weights at the far end to provide feedback about
the pointing direction. During estimation, the panel must be horizontal to
the ground.
A B
C D3.2 Pointing in an Unknown Environment 19
Figure 3.3: Zoo: New Testing Locations of Generalization Testings
New testing locations in TestSetNew used in the generalization testings.
They are highlighted in green, the red crosses are the target locations (and
testing locations) from TestSet1
Calculation of the Correct Airline Directions
The basis of these calculations is the law of cosines, with which one can
calculate the angle between two sides of a triangle. Alth gh the earth is a
sphere, we did not use law of cosines for spheres because the distances in
our experiment were so small that the resultant di↵erence between the law
of cosines for spheres and for Euclidean geometry becomes marginal. It
is much smaller than the possible error made in reading o↵ the estimated
angle from the hand-held compass. This is the law of cosines for Euclidean
geometry:
cos(\ ) =
a2 + b2   c2
2ab
(3.1)
The relation between the variables in equation 3.1 is illustrated in figure
3.4. \  is the variable that the equation needs to be solved for, because it
is the angle between Target and TestingL. To find this angle, a third point
(named C in figure 3.4) must be defined. For each angle \  we defined a
point C. It w s always exactly nort of point T stingLwith a fixed distance
to TestingL of approx. 1 km.
As it is the nature of a triangle, it is true that 0 < \  < 180 . The true
E
3.2 Pointing in an Unknown Environment 26
(a) Guided Tour of Testing 7CISet2 with Path Integration Inquiry
(b) Guided Tour of Testing 7NISet2 with Path Integration Inquiry
Figure 3.7: Zoo: Path Walked During Generalization Testing
These figures show the path walked during the guided tour of the general-
ization testingswith andwithout belt. Theydi↵erwith respect to the points
(depicted with dots) at which the path integration inquiries were made. A
black, filled dot means that the subject answered in the a rmative, a white
dot stands for the opposite.
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